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Abstract
The representational theory of consciousness (also known as "representationalism") 
could potentially supply a framework in which to formalize the individual natures 
of conscious states, their inter-relations, and the relations they stand in to physical 
states. But this theory is itself in need of severe regimentation and a rigorous defense 
before it can begin to play this role as part of scientific inquiry. This is what I aim 
to achieve with this thesis.
I begin by addressing certain difficulties with the notion of representational con­
tent. I then isolate the core tenets of representationalism by subtracting from it all 
commitments which are not essential to its most important applications, including in 
particular its potential use as a framework for the scientific study of consciousness. 
The result is a thesis I call "virtualism".
My case for virtualism proceeds in three steps. I first argue that states of sensory 
consciousness can be described using perceptual verbs intensionally, as when one 
says that one "sees stars". I then use perceptual verbs in this way to show that a 
restricted form of virtualism is true of sensory consciousness. Finally, 1 argue from 
this restricted virtualism to the full virtualist theory on the basis of the phenomeno­
logical unity of consciousness and other considerations.
The last part of the thesis covers a number of objections to representationalism. 
The objections 1 consider fall into two broad categories: those which target the rep- 
resentationalist claim that the phenomenology of consciousness is exhausted by its 
representational contents, and those which rest on the view known "naive realism".
l
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Introduction
A satisfactory solution to the problem of consciousness would take the form of a 
simple yet fully general model which specifies the precise conditions under which 
any given state of consciousness occurs. Science has uncovered numerous correla­
tions between consciousness and neural activity, but it has not yet come anywhere 
close to this. We are still looking for the Newtonian laws of consciousness.
One of the main difficulties with consciousness is that we lack a language in 
which to formulate illuminating generalizations about it. Philosophers and scien­
tists talk about "what it’s like", sensations, feelings, and perceptual states such as 
seeing and hearing. This language does allow a precise articulation of the internal 
structures of conscious states and their inter-relations. It is inadequate to capture 
relations of the kind we are looking for between conscious states and physical states.
In this thesis I refine and defend a theory of consciousness which promises to 
solve this regimentation problem: the representational theory of consciousness. I ar­
gue that the representational theory can solve the regimentation problem and smooth 
out other important obstacles to a fruitful study of consciousness. I also make a case 
for the theory independently of its payoffs, and I discuss the leading opposing the­
ories at some length.
In the rest of this introduction, I will clarify what I mean by "consciousness", 
provide an initial characterization of the representational theory, and outline my 
project in more detail.
Consciousness
At this stage in the thesis, I cannot provide a precise and unambiguous definition of 
consciousness which will please everyone, but I will do my best to fix ideas. What 
matters is that you and I attend to the same phenomenon. Articulating the nature of 
this phenomenon is the project the rest of this thesis tackles.
The kind of consciousness this thesis is about is the kind which is widely thought 
to pose a unique challenge to scientific explanation. It is the kind which has come 
to be called "phenomenal consciousness". To be phenomenally conscious is to in­
stantiate a phenomenal state. The paradigmatic phenomenal states are states we 
instantiate in the course of our sensory, emotional, and cognitive experiences. Here 
I am using "experience" in a sense which should be familiar from everyday talk. I 
will give some examples of each kind of experience just mentioned.
At the moment I have a mild back pain. My experience of pain is a paradigmatic 
sensory experience. There are many other kinds of sensory experience. When I look 
around myself, for example, I undergo a large number of visual experiences. Visual 
experiences, as I think of them, have a felt component a little bit like pain experi­
ences. As Nagel (1974) puts it, there is something it’s like for a subject to have a 
visual experience. There are also auditory, tactile, olfactory, gustatory, kinaesthetic, 
and proprioceptive experiences, and probably many other kinds of sensory expe­
rience which do not fall in any of these categories. There are probably infinitely 
many kinds of possible sensory experience possible creatures could have. All have 
felt components which are part of their essences as sensory experiences.
Emotional experiences also come in a wide variety. For example, one undergoes 
emotional experiences when one feels anxious, sad, relieved, or elated. Emotional 
experiences should not be conflated with emotions. On one common understanding 
of emotions, at least, they are states which can persist independently of how one 
feels. For example, one can be angry at a time without actually feeling angry at 
that time. We can leave the question of how emotions and emotional experiences
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relate to each other largely open for now, but we need to recognize that emotional 
experiences, with their felt components, do not always accompany the emotions 
with which they tend to be associated. It is emotional experiences which are of 
interest here, not emotions.
I count as cognitive all conscious experiences which are not normally associated 
with emotions or sensory processes. Cognitive experiences are more elusive than 
sensory and emotional experiences. Goldman (1993) draws attention to cognitive 
experiences by comparing what it is like to hear and understand a statement with 
what it is like to hear the same statement without understanding it. There is a certain 
feeling of understanding missing in the second case—a feeling Strawson (1994) 
describes as an understanding experience. Goldman also mentions the tip-of-the- 
tongue feeling. There are many other kinds of "cognitive feeling", for example, the 
feeling that something is right (or not right), the feeling of being confused, and the 
feeling of deja vu. We constantly rely on cognitive feelings like these for guidance 
in everyday life.
Also central to one’s mental life is sensory imagination (which I count as cog­
nitive, but that is merely a convenient terminological choice). All of us have some 
capacity for visual sensory imagination. For instance, one can faintly visualize (ex­
perience) an object one is looking at being moved from its actual location to another 
location. Aural imagery is also very common. When you talk to yourself "in your 
head", you are experiencing aural imagery. I will leave other, more controversial 
forms of sensory imagery aside for now.
There might be cognitive experiences which are less sensation-like than emo­
tional feelings and sensory imagery. We could describe these as pure phenomenal 
thoughts. I will remain neutral as to whether there are pure phenomenal thoughts.
Each kind of experience I have mentioned has a felt component: for each kind 
of experience I have mentioned, there is something it is like to have an experience 
of this kind. Phenomenal states are states of the kind one is in when undergoing
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sensory, emotional, and cognitive experiences, in virtue of which there is something 
it is like to have these experiences.
Phenomenal state A state of the kind best exemplified by the states a) instantiated 
by individuals in sensory, emotional, and cognitive experiences b) individu­
ated by the felt components they confer to such experiences.
It is noteworthy that experiences, in the everyday sense of “experience”, are not 
the same as phenomenal states or instantiations of phenomenal states. Consider 
the definition of the verb "to experience" given by the Oxford English Dictionary. 
According to the OED, to experience something is to "encounter" or "undergo" an 
"event or occurrence".1 It is clear that this is how "to experience" is used when one 
says (for example) that Microsoft has experienced a slowdown. It is used in exactly 
the same way when talking about consciousness-involving sensory episodes in a lay 
context.2 Take for example these three everyday statements:
(1) I experienced pain
(2) I experienced flu symptoms
(3) I experienced powerlessness
The OED interpretation of "to experience" makes sense of all three: I encountered 
/ underwent pain, I encountered / underwent flu symptoms, and I encountered / 
underwent powerlessness.
On this everyday interpretation of "experience", a sensory experience of red is a 
kind of encounter with redness. A sensory experience of an object (say, my kitchen 
table) is a kind of encounter with that object. Qua encounter, an experience requires 
the presence of what is encountered: one could not possibly encounter my kitchen 
table without being related to it in some way. The same goes for an experience of
'"experience noun", The Oxford Dictionary of English (revised edition). Oxford Uni­
versity Press, 2005. Oxford Reference Online. Retrieved on 2 May 2009 from: 
http://www.oxfordreference.coni/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t 140.e26250 
“Thanks to Alex Byrne for helpful comments here.
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Sirius (the star): one could not possibly have a visual experience of Sirius in the 
OED’s sense without being affected by Sirius in some way.
Many theorists would deny that there is such a thing as a Sirius-feeling. There is 
a phenomenal state one typically instantiates when one visually experiences Sirius 
in the OED’s sense (when one visually encounters Sirius), but this state is not char­
acteristic of Sirius experiences (as opposed to experiences of other stars). Accord­
ing to the theorists in question, one could instantiate exactly the same phenomenal 
state as part of a visual experience of (a visual encounter with) another star. For this 
reason, we cannot say simply that the phenomenal states are the states instantiated 
in sensory, emotional, and cognitive experiences. This would invite an understand­
ing of phenomenal states as encounter states, and such states clearly involve more 
than what the philosophers in question take phenomenal states to be by definition, 
namely, states individuated by their felt components (their “what it’s like” aspect). 
This is why I stipulate that phenomenal states are individuated by their felt compo­
nents: because the felt aspect of an experience in the OED sense need not involve 
the particular object of the experience.
We will see later in the thesis that there are some who maintain (contrary to 
the aforementioned philosophers) that many if not all phenomenal states essentially 
have external particulars as components. This claim would be nearly trivial if phe­
nomenal states were the states which constitute experiences in the everyday sense. 
On the other hand, it is far from trivial on my definition of phenomenal states. But 
my definition is not meant to exclude this view. The aim is to isolate the substan­
tive issue which is at stake in the debate between proponents of this view and their 
opponents.
So far I have been using the term "experience" in its everyday sense. It is not 
used in this way by everyone, and the everyday sense is rather nebulous (though 
clear enough for the use to which I put it, I hope). For our purposes, it is helpful to 
restrict and regiment our use of "experience". From now on, I will use this term as
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follows:
Experience An event which consists in instantiating a phenomenal state.
This definition of experiences makes them events of the kind described by Kim’s 
(1976; 1991) theory of events. I think this is a common understanding of the noun 
"experience" among philosophers, but there are probably other uses. We must keep 
this in mind as we progress. We must also precisify the meaning of the verb "to 
experience". As I use it, it means instantiating a phenomenal state.
Theorists often talk about “phenomenal characters” and “phenomenal proper­
ties”. Here I am going to use these terms interchangeably with "phenomenal state" 
(I take states to be properties). I take it that my use of these terms is common, but 
there are no doubt exceptions.
The representational theory
The representational theory of consciousness also goes by the names of "repre- 
sentationalism" and "intentionalism". The best known versions of this theory are 
illustrated by the following statements:
• (1) All mental facts are representational facts, and (2) all representational 
facts are facts about informational functions. (Dretske 1995: xiii)
• Phenomenal character is one and the same as representational content that 
meets certain further conditions. (Tye 2000: 45)
• The propositional content of perceptual experiences in a particular modality 
(for example, vision) determines their phenomenal character. (Byrne 2001)
• Phenomenal properties are identical to certain representational properties. 
(Chalmers 2004)
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Qualia are actually intentional contents, represented properties of represented 
objects. (Lycan 2005)
To a first approximation, the points which unify the representational theories of 
the preceding authors are a) that experiences essentially have representational or 
intentional contents and b) that their phenomenal characters are largely determined 
by their contents.
The recent history of the representational theory can be traced back at least to 
Anscombe (1965), Armstrong (1968), Hintikka (1969), and Pitcher (1971). It has 
attracted a significant following during the past decades, but it remains controver­
sial.3 A large tangle of objections, counterarguments, counter-counterarguments, 
misunderstandings, and alternate formulations has developed. Unless some system­
atic way of simplifying and clarifying the debate is discovered, there is little hope 
for further convergence. This is part of what I aim to provide in this thesis.
It strikes me that the bulk of the objections to representationalism are only ef­
fective against specific versions of the theory. Some oppose the externalist commit­
ments of Dretske’s, Lycan’s, and Tye’s views, but there are internalist versions of 
representationalism. Others object that experiences do not have satisfaction condi­
tions, but we don’t have to think of the representational contents of experiences as 
satisfaction conditions. Some argue that experiences cannot be individuated by how 
the world "looks" or "seems" to one in them, but that experiences make the world 
look or seem a certain way in a non-trivial sense is not a general commitment of
3According to the PhilPapers Survey 2009 (http://philpapers.org/surveys/), the distribution of 
relevant views among the faculties of leading philosophy departments is as follows:
• representationalism: 31.4%
• qualia theory: 12.2%
• disjunctivism: 10.9%
• sense-datum theory: 3.1%
• other theories (e.g. the theory of appearing): 3.8%.
While representationalism is the most widely accepted view, the debate is far from settled. It is 
also noteworthy that the theory defended here is stronger than the average representational theory in 
many respects (though weaker in other respects).
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representationalism. And on it goes.4
Since there seems to be no common basis for these objections, one naturally 
wonders whether we would be left with anything of interest after subtracting every­
thing that is controversial from representationalism. Maybe not, but I believe that it 
is possible to articulate a theory which captures the essence of the representational- 
ist program yet is free from the most controversial implications of current versions 
of the theory. Relatedly, I believe that it is both possible and necessary to clarify this 
program. One of the main reasons critics pick on the details of particular represen- 
tationalist views is that there is no widely agreed upon statement of the core theory 
representationalists share. In particular, there is a bewildering variety of interpreta­
tions of the notion of representational content apparently central to the theory. As 
it is, one could reasonably doubt that there is such a thing as the representational 
theory of consciousness. I believe that there is a core representational theory, and I 
believe that this theory has few of the features of specific representational theories 
which have been found controversial. My goal with this thesis is to articulate this 
theory, exhibit its potential as a framework for the scientific study of consciousness, 
build a positive case for it, and show how well it fares on key issues which have 
surfaced in the debates surrounding representationalism.
I call the purified representationalism I defend virtualism. I use this new term 
for two reasons. Firstly, the names "representationalism" and "intentionalism" have 
by now received so many divergent interpretations that their linguistic meanings 
could well be beyond repair. Secondly, whether virtualism really is a kind of repre­
sentationalism or not does not matter; I don’t want to invite a debate on this by using 
the term. What matters (to me, anyway) is that virtualism captures what represen­
tational theories share with one another, including in particular their applications.
It would help to have in sight some of these applications before starting. I al­
ready mentioned representationalism’s promise as a solution to the problem of regi-
4See section 1.2 for more on these objections.
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meriting consciousness. In my opinion, this is the most important application of the 
theory. Let suppose for the purposes of illustration that a phenomenal state is a state 
in which one phenomenally represents a certain proposition. Let us not worry about 
what it is to phenomenally represent a proposition; this will become clear later. If a 
representational thesis of this type were correct, all differences between phenome­
nal states would be accounted for by differences in the propositions one represents 
in them (their "contents"). Now, propositions can be described using logic, and gen­
eral relations between propositions and others entities, be they other propositions or 
worldly entities, can likewise be drawn formally. For this reason, it is reasonable 
to expect this kind of representationalism to enable a new level of regimentation in 
describing phenomenal states, their inter-relations, and their place in nature. I will 
elaborate more on this in chapter 2.
Representationalism also promises to help solve (or dissolve) the problem of 
perception. The problem of perception is best seen as a tension between two ob­
servations. On the one hand, perceptual experience appears to afford us a direct, 
unmediated awareness of our surroundings. On the other hand, no one can deny 
the possibility of illusions and hallucinations. These two observations come in ten­
sion through arguments sense-datum theorists have offered which purport to show 
that the possibility of illusions and hallucinations implies that perceptual aware­
ness is primarily awareness of mental "sense data" (c.f. Ayer 1940; Moore 1905; 
Jackson 1976,1977). If sense-datum theorists were correct, the two aforementioned 
observations would be inconsistent. For many philosophers of perception today, 
the problem of perception is to show that sense-datum theorists are wrong (Crane 
2005). To show this, we need to make room for both the immediacy of perceptual 
experience and the possibility of illusion and hallucination. The sense-datum theory 
is sometimes referred to as "the representative theory of perception", but it should 
not be conflated with representationalism, because the latter is generally intended 
to provide an alternative to the sense-datum theory which achieves just this.
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How does representationalism undermine the inference from the possibility of 
illusions and hallucinations to the conclusion that what we are immediately aware 
of in perceptual experience are mental sense data? Representationalists hold that 
experience is a species of representation. This does not mean that our experience of 
the world is "mediated" in the sense that an experience of the world can only be had 
by experiencing some internal entity which stands for or represents external facts. 
To a first approximation, all this means is that one can experience an F without 
there being an F. This is on the face of it perfectly compatible with our having expe­
riences of everyday objects and qualities without those experiences being mediated 
by awareness of anything like sense data. Compare with the case of belief: one can 
believe that there is an F without there being an F, but this does not imply that belief 
is mediated by awareness of anything like sense data. As we will see in chapter 2, 
the argument from illusion relies on an assumption to the effect that one cannot ex­
perience an F unless one is suitably related to an F. Since representationalists’ claim 
that experience is a species of representation is incompatible with this assumption, 
the representationalist view blocks the argument from illusion. Moreover, it does 
this without rejecting the immediacy of experience. It therefore seems to dissolve 
the apparent dilemma posed by the case for sense data.
In addition to the sense-datum theory, there are two main incompatible alterna­
tives to representationalism today: the intrinsic qualia theory and disjunctivism.5 
According to the former, consciousness is a matter of a state or person instantiat­
ing intrinsic qualitative properties of a special kind. The principal motivations for 
the intrinsic qualia theory will be discussed in chapter 6. To a first approximation, 
disjunctivists claim that there are two kinds of phenomenal state: those which can 
occur in veridical conditions only, and those which can occur in other conditions. I 
will discuss disjunctivism at some length in chapters 7 and 8.
5Of course, these are by no means the only alternatives to representationalism. For example, 
there is also the "the theory of appearing" (Langsam 1997; Alston 1999). See footnote 3 for the 
distribution of views in philosophy of perception.
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Outline
Part I. The theory and its applications
Chapter 1 articulates the kind of representationalism T aim to defend (virtualism).
1 begin by highlighting the difficulties which led me to concentrate on the vir- 
tualist view. The alternative representational theories all face one of two prob­
lems: either they are too vague to yield a good framework for the scientific 
study of consciousness or they are loaded with questionable commitments. 
Virtualism minimizes both difficulties, or so I try to show.
Chapter 2 argues that virtualism can play the key explanatory roles widely at­
tributed to representationalism. This chapter also aims to provide an initial 
motivation for the theory by making these roles explicit.
Part II. A case for virtualism
Chapter 3 puts forward a framework I refer to as the perceptual conception o f 
sensory experience. The perceptual conception of sensory experience enables 
us to describe sensory phenomenal states precisely in everyday language by 
using perceptual verbs intensionally. This will be important in the chapters 
which follow.
Chapter 4 builds on the perceptual conception of sensory experience to make a 
case for a restricted version of virtualism I call sensory virtualism. I offer an 
account of the semantics of perceptual verbs in the process.
Chapter 5 argues that we should not stop at sensory virtualism: if sensory virtual­
ism seems plausible, so should the full virtualist theory. This chapter includes 
a discussion of objections to representationalism which turn on the role of 
sensory modalities.
Part III. Alternatives
Chapter 6 considers objections to representationalism which tend to support the 
case for a qualia theory. I discuss the objections from perspective, blurry 
vision, double vision, imagery, inverted spectra, and other cases or phenom­
ena which have been held to pose a challenge for representationalism and 
require that we postulate intrinsic qualia. These matters have been exten­
sively discussed in the literature already; I limit myself to novel responses the 
framework developed here enables.
Chapter 7 assesses the phenomenological evidence for and against disjunctivism. 
Disjunctivists have often claimed that disjunctivism is supported by the "naive" 
conception of experience we acquire through introspection. In this chapter, I 
argue that virtualism, not disjunctivism, is supported by introspection.
Chapter 8 complements the preceding chapter with a discussion of two central mo­
tivations for disjunctivism which are largely independent of the revelations of 
introspection. I first ask whether disjunctivism is justified by considerations 
pertaining to skepticism and the role of experience in grounding thoughts 
about the external world. I then argue that disjunctivism should be rejected 
on the ground that perceptual experience is massively illusory.
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Part I
The theory and its applications
Chapter 1
Core representationalism
In introduction I glossed representationalism as the view that a) experiences essen­
tially have representational or intentional contents and b) their phenomenal charac­
ters are largely determined by their contents. I said that I am looking for the core 
representational theory— the ecumenical representational theory which lends itself 
best to the applications representationalism is generally supposed capable of. The 
foremost application I am concerned with is to provide a framework for the scien­
tific study of consciousness. The first thing I want to do in this chapter is to show 
that the conjunction of (a) and (b) is not suitable. This statement of representation­
alism is unsatisfactory because the generic notion of intentionality or representation 
it relies upon is not amenable to sufficient clarity and precision. I will also consider 
the alternatives which have been offered to statements along the lines of (a) and (b). 
I will end the chapter by introducing the formulation of core representationalism I 
favor, the theory I call virtualism}
1A good part of the first section of this chapter comes from my article "Consciousness is under­
ived intentionality", forthcoming in Nous.
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1.1 Intentionality, attitudes, and representation
The statement of representationalism I have been using so far is satisfactorily ecu­
menical and non-committal. But what are the intentional contents referred to in this 
statement?
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of 
the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) in-existence of an 
object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, ref­
erence to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be under­
stood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental 
phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they 
do not all do so in the same way. (Brentano 1874: 88-89)
Brentano’s articulation of the concept of intentionality is a landmark in the history 
of philosophy and psychology, but it is insufficiently clear for our purposes. We are 
looking for a representational theory that could serve as a conceptual foundation to 
formulate precise, clear, and general hypotheses about consciousness. We cannot let 
our theory rest on a metaphor such as "direction toward an object". It will also not 
do for our purposes to explain intentional states in terms of aboutness, or to say that 
they have aboutness and other features (aspectuality, intensionality, etc). Aboutness 
is just that pointing beyond or directedness Brentano is gesturing toward.
Intentional states are sometimes equated with propositional attitudes. So an al­
ternative approach to representationalism is to say that phenomenal states are propo­
sitional attitudes. But "propositional attitude" is also a term of art whose use is not 
tied to any clear definition. I suspect that there would be much disagreement as to 
whether the following are propositional attitudes: dreaming that P, knowing that P, 
being frustrated that P, relishing the fact that P, remembering that P, forgetting that 
P, neglecting that P, being blind to the fact that P, being unable to believe that P, 
seeing that P, mistakenly thinking that P, consciously wishing that P, having heard
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that P, deceiving oneself about the fact that P, supposing that P, routinely proving 
that P, never saying that P, being undecided about the claim that P, being born be­
fore anyone said that P. There are also states which are not naturally attributed using 
"that"-clauses but might be thought to fall in the category of propositional attitudes, 
e.g. looking for help, searching for the exit, trying to speak, liking proposition #2, 
believing many propositions, etc. The fuzzy set which is the set of propositional 
attitudes has such a large fringe, it is hard to give determinate content to the claim 
that phenomenal states are propositional attitudes.
There is of course a set of states which everyone would agree are propositional 
attitudes. I would say that these canonical propositional attitudes include belief, 
desire, and states which appear to be intensity variations on or complex combina­
tions of these states, for example, conviction, suspicion, wish, hope, etc. One could 
use canonical propositional attitudes in either of two ways to clarify the notion of a 
propositional attitude. First, one could stipulate that the propositional attitudes are 
the canonical propositional attitudes. Alternatively, one could dehne propositional 
attitudes as states which are in some sense like the canonical propositional attitudes. 
Either way, one could then equate the claim that phenomenal states are intentional 
with the claim that they are propositional attitudes.
The problem with the first approach is that it seems fairly clear that phenomenal 
states are not canonical propositional attitudes. Imagine for example that you are 
looking at a stick which is half immersed in water. Even if your experience in some 
sense presented the stick as bent to you, you would not necessarily believe, wish, 
suppose, desire, or intend it to be bent, or have any other canonical propositional 
attitude toward its being bent. Alternatively, suppose that you are lying in bed with 
your eyes closed and an image of a beach pops in your mind. It does not follow 
from the fact that you have an experience of a beach that you have any canonical 
propositional attitude toward any proposition about any beach.
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Arguably the best potential examples of phenomenal states which are also propo­
sitional attitudes are felt urges. Imagine for example that Bob felt a strong urge to 
eat a piece of black forest cake someone put in front of him. This feeling would 
be a phenomenal state. It might also seem to be a kind of propositional attitude—a 
desire-like propositional attitude. Similarly, one might think that a perceptual expe­
rience accompanied by a certain feeling of conviction ought to count as a belief-like 
propositional attitude.
But imagine that Bob felt an urge to eat a piece of cake while having no cor­
responding cognitive or behavioral dispositions: although he felt an urge to eat it, 
he gave strong nonverbal signs of loathing it, asked the person next to him if she 
would not want his share, and was profoundly relieved he would not have to suffer 
its sweetness when she accepted it. The natural thing to say in this case would be 
that Bob momentarily felt as if he wanted to eat the cake but did not really want to. 
The same is true of belief-like propositional attitudes and the feelings which some­
times accompany them. For instance, a claim can momentarily feel right to you 
without your believing it. One can feel as if one believed something without really 
believing it. Although feelings are normal concomitants of propositional attitudes, 
they don’t seem to be canonical propositional attitudes.
If phenomenal states are not canonical propositional attitudes, a representation- 
alist can at best say that they are like canonical propositional attitudes. This takes 
us back to the notion of intentionality, because the alternative to defining inten- 
tionality through the aboutness metaphor is to give examples of it, and one would 
have to use the canonical propositional attitudes as examples.2 So at this stage the
2It is noteworthy that Brentano uses experiences as his primary examples of intentional states 
(of mental states, in fact, but he means to equate the two). Somehow, propositional attitudes have 
become the canonical intentional states. Brentano’s true explication of the notion of intentionality 
is a list of examples, and the main ones are "presentations". Brentano explains the notion of a 
presentation as follows:
By presentation I do not mean that which is presented, but rather the act of presenta­
tion. Thus, hearing a sound, seeing a colored object, feeling warmth or cold, as well 
as similar states of imagination are examples of what I mean by this term. (Brentano 
1874: 479)
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question is whether the notion of intentionally or propositional attitude which the 
representationalist wants to apply to experience could be clarified sufficiently by 
using the canonical propositional attitudes as examples. We are now getting closer 
to how the representational theory is normally understood in practice. Even though 
some explicit definitions of "inlentionality" and "propositional attitude" have been 
attempted, it seems clear that the terms are in practice grounded in the examples of 
canonical propositional attitudes.
There seems to be three possible ways of defining intentionality (or proposi­
tional attitudes) by pointing to the canonical propositional attitudes as examples:
MOST: Intentionality is the most specific kind which encompasses all 
canonical propositional attitudes.
LEAST: Intentionality is the least specific kind which encompasses all 
canonical propositional attitudes.
NATURAL: Intentionality is the most specific, interesting natural kind 
which encompasses all canonical propositional attitudes.
LEAST is clearly a nonstarter: it picks out the vacuous Entity or State kind.
The problem with MOST is that many properties a representationalist should 
probably not ascribe to phenomenal states happen to be had by all canonical propo­
sitional attitudes. Here are some examples:
(1.1) Not being a phenomenal state
(1.2) Being at least partially a functional or dispositional state
(1.3) Being "cognitive" and "conceptual" (on some understanding of these terms)
(1.4) Having a content that can in principle be expressed in plain English
It would not be completely out of line with the long-term tradition to stipulate that experiences are 
canonical intentional states. The only thing is that this would trivialize much of the representational­
ist position. I am interested in the non-trivial theory which appears to have interesting applications, 
so 1 will set this option aside.
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I have already argued that phenomenal states are not canonical propositional atti­
tudes, and from this it follows that canonical propositional attitudes are not phe­
nomenal states (1.1). I have not said anything about 1.2, however, and the point will 
be important later, so I will say something about it now. I will leave the claim that 
all canonical propositional attitudes have properties 1.3 and 1.4 unargued; two good 
examples should suffice.
That the canonical propositional attitudes are essentially functional or dispo­
sitional (property 1.2) is easily seen in light of the fact that experiences are not 
canonical propositional attitudes. Take the phenomenal states T used as examples 
of phenomenal states which are not canonical propositional attitudes. Assuming for 
now that they have content in some sense or other—they certainly have some kind 
of directedness, in some vague sense of this— , what is missing from them to confer 
propositional attitudes? What else would it take for you to count as believing that 
the stick is bent, or as desiring to be at the beach? Dispositions to behave (move) 
in certain ways would seem insufficient. For not believing that P seems entirely 
consistent with experiencing P and having exactly the behavioral dispositions of 
someone who believes that P. It is a familiar point that the very same behavioral dis­
positions can be explained just as well by mutually exclusive sets of attitudes, e.g., 
a set involving the belief that P and other propositional attitudes, and a set involving 
the belief that not-P among other propositional attitudes. But if behavioral disposi­
tions would not be sufficient for you to believe that the stick is bent or desire being 
at the beach, what is missing has to be dispositions to token other mental states. 
Perhaps you would have to be robustly disposed to feel certain things, e.g. a certain 
conviction for belief, a certain pull for desire. Or perhaps you would need disposi­
tions to token propositional attitudes consistent with believing that the stick is bent 
or desiring to be at the beach. Or one might think that either robust dispositions to 
have relevant feelings or dispositions to token relevant propositional attitudes would 
do it. Whatever the case may be, these examples bring out the fact that believing
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and desiring are attitudes in the ordinary sense— in the same sense in which being 
annoying and being forward are attitudes. Your beliefs and desires are not just static 
representations in your brain. They also involve (if they are not exhausted by) com­
plex dispositions to token certain patterns of mental states (phenomenal states and 
other propositional attitudes) and (perhaps) certain patterns of behavior. As such, 
they are in part functional or dispositional.3 I will not argue more for this point, 
because I take it to be as close to orthodoxy as there ever is in the held.
Arguably, none of properties 1.1-1.4 are essential to phenomenal states.4 But 
if, as seems plausible, all the canonical propositional attitudes have these proper­
ties, then plausibly all states of the most specific kind which encompasses all the 
canonical propositional attitudes have these properties, too. So option MOST does 
not seem to yield a notion of intentionality that is suitable for a representationalist’s 
purposes, though it could of course be suitable for other purposes.5
The main problem with NATURAL is that there seems to be many equally inter­
esting and specific natural kinds which encompass the canonical intentional states 
specified. For example, there is the kind Millikan (1984; 1989; 2004) identifies with 
representation— roughly, states which must correspond in certain ways to external 
facts for the systems which "consume" them to perform normally in a biological 
sense. There is also the kind Dretske (1995; 2003) identifies with representations, 
that is, states which have the function of indicating external facts. And there is the 
kind of intentionality which is constituted by interpretability—the sort described 
by Davidson’s (1973; 1974; 1984) and Dennett’s (1971; 1987) views. Any "theory
4Note how weak this claim is. Since it only implies that certain relations to distinct mental states 
are partly constitutive of attitudes, it is not open to objections to functionalism which purport to 
show that functional role is insufficient for attitudes. For example, it is not open to Searle’s (1980) 
Chinese room and Block’s (1978) China brain objections. It is also not open to Galen Strawson’s 
(1994) Weather Watcher argument against “neobehaviorism”, because it does not draw any necessary 
connection between mental states and behavior.
4See Bourget (forthcoming) regarding 1.2.
5Some objections to representational ism seem to arise from the assumption that something like 
MOST defines intentional states. Robinson’s (1994) claim that experience is not a kind of repre­
sentation because representations are "cognitive" and don’t have "feel" seems to be an example of 
this.
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of intentionality" which predicts that there is intentionally where there are canon­
ical propositional attitudes potentially describes a highly specific natural kind that 
encompasses all these attitudes, and all seem equally striking or interesting. NAT­
URAL therefore leaves intentionality talk highly indeterminate. It also retains the 
problem we had with MOST. For example, all the canonical propositional attitudes 
appear to be non-phenomenal states, so it might well be that the most specific, inter­
esting natural kind which encompasses all of them (if any) is a kind of state whose 
instances are necessarily non-phenomenal.
The preceding problems bring out the fact that we cannot escape specifying ex­
plicitly what it is that makes a state intentional. A definition by ostension works 
when vagueness is acceptable or some abstraction method is specified implicitly or 
explicitly. Often, the abstraction method is to focus on the most striking or interest­
ing kind which encompasses the canonical examples (that is roughly how Putnam 
1975 claims we pick out natural kinds). But in the case of intentionality there seems 
to be no abstraction method available that would yield a concept usable as part of 
the representationalist framework.
Compared to "intentionality" and "propositional attitude", the term "representa­
tion" has the advantage of grounding in everyday language. Examples of represen­
tation in the everyday sense include diagrams, street signs, photographs, semaphore 
signs, sculptures, equations, computer models, and sentences. Contrary to "inten­
tionality", there seems to be a pre-theoretic kind this term latches on.
The problem with saying that experiences are representations in the everyday 
sense is that this kind appears to have a feature experiences clearly don’t have: it 
appears to be a kind of thing whose instances are dependent on the intentions of 
individuals for their existence. A colored sheet of glossy paper, for example, cannot 
be a photograph unless it has been produced by an apparel intended to photograph 
or duplicate photographs. The sheet’s existence does not depend on the intentions 
of individuals, but its being a photograph or, put differently, the existence of a pho-
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tograph, depends on the intentions of individuals. Likewise, a string of marks on a 
sheet of paper is not a sentence (i.e. a meaningful entity) unless it or some kind it 
exemplifies is intended to be by an individual or a collective, and a white arrow on a 
black background is not a sign indicating a one-way street unless it is conventionally 
agreed to be so. The same applies to all the preceding examples. Representations, in 
everyday life, seem to be things intended to stand for other things. Whatever "stand­
ing for" amounts to is not important. What is important is that intentions enter in 
the nature of everyday representations but not in the nature of phenomenal expe­
riences. It is in any case definitely not a tenet of the representationalist view that 
experiences are intended to stand for other things, on any reasonable interpretation 
of "stand for".
One might think that we could successfully pin down the relevant kind by com­
bining examples of representations and canonical attitudes. But what is picked out 
by "the kind common to everyday representations and canonical attitudes" is sub­
ject to the same indeterminacy as "what is common to all canonical attitudes". As 
before, we can take either the most specific, the most natural, or the least specific 
kind. The most specific plausibly has such properties as not being phenomenal, 
which rules it out for the representationalist’s purposes. The least specific is Entity 
or State. As before, there are also many equally interesting natural kinds exem­
plified by all the relevant examples— more or less every philosophical theory of 
representation describes one.
Let us take stock. In this section I have discussed two traditional ways of expli­
cating the notion of intentionality or representation which is central to representa- 
tionalism as typically formulated: through the metaphor of aboutness, and through 
examples. Explanations of these kinds might be sufficient for some purposes. They 
might be sufficient to convey a rough and ready sense of what various phenomena 
in the neighborhood of intentionality have in common. But our goal is to flesh out a 
representational theory of consciousness which can provide a framework in which
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to formulate clear and precise hypotheses about consciousness. Traditional expli­
cations of the notion of intentionality either a) leave it too vague or too obscure 
for this purpose or b) yield an understanding of representationalism which makes it 
implausible.
1.2 Beyond aboutness and ostension
The preceding points are largely unoriginal. I would say that most theorists are 
aware at least in the back of their minds of the considerable vagueness of "about­
ness", "representation", "intentionality" and derivative terminology (e.g. "content") 
as typically introduced. A number of representationalists attempt to explain their 
views in more precise terms. For example, Byrne (2001) appears to take it as ax­
iomatic that the content of an experience is "the way the world perceptually seems 
to [its] subject". Others, such as Chalmers (2004), Siegel (2005b; 2006; 2007), 
and Siewert (1998), assimilate the contents of experiences to accuracy, veridicality, 
or satisfaction conditions.6 Of course, there are also theorists who understand the 
representationalist view in terms of information-theoretic notions of representation, 
e.g., Dretske (1995), Lycan (1996a), and Tye (1995; 2000).
At this stage, it might seem that there is no adequately clear common element 
that unifies all representational theories, and that we would do best to settle for one 
of the preceding approaches to representationalism instead of trying to unify them. 
I will later argue that there is a viable theory which unifies these approaches, but for 
now I want to do something else: I want to briefly indicate some difficulties with 
these approaches and a few others. This will help motivate the radical departure 
from prior formulations of representationalism I am about to propose. Another 
reason why I want to discuss these difficulties is that similar issues have repeatedly 
been presented as problems for representationalism generally; I want to highlight
6Siewcrt docs not identify contents with accuracy conditions but holds that having accuracy 
conditions is sufficient to have content.
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the fact that they arise only on particular interpretations of the view.
Four relatively clear ways of cashing out the idea that experiences "have con­
tent" have gained currency in the literature:
1. Experiences carry information about the world.
e.g. Dretske (1995), Lycan (1996a), Tye (1995; 2000)
2. Experiences have accuracy, veridicality, or success conditions, 
e.g. Chalmers (2004), Siegel (2005b; 2006; 2007), Siewert (1998)
3. Experiences make things seem, look, or appear a certain way. 
e.g. Byrne (2001), Byrne & Hilbert (2003), McGinn (1989; 1988)
4. Experiences are acquisitions of potential beliefs or invitations to belief, 
e.g. Armstrong (1968), Pitcher (1971), Jackson (2004)
There is another, less common approach adopted by Crane (2003) and Pautz (2007; 
2009). Crane and Pautz characterize the intentional contents of experiences in part 
in terms of the latter’s relational structure.7 This is the approach I favor, and I will 
return to it later. Aside from it, all extant accounts of the intentionality of experience 
which go beyond the unanalyzed notion of intentionality or representation fall under 
the heading of one of the preceding views.<s I now want to briefly outline the main 
problems each of these views faces.
Representationalism says (among other things) that experience is necessarily 
representational. If we understand representation in information-theoretic terms, we 
obtain a view which entails that experiences necessarily have informational proper­
ties. But this consequence appears dubious. One way to bring out its dubiousness
7Crane is less explicit than Pautz about this, but this seems to me to be the gist of his solution to 
the puzzle we are facing.
SI don’t count topic-neutral analyses of the kind suggested by Smart (1959) and Lycan (1987) 
as providing accounts of the intentionality of experience. On topic-neutral accounts, an experience 
of red is (roughly) a state of the kind one is normally in when one perceives something red. The 
problem with analyses of this kind is that there are very many states one is normally in when one 
perceives something red or any other kind of thing.
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is with a by now familiar combination of the brain-in-a-vat and Swampman scenar­
ios. Imagine an alien brain which pops into existence in empty space somewhere, 
has some color experiences, then disappears. The brain in question has no lineage 
(hence no biological function), no sensory equipment of any kind, and is not at all 
similar to a human brain. By construction, this brain’s experiences would not have 
informational properties of any kind that has been invoked in a theory of conscious­
ness. If such a brain is possible (and it really seems to be), phenomenal states are 
not informational states of any relevant kind. More problems for this type of repre- 
sentationalism are raised by Block (1990; 1998; 2003), Ellis (2007), Gray (2003), 
Kirk (1996), Macpherson (1999; 2003; 2005; 2006), Nickel (2006), Pautz (2006), 
and Wager (1999).
One problem which has not been discussed much but seems critical to me is that 
no information-theoretic account of intentionality seems to achieve the sharpness 
required to plausibly characterize the nature of experience. When consciousness 
is assimilated to an informational process, one gets the impression that it is being 
described with the precision of a blueprint for a computer chip. Not so. The notion 
of information which is at play in such theories as Dretske’s and Tye’s is not one of 
the engineering notions which go by this label but something far more nebulous.
According to Dretske, a state represents a given state of affairs just in case it 
has the function of indicating this state of affairs. In his 1995 and 1988 books, 
Dretske refers back to his earlier work for a precise definition of indication. But 
the notion has been shifting through his earlier work. In his 1981 book, he gives 
a very demanding, highly precise definition of information according to which a 
state carries the information that P just in case the probability of P given that the 
state obtains is 1. If indication is understood this way, plausibly no brain state 
has the function of indicating an external state of affairs. The problem is that a 
state can only acquire its function by performing it, and plausibly no brain state 
has ever stood in such a perfect correlation to external states of affairs. Problems
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of this type led Dretske to weaken his account of the kind of indication relevant to 
representation (see Godfrey-Smith 1992). In his 1986 article, he begins using the 
terms "indication" and "natural sign" rather than "information" and suggests a less 
demanding account of the notion: he describes natural signs as "more or less reliable 
indicators" (p. 18). Indication no longer seems to require a perfect correlation. But 
what strength must the correlation have, then? Dretske never explains. Should we 
say that an experience represents an F just in case it has the function of correlating 
with Fs with probability 0.8654?
There is also the issue that Dretske does not tell us precisely how states acquire 
natural functions. On most accounts, having a natural function is a matter of having 
been useful in a certain way during evolution. We can try to give a precise char­
acterization of how useful a state must have been to acquire a function, or we can 
leave the notion vague. We again seem to face a choice between vagueness and 
implausible precision.
Parallel remarks apply to Tye?s account of content in terms of covariation in 
"optimal conditions". The problem with both Dretske’s and Tye’s suggestions is a 
dilemma: if they are made more precise, they will likely seem utterly arbitrary; if 
they are left vague, they cannot be literally, entirely correct and complete, because 
consciousness is not vague.
I now turn to the second approach. Let us use the term "success condition" in 
such a way that success conditions include all potentially relevant kinds of condi­
tion: accuracy conditions, veridicality conditions, satisfaction conditions, and what 
we would normally call "success conditions", whatever these are.
The claim that experiences essentially have success conditions has been criti­
cized from many directions. Opponents include Brewer (2006; 2007; 2008), Travis 
(2004), Smith (2008), Biggs (2009), and Pautz (2009). Smith bases his case on 
blurry experiences. Brewer claims that the Müller-Lyer illusion shows the possibil­
ity of experiences without accuracy conditions because there is no way the world
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could be that would make such an experience accurate. Biggs offers the fictitious 
example of streams of randomly occurring experiences (visual experiences similar 
to white noise on TV), which, he argues, would have no accuracy or veridicality 
conditions. Travis gives an argument which turns on the idea that the accuracy or 
veridicality conditions of an experience, if any, should be reflected in how things 
look to one when undergoing it. Pautz distinguishes two accuracy conceptions of 
phenomenal content: one grounded in examples, and one grounded in an explicit 
definition. He then argues that both conceptions of phenomenal content fail to cap­
ture the intended notion of content because they trivialize central questions about 
phenomenal content.
My view is similar to Pautz’ in outline. The main problem with success condi­
tions takes the form of a dilemma. Either we understand the relevant conditions on 
the model of familiar entities which have them, or we do not. In the former case, 
experiences don’t seem to have success conditions. In the latter case, it is most 
unclear what success conditions might be. I will briefly discuss each branch of this 
dilemma.
We can ask first if experiences have belief-like veridicality or accuracy condi­
tions, or desire-like satisfaction conditions, that is, if they have the potential for 
being veridical or accurate like beliefs, or satisfied like desires. The main challenge 
for this proposal is to account for idle episodes of sensory imagination, including 
idle episodes of visual and aural imagery (as when one talks to oneself). These kinds 
of imagery involve experiences which must be accounted for by representational- 
ism, because representationalism is a general theory of consciousness which must 
apply to all experiences. To illustrate the problem, take the jingle that is currently 
stuck in my head (the "Zoom Zoom Zoom" jingle of Mazda’s television ads). I am 
not, to use Siewert’s (1998) phraseology, assessable for accuracy in virtue of expe­
riencing the jingle. My experience does not seem to aim at truth in the same way 
as beliefs. It also does not seem to aim at satisfaction in the same way as desires:
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I would not he satisfied if the jingle started playing. My jingle experienee does not 
even seem to have the direction of lit of belief or desire. Of course, the idea that 
experiences are belief-like or desire-like is vague and one could insist that there is 
a similarity. But anything is similar to anything. Whatever jingle experiences have 
in common with beliefs and desires is not sufficiently salient that we can leave the 
matter at this. Saying that jingle experiences have success conditions like beliefs 
and desires does not unambiguously pinpoint an interesting feature of experiences.9
An alternative is to understand the relevant success conditions in terms of bio­
logical function. But we have already found a major difficulty with the claim that 
experiences essentially have biological functions, so we can set this possibility aside 
(this is also not how proponents of the success condition view see it).
The only other way of explicating the relevant success conditions is by com­
parison with things lay people would sometimes describe as "successful", "accu­
rate" or "satisfactory". Examples include job applications, military interventions, 
gun shots, portraits, measurements, theories, descriptions, chemical analyses, di­
rections, projects, etc. All of these have success conditions, whether accuracy con­
ditions or success conditions of some other kind. However, they all have their suc­
cess conditions in virtue of certain people having certain intentions or expectations. 
Experiences (jingle experiences, at least) are not like that, so we cannot explain 
the success conditions of experiences by comparison with these mundane success 
conditions.
We have now reached the second horn of the dilemma. If experiences have 
success conditions, it is not in a sense which can be immediately grasped through
9 David Chalmers (private correspondence) suggests that one could give different accounts of 
the contents of sensory imagination and perceptual experiences. More specifically, he suggests that 
part of the difference between sensory imagination and perceptual experience could be that only 
the latter’s contents are proposition-like. The contents of sensory imagination could be akin to the 
contents of predicates, for example.
This proposal is compatible with sensory imagination not having success conditions, but it does 
not present a solution to our problem: our problem is to explain what it is for an experience to have 
content in such a way that representationalism turns out true. If an experience’s having content is its 
having success conditions and experiences of sensory imagination do not have such conditions, then 
not all experiences have content and representationalism is false.
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examples of other things that have success conditions: it is not in the everyday 
sense, in the biological sense, or in the sense in which philosophers say that beliefs 
and desires have success conditions. In what sense? What is the relevant technical 
meaning given to "success condition"? Some (e.g. Chalmers 2006) give examples 
of successful and unsuccessful experiences to help fix ideas, but such examples 
leave the relevant concept highly indeterminate (Pautz 2009: 488-9).
As far as I can tell, proponents of the success condition view have not attempted 
to clarify the relevant notion of a success condition otherwise than by pointing to 
examples of the kinds we have already considered or by assimilating success con­
ditions to contents of some other type under consideration. Note in particular that 
Siegel’s (2005a) suggestion that the relevant success conditions correspond to what 
is "conveyed" to the subject of an experience seems to equate the success condition 
view with the view that the content of an experience is what it inclines or invites 
one to believe (which is discussed below).
One is tempted to say that typical jingle experiences have accuracy conditions 
(but maybe not success conditions in the other senses considered so far) because 
they can be compared or matched with the world in some way. But anything can be 
matched with anything. I challenge proponents of such attenuated accuracy condi­
tions to give an account of them which does not confer accuracy conditions to the 
rug in my office. Like experiences, my rug can be compared or matched with the 
world. There is a function F which accepts rugs as input and outputs propositions. 
Its output for my rug is the proposition that a certain jingle is playing. I can com­
pare the F-value of my rug with the way the world is: its F-value can be accurate 
or inaccurate in the sense that it can be a proposition that is true or false. We are 
inclined to compare experiences with the way the world is with respect to what they 
are experiences "of". Rugs can be compared with the way the world is with respect 
to their F-values. What is the relevant difference?
It is tempting to say that comparing what an experience is "of" with the way
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the world is is less arbitrary than comparing a rug’s F-value with the way the world 
is. I can think of only one way of cashing out this idea. The idea must be that the 
relevant difference between my rug and my jingle experience is that it is an essential 
part of the latter that it is "of" the tune in question, while it is not an essential part 
of my rug that its F-value is this tune. But this only moves the bump in the rug. 10 
For consider the state S of owning a rug whose F-value is the proposition that the 
Mazda jingle is being aired. S essentially involves standing in a certain relation to 
the same proposition or state of affairs my experience is "of". Why doesn’t my rug 
have the same accuracy conditions as my experience? At this stage I don’t know 
how a proponent of accuracy conditions might further develop the proposal. One 
wants to say that S lacks the right kind of aboutness or directedness, but that is the 
very notion we are trying to clarify.
Let us now consider Armstrong’s, Pitcher’s and Jackson’s suggestions to the 
effect that the contents of experiences should be understood in terms of relations 
to beliefs. Armstrong and Pitcher suggest that an experience has a given content P 
if it is an acquisition of a potential belief that P. Jackson proposes that experiences 
are invitations to believe propositions. The same example which makes trouble for 
accuracy conditions makes trouble for this general approach: the jingle in my head 
does not seem to even begin to induce a belief in me. I do not feel inclined or invited 
to believe that the tune is playing.
The problem is easier to see if we keep in mind that believing or desiring re­
quires robust cognitive dispositions which reflect what one believes or desires (as 
argued above). It does not seem that experiences always come with sufficiently fine­
grained dispositions. Take for example the total, unified visual experience I have of 
my office at this time (call it o). Millions of different colors and even more small 
surfaces figure in the content of o. Now take an experience o’ which is just like
l0Besides, it is an essential part of my rug that it has the proposition in question as F-value if 
all necessary properties are essential properties. A representationalist ought to be uncomfortable 
hanging his or her theory on the metaphysical thesis that some necessary properties are not essential 
properties.
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0 except that it presents the top-left most perceptible point on the copy of Hume’s 
Treatise two meters away from me as being of a slightly different shade of purple.
1 doubt that one’s cognitive dispositions with regard to experiences such as o and 
o’ are always different. Yet they would have to be for a belief-grounded repre­
sentational theory to account for all differences in phenomenal character between 
them. In the same vein, cases of change blindness with respect to striking features 
of objects of attention seem to show that some differences in phenomenology (even 
quite stark ones) sometimes fail to be reflected in the connections phenomenal states 
stand in with cognitive states (see Levin et al 2002 for some relevant cases).
The Mazda jingle and the coarse grain of inferential links between experiences 
and beliefs are also a problem for the view that experiences make the world seem, 
appear, or look a certain way to one. The world’s seeming, appearing, or look­
ing a certain way can be understood phenomenally, comparatively, or epistemically. 
Understood either phenomenally or comparatively, to say that the world seems, ap­
pears, or looks a certain way is just to say that one is having experiences of a certain 
kind. In the comparative case, it is to say something roughly along the lines of "this 
causes in me experiences similar to those an X would (probably) cause". Under­
stood this way or phenomenally, the claim that experiences make the world seem, 
appear, or look a certain way has no interesting content. Understood epistemically, 
the world’s seeming, appearing, or looking a certain way is a matter of one’s having 
visual evidence for a claim, or perhaps an experience which inclines to believe a 
certain claim. We saw already that not all experiences bear such epistemic connec­
tions to beliefs: my jingle experience does not. The epistemic connections between 
experience and belief are in any case too coarse-grained to reflect all possible vari­
ations in phenomenology. So the phenomenal character of experience cannot be 
fully explained solely by reference to how the world seems, looks, or appears to 
one in the epistemic sense. Travis (2004) and Pautz (2009) offer more extensive 
cases against representationalism understood in terms of seemings, appearances, or
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looks.
I hope that the brief remarks in this section will have sufficed to convey the dif­
ficulties I want to avoid by setting aside the preceding approaches. It is common 
to conclude that representationalism is false on the ground that experiences do not 
satisfy any or some of these accounts, but this line of reasoning ignores the fact that 
each of these proposals is an attempt at precisifying the vague idea that experience 
is a species of intentionality or representation. If this idea could be precisified dif­
ferently, representationalism might be saved. I will now describe the approach I 
favor.
1.3 Virtualism
To isolate the core representational ist theory, and so to find out how a representa- 
tionalist should explicate the notion of content, we need only ask ourselves in what 
respects phenomenal states have to be like canonical intentional states or represen­
tations for the main consequences of the theory to follow. In introduction I said that 
the two main applications of the theory had to do with the regimentation problem 
and the problem of perception. It has other applications, which will be discussed in 
the next chapter and throughout this thesis, but we can already begin to see that the 
theory’s applications do not seem to hinge on considerations about representation or 
intentionality per se. The two applications discussed so far depend on two points: a) 
that phenomenal states have a certain relational or quasi-relational structure involv­
ing on one end proposition-like entities (this is what helps with the regimentation 
problem); b) that phenomenal states have a certain fallibility or independence from 
their objects (this is what helps with the problem of perception). In the next chapter, 
I will argue that all the main applications of the theory turn on these two points and 
nothing else. Assuming for the moment that this is correct, the following statement 
would seem to capture the essence of representationalism:
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Definition 1 There is a nonfactive relation R such that, for every phenomenal state 
.y, there is some proposition P such that.v = standing in R to P.
A relation R is factive just in case something’s standing in R to some proposition P 
entails that P is true. So a nonfactive relation is a relation that something can stand 
in to a false proposition if something can stand in it to any proposition at all.
Definition 1 makes reference to propositions, but this should not be read too nar­
rowly. Consistently with the requirements on representationalism uncovered so far, 
I mean to count as propositions all proposition-like things. I write "propositions" 
because one tires quickly of "proposition-like things". I also happen to think that 
the term "proposition" is used sufficiently loosely in the literature that it already can 
encompass almost all proposition-like things.
What is a proposition-like thing? Perhaps the most familiar examples of propo­
sitions are sets of possible worlds. In addition to the various set-theoretic con­
structs which have been labeled "propositions", I want to include in the category 
of proposition-like things world-properties (properties of whole possible worlds), 
possible situations (in the sense of Barwise and Perry (1983)), Kim-style events (in­
stantiations of properties), and states of affairs. I count as propositions all entities 
which can easily and systematically be described using statements in higher-order 
predicate logic, because what matters for the applications of representationalism 
is that the contents of experiences be readily and systematically describable using 
such a formalism.
I am inclined to think that the best candidate relata of experiences are states of 
affairs of some kind or other, but I will for the most part remain neutral on this here. 
I will also remain largely neutral on what a state of affairs is. However, I take it 
as axiomatic that there is a difference between facts and states of affairs: states of 
affairs are not facts but things of the kind which are facts when they obtain. One 
might want to assimilate states of affairs thus understood to ways the world could be, 
states of the world (properties of the world), arrangements of objects and properties,
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abstract structures composed of universals, or some other kind of entity— I leave all 
these options open.
Definition 1 is a good start, but it has two significant flaws. First, it does not 
guarantee that phenomenal states are fallible. The reason is that relation R could 
have instances which are not constitutive of phenomenal states. Since nonfactivity 
at most requires that one can stand in R to some false proposition, R could be fallible 
with respect to its non-phenomenal instances while being infallible with respect to 
its phenomenal instances. But we want to capture the fallibility of relation R with 
respect to phenomenal states in order to block the argument from illusion for sense 
data (more on this topic in section 2.1).
Another problem is that definition 1 does not guarantee that some phenomenal 
states at least can be both veridical and non-veridical (in different circumstances). 
In other words, it is consistent with definition 1 that every phenomenal state is ei­
ther necessarily veridical or necessarily nonveridical. This means that the view 
captured by definition 1 is not strictly speaking incompatible with representation- 
alism’s main competitor (disjunctivism; see below for some possible definitions of 
disjunctivism).
We can improve on definition 1 by invoking the tailor-made notion of virtuality.
Virtuality A relation R is virtual with respect to a set S of its state instances iff 
there is a state  ^ in S which is a state of standing in R to some x and which 
is such that it is metaphysically possible for to obtain whether jc obtains or 
not.
By "state instances" I mean states (or properties) which consist in standing in the 
relation to a given entity. For example, standing in the next-to relation to my desk is 
a state instance of the next-to relation. A state instance of a relation R is a monadic 
property formed by assigning a value to all but one of the arguments of R. I use 
the term "obtain" to remain neutral regarding the precise nature of the relata of the 
relation. We can say that propositions obtain when they are true, that properties
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obtain when they are instantiated, and that individuals obtain when they exist.
Given this notion of virtuality, we can restate the core representationalist thesis 
as follows:
Definition 2 There is a relation R such that 1) for every phenomenal state s, there 
is some proposition P such that s = standing in R to P; 2) R is virtual with 
respect to phenomenal states.
Definition 2 solves the preceding problems, but it is too strong in one respect. Con­
sider these three phenomenal states:
(1.5) Experiencing a red square floating above the ground
(1.6) Experiencing some color or other
(1.7) Having an experience
In the first case, there is an obvious candidate proposition for being the content 
of the experience: that there is a red square iloating above the ground. But what 
propositions could satisfy definition 2 in the two other cases? These don’t seem 
to be states in which one experiences a complete state of affairs, yet we should 
arguably count them as phenomenal states.
What distinguishes the second and third states from the first is that they are 
derivative phenomenal states, while the first is a non-derivative or basic phenomenal 
state.
Derivative phenomenal state A state which consists in being in one of a given set 
of phenomenal states distinct from itself.
Basic phenomenal state A phenomenal state which is not derivative.
For example, state 1.6 consists in having one of the possible color experiences, 
where color experiences are experiences of specific colors. It is not itself a color 
experience. It is therefore derivative. It is arguable that most of the phenomenal
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States we discuss in academic contexts are derivative. Take the state of experiencing 
red. When we speak of the experience of red, we generally mean to refer to a kind 
of experience, namely, experiences which are of red things among other things. We 
count experiencing red as a phenomenal state, but the only sense in which there 
is "something it’s like" to experience red is that when one experiences red, one 
experiences certain things having certain properties, one of which at least is the 
property of being red. I will return to the question of which states are basic and 
which are derivative in chapter 3. For now, we need only keep in mind that there 
is a distinction, and that derivative phenomenal states are mere states of having 
phenomenal states of a certain kind.
A theory of consciousness which explains basic phenomenal states would auto­
matically explain derivative phenomenal states, so we only need a theory of basic 
phenomenal states. Although this is seldom made explicit, most theories of con­
sciousness are aimed primarily at explaining basic phenomenal states. Representa- 
tionalism makes no exception.
We can now state the core representationalist claim, which I am going to refer 
to as virtual ism.
Virtualism There is a relation R such that: 1) For any basic phenomenal state 5 , 
there is a proposition P such that s = standing in R to P; 2) R is virtual with 
respect to basic phenomenal states.
The idea remains roughly that phenomenal states are like propositional attitudes in 
that they are nonfactive relations to propositions.
Note that virtualism makes no reference to intentional or representational con­
tents. On this view, the content of an experience is simply the proposition one is 
related to in it.
Earlier I said that the approach I wanted to suggest is similar to those adopted 
by Crane (2003) and Pautz (2007;2009). It is similar to Crane’s and Pautz’ ap­
proaches in that the latter also explain the notion of phenomenal content in part by
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reference to the relational structure of experience. But there are significant differ­
ences. Crane describes the relations which are constitutive of intentional states as 
"intentional modes", and he explicates the notion of an intentional mode primarily 
through the example of propositional attitudes. This is where the approach I am 
proposing differ from Crane’s. As I tried to show earlier, we cannot make a suitable 
notion of intentionality sufficiently precise by pointing to propositional attitudes as 
examples. The problem is that it is unclear how to generalize from the canonical 
propositional attitudes, while we don’t want to say that the only intentional modes 
are those involved in canonical propositional attitudes.
Pautz completely reverses the usual order of explanation between intentional­
ity and representationalism. Rather than explicating representationalism in terms 
of some independently given notion of intentionality or intentional content, he ex­
plicates the notion of an experience having content in terms of representationalism. 
Virtualism is inspired from Pautz’ approach in this regard. Simplified a little, Pautz’ 
intentionalism says that there is a relation R such that phenomenal states are identi­
cal to states of standing in R to proposition-like entities.1' Virtualism differs from 
this view in asserting that relation R is a virtual relation and not any old relation. My 
main quibble with Pautz’ intentionalism is that it does not guarantee the fallibility 
of experience. 12
A noticeable shortcoming of virtualism and Pautz’ intentionalism, compared to 
Crane’s view at least, is that the former give us no clue as to what the contents of
"Pautz’ statement of his intentionalist theory:
There is a distinctive relation R such that for every experiential property of the form 
having an experience with minimal phenomenal character K, there is some intentional 
content c, such that the property of the form having an experience with minimal phe­
nomenal character K is identical with the property bearing R to c (or else there is 
some type of intentional content T such that the experiential property is identical with 
standing in R to some singular content or other of type T). (2007: 497)
12Pautz’ qualification that the relevant contents are "intentional" (see previous footnote) might 
seem to play the same role as my qualification that the relevant relation is virtual. However, the 
point of Pautz’ approach, as I understand it, is to avoid having to define intentionality, contents and 
cognate notions independently of representationalism. It is only without this qualification that Pautz’ 
definition solves our definition problem.
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particular experiences are or what relation R is. Virtualism is incomplete in this 
respect, and its applications slightly restricted because of this. I will state a more 
robust theory (virtualism+; p. 141) when the need arises. This theory will fall out 
of my case for the basic virtualist theory stated above.
Earlier I said that I am inclined to think of the propositions (i.e. proposition-like 
things) we are related to in experience as states of affairs. On this understanding of 
virtualism, it arguably commits one to there being non-obtaining states of affairs: 
if one is related to a state of affairs which does not obtain, it follows by existential 
generalization that there is a state of affairs which does not obtain. One might think 
that this is a heavy ontological burden for a mere theory of consciousness.
This objection raises a host of issues in ontology which I cannot discuss in 
detail here— there are considerations against virtualism which are more specific to 
it I want to concentrate on. However, two points should help alleviate this concern.
Firstly, ontology is hostage to its applications. There is no prospect of directly 
determining whether any given abstract object exists or not. The only sensible 
way of going about determining whether any given abstract object exists is to ask 
whether we need to posit its existence to explain other things. So we should accept 
the existence of non-obtaining states of affairs if we find ourselves having to talk 
about them in our best theory of the world. Since a theory of consciousness would 
be an application of major importance for non-obtaining states of affairs, it would 
be backward to reject virtualism on the ground that there are no non-obtaining states 
of affairs. Rather, we should first ask whether virtualism and other relevant theories 
outside of ontology are plausible independently of such considerations, then draw 
ontological conclusions from these theories.
Secondly (and relatedly), it does not seem implausible that virtualism shares its 
ontological commitments with the theory of propositional attitudes. The reason I, 
at least, am inclined to say that experiences are relations to states of affairs rather 
than propositions of a more abstract kind is that this seems to me to be the most
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phenomenologically accurate view. A parallel observation applies to propositional 
attitudes. It seems to fly in the face of common sense to say that we believe and 
desire set theoretic constructs such as functions from worlds to truth values or sets 
of possible worlds. One cannot intelligibly say "I believe the set of possible worlds 
S" or "I believe function F".13 Propositions of the state of affairs kind seem to be 
the most likely candidates for being the objects of beliefs and desires. If that is 
correct, then there is good reason independently of virtualism to think that there are 
non-obtaining states of affairs.
1.4 Other representationalisms
There is one respect in which virtualism is likely too committal to reflect the view 
nearly all representationalists endorse: it implies that no two distinct phenomenal 
states can have the same content, while several formulations of representationalism 
leave this open. For example, Chalmers (2004), Crane (2003), John (2005), and 
Lycan (1987; 1996a) appear willing to allow that phenomenally distinct experiences 
in different sensory modalities have the same content. Virtualism does not allow 
this, but it could be weakened for this purpose.
Sensory virtualism (SV) For any sensory modality M, there is a relation R such 
that: 1) For any basic phenomenal state 5 in M, there is some proposition P 
such that s = standing in R to P; 2) R is virtual with respect to basic phenom­
enal states.
SV makes room for the kinds of possibility that concern the aforementioned au­
thors, but it has the major shortcoming of covering only phenomenal states which 
can be associated with sensory modalities. It is unclear how to generalize it to all 
phenomenal states. I will return to this matter in in chapter 5.
There is also another view it is useful to distinguish:
1 ^ See the substitution problem discussed in McGrath (2008)
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Weak virtualism (WV) For every basic phenomenal state s, there is a virtual rela­
tion R and a proposition P such that: 1) .v = standing in R to P; 2) R is virtual 
with respect to basic phenomenal states.
Weak virtualism allows any number of additional ingredients (including intrinsic 
qualia) to play any role whatsoever in the determination of an experience’s phe­
nomenal character beyond its content—whatever they are, they can be built into R. 
As such, it is much weaker than SV and virtualism (though stronger than SV in that 
it covers all phenomenal states).
It may be argued that the sensory view, or even the weak view, is the one which 
ought to be described as the core representationalist theory. They can handle a num­
ber of the same explanatory tasks, including the problem of perception. However, 
they seem much less satisfactory than virtualism as far as the regimentation problem 
goes. We will see in chapter 5 how much worse than the pure virtualist theory the 
sensory and weak views are at dealing with the regimentation problem. I describe 
virtualism as the core representationalist view because I believe that the solution to 
the regimentation problem it enables is a pivotal motivation for representationalism 
generally.
Virtualism is compatible with nearly all representational theories I am aware 
of, including the sensory and weak views just introduced (these theories do not 
exclude the possibility that the relations which satisfy them are all identical to the 
relation posited by virtualism). Both reductive and ontologically neutral theories are 
compatible with virtualism: Armstrong (1968), Pitcher (1971), Dretske (1995), Ly- 
can (1996), Rey (1998), Harman (1990), Tye (1995), Anscombe (1965), Chalmers 
(2004), Byrne (2001), Crane (2003), and Jackson (2004) could all happily endorse 
virtualism. Reductive theories can be regarded as providing reductive accounts of 
the relation R posited by virtualism. For example, Tye’s theory that experiences are 
nonconceptual, poised states which covary with their objects in optimal conditions 
can be regarded as virtualism combined with a reductive account of relation R. On
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his view, R would be being in a state which covaries with x in optimal conditions 
while being nonconceptual and poised. Virtualism can also accommodate some 
higher-order and self-representational theories, e.g. those advocated by Rosenthal 
(2002) and Kriegel (2003). For instance, one can take relation R to be the relation 
of representing x while having a higher-order thought about the fact that one is 
representing x. R could not be representing that one instantiates a quale x while 
one is instantiating x  (this relation is not virtual, and its relata are not propositions), 
so some higher-order theories are ruled out. Still, virtualism and its weaker variants 
seem to capture the essence of centrally representational theories of consciousness.
1.5 Opposing views
Proponents of adverbialism and the intrinsic qualia theory (e.g., Chisholm 1948, 
Ducasse 1942, Block 2003) oppose the idea that experience has an act-object struc­
ture— that it can be decomposed into a relation common to all experiences and 
objects which vary from one experience type to another. This idea is explicitly 
captured by virtualism, though virtualism posits that the objects of experiences 
are propositions, not the phenomenal individuals posited by sense-datum theorists. 
Virtualism also seems to capture what sense-datum theorists (e.g., Jackson 1977, 
O’Shaughnessy 1980, Robinson 1994) oppose. As we will see in the next chapter, 
the starting point for this theory is precisely that experiencing an F is not a vir­
tual relation. Sense-datum theorists often put the point by saying that the relevant 
relation is a kind of "acquaintance".
The relation between disjunctivism and virtualism is less straightforward.
Two characteristics are shared by all positions which fall under the heading of 
disjunctivism. The first is a claim (or cluster of claims) disjunctivists label "naive 
realism". To a first approximation, naive realism asserts that there is a strong con­
nection between veridical experiences and external entities. This connection has
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been conveyed using such expressions as "direct contact", "immediate presence", 
and "openness to the world". The connection is taken by disjunctivists to imply that 
veridical and non-veridical experiences are importantly different— that they have no 
"highest common factor". This last claim is the second tenet of disjunctivism.
On the face of it, virtualism and disjunctivism seem incompatible, because vir- 
tualism posits a common factor between veridical and non-veridical experiences. 
William Fish’s (2009) characterization of the naive realist view which is central to 
disjunctivism appears to make the latter incompatible with virtualism:
The distinctive feature of naive realism lies in the claim that, when 
we see the world [i.e. in veridical perception], the subject is acquainted 
with the elements of the presentational character—the mind-independent 
objects and their features—where ‘acquaintance’ names an irreducible 
mental relation that the subject can only stand in to objects that ex­
ist and features that are instantiated in the part of the environment at 
which the subject is looking. [...] Why is it like that to have that experi­
ence? Because in having the experience, the subject is acquainted with 
thus-and-such objects and their properties. This acquaintance property 
can therefore be identified with the experience’s phenomenal character.
(Fish 2009: 14-5; comment in square bracket is mine)
Going by Fish’s account, naive realism appears to imply that the phenomenal states 
which are tokened in veridical experience are states of standing in a factive relation 
to external states of affairs. It is not clear to me that naive realism as traditionally 
understood has this implication, so I will refer to this claim as factualism to avoid 
confusion.
Factualism The phenomenal states instantiated in veridical perceptual experience 
are states of standing in a factive relation to states of affairs.14
i4A factualist would probably want to restrict this claim to basic phenomenal states as I have done 
above for virtualism.
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A factualist like Fish must deny that the same phenomenal states can be tokened 
in veridical and non-veridical experience—to deny a common phenomenal factor to 
veridical and non-veridical experience. This is one natural understanding of the dis- 
junctivist position. This understanding of the position makes it incompatible with 
virtualism, because virtualism entails that some phenomenal states can be instanti­
ated either in veridical or non-veridical conditions.
There are at least two alternative understandings of naive realism which do not 
carry any commitments to factualism:
Objectivism The phenomenal states instantiated in non-hallucinatory perceptual 
experience are states of standing in an acquaintance relation to ordinary ob­
jects.
Particularism The phenomenal states instantiated in non-hallucinatory perceptual 
experience are states of standing in a relation to states of affairs involving 
ordinary objects.
The main difference between factualism and these two views is that factualism im­
plies that illusory experiences instantiate different phenomenal states than veridical 
experiences. On the other hand, all three views imply that veridical and halluci­
natory experiences instantiate different phenomenal states (assuming there are no 
non-existent ordinary objects).
Objectivism is no more compatible with virtualism than factualism is, but for 
different reasons. The incompatibility comes from the fact that virtualism implies 
that the phenomenal states instantiated in veridical perception are relations to propo­
sitions and not particulars. However, it is worth noting that virtualism is compatible 
with a number of claims which are commonly taken to support objectivism. In par­
ticular, it is compatible with the claim that we experience ordinary objects, because 
we can do this as part of experiencing states of affairs. Virtualism is compatible 
with the claim that we experience ordinary objects even on the assumption that one
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can experience an ordinary object only if the object exists and one is suitably related 
to it. I will discuss these matters at some length in section 7.2.
In contrast with objectivism, particularism is entirely compatible with virtual- 
ism, because the latter at most requires that illusory and veridical experiences share 
phenomenal character, while particularism at most implies that hallucinatory and 
veridical or illusory experiences never instantiate the same phenomenal states. Vir- 
tualism might seem a little too weak because of this, but building the negation of 
particularism into the theory would not add to its explanatory power as far as its core 
applications are concerned. One could strenghen virtualism to say that the proposi­
tions one is related to in experience never involve particulars, but I prefer not to do 
this because this would raise subtle phenomenological issues which are orthogonal 
to my primary aims. I will nevertheless return to the question of object-involving 
contents in section 7.2.
Factualism seems to me to be the most common understanding of the core tenet 
of naive realism. For example, Campbell (2002: 116) appears to be a factualist, and 
Hellie’s (2007; 2006) exposition of naive realism is along the same lines as Fish’s. 
The picture painted in broad strokes by McDowell (1982; 1986; 1994) also seems 
to me to have something like Fish’s factualism as a central component, though there 
are dissenting interpretations.15
Martin (2004) can easily seem to endorse factualism, but there is considerable 
room for alternate interpretations of his position. Take for example this passage:
The Naive Realist, however, claims that our sense experience of the 
world is, at least in part, non-representational. Some of the objects of 
perception— the concrete individuals, their properties, the events these
partake in— are constituents of the experience. No experience like this,
l5Byrne & Logue (2008) suggest that McDowell is only a disjunctivist about the epistemic status 
of experiences. There is certainly room for such an interpretation. However, we will see in chapter 
8 that McDowell’s arguments lend themselves easily to readings on which they support a Fish-type 
naive realism. It seems to me that this is how they are normally understood. Since this is the only 
interpretation of McDowell’s work which makes contact with virtualism and it seems to be the most 
common interpretation, I will adopt it for present purposes.
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no experience of fundamentally the same kind, could have occurred 
had no appropriate candidate for awareness existed. In this, sense per­
ception contrasts with imagining and thought. For one can certainly 
imagine objects in their absence, so the mind’s direction on an object 
does not require that it actually exist when one imagines. The same 
is true, arguably, of thought—we think of objects which in fact do not 
exist as well as thinking of the existent. The Naive Realist insists that 
sensing is not like this, and in that respect the Naive Realist finds com­
mon ground with the Sense-Datum tradition, or what more broadly I 
will label Subjectivism. For Subjectivists have long insisted that what 
is distinctive of sensing as opposed to thinking is that one really cannot 
sense in the absence of an object of sensing. (2004: 39)
The second sentence of this passage suggests that Martin is using the term "object" 
to refer to what an experience is directed at (as opposed to the material object one 
perceives). He also seems to take the primary objects of experiences to be complex 
events or states of affairs, not ordinary objects. Since he claims that the directedness 
of experiences toward their objects is not a kind of representation, he seems to 
endorse factualism. After all, the only thing that is clear about representation is that 
it is not a factive relation; if Martin denies that the relation constitutive of experience 
is a kind of representation, he must think that it is factive.
Having said this, there is room for alternate readings of Martin’s position. In 
particular, the part of the above passage which is most characteristic of what Martin 
says elsewhere is the claim that "no experience like this, no experience of fun­
damentally the same kind, could have occurred had no appropriate candidate for 
awareness existed". This claim does not clearly imply factualism (or particularism 
or objectivism). The key question is what "fundamentally the same kind" means. 
All Martin says in guise of clarification is that he does not mean "fundamental" in 
the sense in which particle physics is concerned with fundamental particles, and
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that we should not try to determine whether two things are fundamentally of the 
same kind "merely through appeal to an inclination on our part to describe some 
things as similar and others as different" (Martin 2006, footnote 9). In other words, 
we should allow that things are not fundamentally of the same kind even when they 
strike us as similar. But what is it that we are allowing? What is it for two things 
to be fundamentally of the same kind? This question is crucial to the relation be­
tween Martin’s disjunctivism and virtualism: his position, if defined by the preced­
ing statement, would appear to be incompatible with virtualism just in case same­
ness of phenomenal character implies sameness of fundamental kind in his sense. 
If phenomenal sameness implies fundamental sameness, virtualism is incompatible 
with Martin’s position, because virtualism implies that the same phenomenal states 
can occur independently of the states of affairs they relate us to. If the phenomenal 
state instantiated in an experience is its phenomenal kind, then virtualism implies 
that veridical and non-veridical experiences of the same fundamental kind are pos­
sible. However, if phenomenal sameness does not imply fundamental sameness, 
then virtualism seems to be compatible with Martin’s position.
Does phenomenal sameness imply fundamental sameness in Martin’s sense? 
One cannot say for sure, because Martin does not sufficiently explain what he means 
by "fundamental". However, it does not seem improbable that the phenomenal state 
instantiated in an experience should count as its fundamental kind in Martin’s sense. 
The reason is that the phenomenal state it instantiates is by far the most salient and 
interesting property which enters into its nature. But we cannot say for sure given 
what Martin discloses about his unconventional use of "fundamental".
In brief, Martin’s statement that the directedness of experiences is not represen­
tational suggests that he endorses factualism. The "fundamental kind" formulation 
of his position is less clear on this matter, but it can reasonably be taken to conflict 
with virtualism.
I should stress that it is not only the virtualist approach to representationalism
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whose relation to Martin’s position is unclear. Even Dretske’s and Tye’s views could 
conceivably be compatible with Martin’s claim that veridical and non-veridical ex­
periences lack a common fundamental kind: it could be that the informational- 
functional properties which are identical to phenomenal states on Dretske’s and 
Tye’s views are not fundamental properties by Martin’s lights. This is in fact quite 
plausible given that Martin does not regard the epistemic, quasi-functional proper­
ties which veridical and non-veridical experiences share as sufficient for fundamen­
tal sameness (c.f. Martin 2006: 72).
Snowdon’s (1980; 2005) disjunctivism is also slightly elusive. According to 
Snowdon (2005), "the thesis that ‘disjunctivism’ stands for is precisely the denial of 
the common visual element claim", where the common visual element claim is that 
perceptions and non-perceptions "are, in respect of the experiential element in them, 
of the same fundamental sort". Like Martin, Snowdon does not explain the notion 
of fundamental sameness he is appealing to. This statement of the disjunctivist 
position suffers from the same indeterminacy as Martin’s. However, Snowdon’s 
position in his 1980 article seems to be a disjunctivism of either the factualist or the 
particularist kind:
The disjunctive picture divides what makes looks ascriptions true into 
two classes. In cases where there is no sighting they are made true by 
a state of affairs intrinsically independent of surrounding objects; but 
in cases of sightings the truth-conferring state of affairs involves the 
surrounding objects.
It is this picture, rather than the claim that the actual formula given to 
express the disjunctive theory adequately does so, which constitutes the 
core-idea, on the basis of which radical alternative explanation can be 
given. (1980: 186)
Byrne & Logue (2008) suggest that Snowdon’s position puts illusory and veridi­
cal perceptual experiences in the same category. On this reading of the preceding
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passage, which Snowdon has confirmed to me is correct, his view seem to be best 
captured by the particularist position.
To summarize, disjunctivism combines claims of two kinds: some kind of naive 
realism, and a corollary claim to the effect that veridical experiences lack a certain 
type of commonality with certain non-veridical experiences. I identified three po­
tential understandings of the naive realist thesis central to disjunctivism: factualism, 
objectivism, and particularism. The first implies that veridical and non-veridical ex­
periences do not instantiate the same phenomenal states, while the second and third 
imply only that veridical and hallucinatory experiences do not instantiate the same 
phenomenal states. We have seen that disjunctivists generally seem committed to 
factualism or at least particularism. However, some theorists who explain their posi­
tion in terms of "fundamental sameness" and cognate expressions might perhaps not 
be committed to any of the preceding positions— the textual evidence is insufficient 
to settle the matter.16
I will set aside exegetical questions regarding disjunctivism and naive realism. 
From now on, I will reserve the label "disjunctivism" for the most widespread view 
which is unquestionably in conflict with virtualism, namely, the view that the phe­
nomenal states instantiated in veridical experience cannot be instantiated in non- 
veridical experience (i.e. the position motivated by factualism). There might be 
other kinds of disjunctivism, but they are of no concern to us here because what we 
want to know is whether virtualism is true or not, not whether all putative alterna­
tives are false; we need only concern ourselves with theories that clearly conflict 
with virtualism.
l6This also holds of Hinton’s (1967; 1973) intricate position, which I have insufficient space to 
discuss here.
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1.6 Summary
In the first part of this chapter, I have tried to expose a dilemma for representa- 
tionalists: either define the theory using the vague terminology of "intentional- 
ity", "propositional attitudes" or "representation", or adopt one of the substitute 
notions of intentionality which have previously been suggested and face the dif­
ficulties these notions introduce. At times it might have seemed that I wished to 
reject representationalism altogether, but my ultimate aim has been constructive. I 
meant to make the case for a change of direction in how the representational the­
ory of consciousness is conceived of. I also meant to show in passing that some 
of the problems often brought up against representationalism fail to make contact 
with the core of the theory (virtualism). I have concluded the chapter by exploring 
the main relations between virtualism and other theories. As far as I can tell, they 
are roughly what the relations between representationalism and other theories are 
generally supposed to be. In the next chapter, I will try to show that virtualism 
can do all the important explanatory work of which representationalism is generally 
supposed capable.
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Chapter 2
Virtualism at work
My aim in this chapter is twofold. First, I want to address the concern that virtualism 
is too weak to play the important theoretical roles representationalism is generally 
taken to play. Representationalism has a number of implications which its propo­
nents take to yield theoretical benefits. My primary aim in this chapter is to show 
that virtualism, though weaker than most other general, ecumenical representational 
theories, has the same relevant consequences as far as the theoretical benefits of rep­
resentationalism go. My second aim is to motivate virtualism by bringing out these 
benefits. However, I will not argue that the theoretical motivations for representa­
tionalism discussed here really make the case for the theory. At this point, I mainly 
want to bring virtualism up to par with other forms of representationalism.
I will discuss four themes in connection with which the main applications of the 
representationalist framework arise: the problem of perception, the transparency of 
experience, the place of consciousness in nature, and the place of consciousness in 
the mind. In each case I will argue that virtualism can play the explanatory role a 
representational theory should play.
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2.1 The problem of perception
As I noted in introduction, the central problem of perception is to provide an account 
of illusion and hallucination which does justice to the fact that our experience of the 
world is direct or immediate. One of the key motivations for representationalism is 
that it offers a solution to this problem.1
There are different ways to read the claim that experience is "immediate", and 
some interpretations make the claim incompatible with representationalism. Still, 
the most natural reading makes it compatible with representationalism. That is how 
I will understand it for now:
Immediacy datum One does not experience external states of affairs by being 
aware of other things (e.g. sense data or intrinsic qualia).
The immediacy datum captures, I think, the most common and natural reading of the 
claim that our experience of external states of affairs is immediate: it is immediate 
in the sense that experiences of external states of affairs do not consist even in part 
in experiencing or being otherwise aware of distinct entities which stand between 
us and them. Stronger readings of the immediacy point will be discussed in chapter 
7.
The immediacy datum is widely held to be supported by introspection (see the 
transparency section below, as well as chapter 7), and denying it allegedly has dire 
epistemological consequences. Having said this, I am only trying to reconstruct and 
expose an element of the motivation for representationalism, so I will not defend the 
immediacy datum here.
T should also make it clear that I am not suggesting that representationalism’s 
ability to account for illusion while preserving the immediacy datum sufficiently 
justifies the theory. One of its main competitor, disjunctivism, is also supposed to
'See Anscombe (1965), Crane (2005), Harman (1990), and Robinson’s (1994) historical 
overview, ch 7.
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achieve this. So is adverbialism, and adverbialism does not imply representational- 
ism. If there were a compelling argument from the immediacy datum to represen- 
tationalism, its key premise would have to be that no other view can satisfactorily 
account for the datum. I am not about to run this argument. I merely observe that a 
satisfactory representational theory ought to fill the theoretical role which represen- 
tationalists generally take their view to play regarding the problem of perception, 
which is to provide an account of illusion and hallucination that is consistent with 
the immediacy datum.
There is a wide variety of arguments from illusion and hallucination, and other 
related threats to the immediacy datum (e.g. the argument from perceptual vari­
ation). Here I will use as stalking horse an argument from illusion adapted from 
Harman’s (1990) discussion.
Argument S: the argument from illusion
1. If one perceives (sees, hears, etc.) an F directly, there is an F that one per­
ceives directly.
2. Sometimes one perceives an F directly without there being any physical ob­
ject that is F and that one directly perceives.
3. Sometimes one directly perceives non-physical objects (from 1-2).
4. The objects we perceive directly are always of the same kind (either physical 
or non-physical).
Therefore, the objects that we perceive directly are always non-physical 
objects.
Claims along the lines of premise SI have been treated as self-evident by a number 
of proponents of such arguments (c.f., Broad 1952, Moore 1910; 1905, Price 1932).
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It is a version of what Crane (2005) and Robinson (1994: 32) call the “phenom­
enal principle”. Premise S2 asserts the possibility of a certain kind of illusion. It 
is typically motivated by the observation that statements such as the following are 
sometimes true even though there is nothing physical in one’s environment corre­
sponding to what one is said to see:
• All he sees on his left is a grey blob. (Describing a neurological condition)
• I saw a pink elephant. (Describing the effect of a drug)
• She is seeing stars. (Describing the effect of a sudden head movement)
Premise S4 is sometimes described as the "spreading step". It warrants extending 
the conclusion drawn about illusory experiences to veridical experiences.
Harman’s objection to argument S, as formulated his 1990 paper, turns in part 
on a distinction between two kinds of seeing or perceiving. Typically, when one 
says that one sees an F, this implies that there is an F. For example, if, looking at the 
parking lot outside my window, and confident that I am perceiving the world as it is, 
I sincerely declare that I see a green Volvo outside, my claim arguably entails that 
there is a Volvo I am suitably related to. Following Anscombe (1965), we can call 
this the material reading of the ascription. There is also a sense in which I can see a 
Volvo (or Volvo-like object) without there being any. This is the intensional reading 
of the ascription.2 This is the kind of reading on which it is true that some people 
have seen pink elephants, stars, and gray blobs due to neurological dysfunction. 
One of Harman’s key points in response to argument S is that premise SI is not 
true if "perceives" is given an intensional reading, while premise S2 is only true on 
an intensional reading. He uses "see*" for the material reading and "seet" for the 
intensional reading:
The argument from illusion starts from a case in which Eloise "sees" 
something brown and green before her, although there is nothing brown 
“Anscombe writes "intentional", but I find "intensional" more appropriate.
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and green before her in the external physical world. From this, the 
argument infers that the brown and green she sees must be internal and 
mental. Now, if "see" is "seef" here, this is the fallacy already noted, 
like that of concluding that Ponce de Leon was searching for something 
mental from the fact that there is no Fountain of Youth in the external 
world. On the other hand, if "see" is "see*" here, then the premise of 
the argument simply begs the question. No reason at all has so far been 
given for the claim that Eloise sees* something brown and green in this 
case. It is true that her perceptual experience presents her as visually 
presented with something brown and green; but that is to say merely 
that she seesf something brown and green, not that she sees* anything 
at all. (Harman 1990: 36-7)
Harman’s response might seem to turn exclusively on the material / intensional dis­
tinction, but I think it is intended to cut deeper than this. The material / intensional 
distinction is sufficient to address the particular form of argument at hand, but an­
other point Harman makes in the last sentence extends his response to all arguments 
from illusion: the only sense in which Eloise can "see" something brown and green 
when nothing is in her environment is equivalent to saying that she experiences 
something brown and green. Experience, he further suggests, is intentional just like 
searches (so an experience is at best a state in which one seest, not sees*). This 
claim puts Harman in a position to block not only the present argument but any 
parallel argument, whether cast in terms of "seeing" or not. Tn all such arguments, 
there will be premises to the effect that one cannot experience an F without there 
being one. According to Harman, this is not true because experience is intentional.
Here is how Harman’s general response applies to argument S in particular:
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Argument H: Harman’s counterargument
1. Premise S2 is only true in the sense of "perceives an F" which picks out a 
phenomenal state.
2. Phenomenal states are intentional.
3. If (1) and (2), then it is possible to perceive an F without there being any F 
(in the sense of "perceive an F" which makes S2 true).
4. Premise S 1 is only true in a sense of “perceive an F* on which it is impossible 
to perceive an F without there being an F.
Therefore, premise S2 is only true in a sense of "perceives an F" on 
which premise S 1 is false.
This statement of Harman’s reply brings into sharp relief the role of representation- 
alism: its role is to supply premises H2 and H3. H2 merely states that represen- 
tationalism is true (or that a relatively weak kind of representationalism is true), 
so the test for a formulation of representationalism is whether it supports H3 to 
satisfaction. Is this true of virtualism?
Suppose that "perceiving an F" picks out a phenomenal state as HI requires, 
and suppose that phenomenal states are as virtualism says they are (i.e. assume the 
antecedents of H3). In this case it would seem that "perceiving an F" picks out a 
state which obtains when one stands in R to a proposition involving F-ness. Since 
R is virtual, this would strongly suggest that one can perceive an F without there 
being an F. Virtualism therefore seems to supply premise H3. It does not obviously 
entail premise H3, but it supports it as well as any other representational theory. In 
the next chapter I will give a detailed account of intensional readings of perceptual 
ascriptions which establishes a more direct connection between virtualism and H3. 
For now, I think we can at least see that there is no need to say that experience is 
representational or intentional to block the argument from illusion: we only need
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to say that it is virtual. Adding that relation R is a representational or intentional 
relation would not make the reply go any better.
Blocking the argument from illusion for sense data is part of what a theory must 
do in order to solve the problem of perception, but it is not everything. To solve the 
problem, a theory must account for illusion while preserving the immediacy datum. 
We must now ask: a) is virtualism compatible with the immediacy datum?; b) does 
virtualism really account for illusion?
One might think that if we experience propositions it follows that we don't ex­
perience external facts or states of affairs directly. Is not the veil of perception a veil 
of abstract objects on the virtualist view? But recall that we count states of affairs as 
propositions. I am using "proposition" as an umbrella term for all proposition-like 
things. On the virtualist view, what you are directly aware of (what you experience) 
when you perceive an external scene can perfectly well be the scene itself, not a sur­
rogate: the scene is a state of affairs, which is a kind of proposition. The content of 
your experience can be the very same external scene that you perceive. If this state 
of affairs happens to be a fact, what you experience is a fact, and you experience it 
directly (I discuss this topic a greater length in section 7.2).
Of course, it is part of the theory that you could have the very same kind of 
experience— stand in R to the very same state of affairs— without the state of affairs 
you experience obtaining. But the point of virtualism is that this does not imply 
that what you experience in the veridical case is something else than the state of 
affairs that is before you. What this implies is that in experience you can stand 
in a relation to a state of affairs which does not obtain, i.e. that the experiencing 
relation is virtual. I think it is safe to say that virtualism at least preserves the 
immediacy datum and avoids the "veil of perception" consequences which make the 
sense-datum theory clearly unacceptable. On the virtualist view, you do not have 
to infer the existence of a three-dimensional world from a two-dimensional array of 
pixels or any other mimicry of the world. You simply believe the content of your
57
experience, and this gives you a belief about a three-dimensional world. Whether 
there is a kind of immediacy virtualism does not allow beyond this—and whether 
perception is immediate in this stronger sense— is a more complex question I will 
turn to in chapter 7.
Question (b) is also bound to elicit negative answers. In what sense does virtu­
alism account for illusion? It might seem to provide less of an explanation than the 
theory that experience is representational or intentional, because this theory might 
seem to at least provide a model for understanding what goes on in illusion. But 
virtualism does that too. The model it provides is the general class of virtual rela­
tions. What virtualism loses in specificity, it gains in precision and clarity. Rather 
than saying vaguely that experience is like belief, it says exactly in what relevant 
respects it is like belief. Overall, virtualism illuminates the nature of illusion as 
much if not more than other general, ecumenical representational theories of con­
sciousness.
One might say that conventional representational theories formulated in terms 
of intentionality or representation at least have the advantage of paving the way for 
further explanation by assimilating experiences to states of a kind there are many 
candidate reductive explanations for. But we have found no suitable meaning for 
"intentionality" and "representation". A consequence of this is that it is unclear 
whether the explanatory target of "reductive theories of intentionality" really is the 
kind of intentionality or representation which some representationalists want to as­
similate experiences to. In fact, some proponents of “theories of intentionality" (e.g. 
Dennett 1971 and Millikan 1984) make explicit that they are not trying to explain a 
pre-theoretically grasped phenomenon of "intentionality" but merely to characterize 
an interesting kind of state in terms of which behavior can be explained.
Setting this aside, a proponent of virtualism also has access to reductive theories 
of intentionality to explain the virtual character of experience: just like a proponent 
of conventional representationalism can claim that the intentionality of experience
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is suitably explained by such and such a theory of intentionally, a proponent of vir- 
tualism can claim that the virtual character of experience is suitably explained by the 
fact that the virtual relation constitutive of experience is the kind of relation labeled 
"intentionality" or "representation" in such and such a theory of "intentionality" or 
"representation".
2.2 The transparency of experience
Aside from accounting for illusion, another role representationalism is generally 
agreed to play is that of explaining the transparency or diaphanousness of experi­
ence.3 A number of different transparency theses have been discussed in the liter­
ature. I will once again begin with what Harman says in his seminal article. This 
oft-quoted passage provides a natural starting point:
Look at a tree and try to turn your attention to intrinsic features of your 
visual experience. I predict you will hnd that the only features there to 
turn your attention to will be features of the presented tree. (Harman 
1990: 39).
Harman is making two claims: one negative and one positive. The negative claim 
is that, if one tries to attend to intrinsic features of a visual experience, one will 
fail. The positive claim is that, if one tries to attend to intrinsic features of a visual 
experience, one’s attention will be drawn to what we can on a first gloss describe as 
features of external objects. I will discuss each point in turn.
2.2.1 Negative transparency
When Harman talks about intrinsic features, he does not just mean intrinsic prop­
erties. He is not saying, for instance, that introspection fails to show experiences’
^Transparency is sometimes taken to be a key premise of some deductive arguments for represen­
tationalism (c.f. Stoljar 2004), but it is also sometimes presented as an explanandum for this theory 
(c.f. Tye 1995).
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durations or levels of complexity, even though these are arguably intrinsic proper­
ties of experiences. He also does not mean simply intrinsic qualitative properties, at 
least not in the common, broad sense of "qualitative" which is roughly equivalent to 
"not quantitative". Again, Harman is not trying to suggest that experiences cannot 
introspectively seem brief or complex, and these are arguably intrinsic qualitative 
properties. What he means by "intrinsic features" is monadic qualitative properties 
of the kind we experience in perception—the properties our perceptual experiences 
are typically said to be "of" (e.g., redness). I will refer to properties of this kind as 
"qualia".4 Harman’s negative point is that, as a general rule, introspection does not 
present phenomenal states as instantiating qualia. This is the negative transparency 
thesis representationalism is often taken to shed light on.
Note also that representationalism is not supposed to explain negative trans­
parency by showing that introspection misleadingly presents qualia as belonging to 
external objects instead of experiences. It is supposed to explain transparency by 
explaining, predicting, or otherwise shedding light on the fact that experiences do 
not instantiate qualia at all.
Now, explaining the non-existence of something is different from explaining 
the existence of something. One does not normally explain why a property or a 
state of affairs does not obtain by uncovering a causal mechanism or postulating 
principles in virtue of which it does not obtain. As a general rule, explanations of 
negative facts (to the extent that we can speak of explanations at all) take the form of 
accounts of reality which remove any reason for positing that the relevant entities 
obtain. For example, modern physics in a sense explains the fact that there is no 
phlogiston by providing an account of thermal phenomena which removes the need 
to posit phlogiston. Representationalism can at best explain the absence of qualia in 
this kind of way, because the view is universally conceived of as a thesis about what 
experience is, not what it is not. Whatever the representationalist says experience is
4Qualia, in this sense, are not the same thing as Block’s (1998) Qualia or Chalmers’ (1996) 
qualia, or Dennett’s (1988).
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(e.g., a kind of informational process), it cannot be directly inferred from this that 
experiences do not also have intrinsic qualia: for all we know, experience could 
be an informational process, yet be accompanied by qualia.5 (Indeed, Shoemaker 
(1994) essentially endorses this view.) What representationalism can do is remove 
the need to posit intrinsic qualia.
Why might one think that experiences instantiate qualia—colors and sounds, or 
similar properties (e.g. red’)? A possible response is that one can verify that ex­
periences have such properties introspectively. But this is simply the negation of 
negative transparency. Representationalism is supposed to shed light on negative 
transparency by undercutting the motivation for positing intrinsic qualia. If this 
motivation were the negation of negative transparency itself, the representationalist 
would be in a position where a) her explanation of T (negative transparency) is that 
N (no intrinsic qualia) is true and implies T; b) her explanation of N is that not- 
T is false (T is true). In other words, representationalists’ explanation of negative 
transparency, insofar as they have one, would be negative transparency itself. This 
cannot be how representationalism sheds light on negative transparency, so the mo­
tivation for positing intrinsic qualia which representationalism undercuts must be 
something else than that they are manifest in introspection.
The only other potentially historically influential motivation for intrinsic qualia 
I am aware of is the argument from illusion (and its variations). This is roughly 
the motivation outlined by Crane (2000) in his history of the concept of a quale. 
Crane essentially argues that the qualia theory is a version of the sense-datum theory 
according to which the bearers of the properties we experience (sense data) are our 
experiences themselves. His discussion also suggests that the theory’s motivation is 
the argument for sense data combined with a rejection of mental particulars distinct 
from familiar mental events. Harman (1990) also suggests that the argument from 
illusion is the primary motivation for intrinsic qualia. If this reconstruction of the
sThis point is discussed at greater length in Seager and Bourget (2007).
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motivation for intrinsic qualia is correct, virtualism’s ability to block all arguments 
along the lines of argument S should already ensure that it undercuts the motivation 
for intrinsic qualia (hence explains negative transparency).
2.2.2 Positive transparency
Let us now turn to positive transparency. The claim, as put by Harman, is something 
like this: as a general rule at least, if you try to attend to intrinsic features of your 
experience, you will end up attending to what might be described as features of 
external objects. This gloss of positive transparency is problematic because it is un­
clear what is meant by "features of external objects". T can think of four reasonably 
likely interpretations of this phrase:
1. Features which are as a matter of fact instantiated by external objects
2. Features which seem to you to be features of external objects
3. Features which you experience as features of external objects
4. Features of the external kind
The "seem" in option 2 should be read epistemically (see p. 32 for the distinction 
between epistemic and non-epistemic readings of “seem”). It is only on this reading 
that it differs significantly from option 3. Option 4 can also be given multiple inter­
pretations. For the sake of concreteness, we can say that a property is external (is of 
the external kind) just in case a) its instantiation requires the instantiation of spatial 
properties; b) it is publicly observable if observable at all; c) it is mind-independent 
in the sense that its instantiation does not require the existence of a mind. These 
three conditions seem to me to capture a widespread notion of external property, 
but the details are not very important for our purposes.
Option 1 does not seem acceptable. Read this way, positive transparency would 
imply that the features we attend to in introspection are always actual features of
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external objects. This would imply that positive transparency is not always true 
of hallucinatory and illusory experiences, an implication which representationalists 
seem to reject (c.f. Tye 2002a: 45-51).
It is worth looking at alternative statements of positive transparency to see if any 
of the remaining options emerges as a canonical interpretation.
In turning one’s mind inward to attend to the experience, one seems to 
end up concentrating on what is outside again, on external features or 
properties. (Tye, 1995: 136)
Assuming option 1 is not charitable enough, Tye’s statement is most naturally un­
derstood along the lines of 2 or 4. By contrast, this statement by Chalmers is most 
naturally interpreted as an instance of either 3 or 4:
[...] the central datum of transparency is that when we attempt to in­
trospect the qualities of our experiences (e.g. phenomenal redness), we 
do so by attending to the qualities of external objects (e.g. redness) 
(Chalmers, 2004)
Martin’s gloss of transparency suggests 2 or 4 (4 with a more permissive definition 
of external properties as mind-independent properties):
At heart, the concern is that introspection of one’s perceptual experi­
ence reveals only the mind-independent objects, qualities and relations 
that one learns about through perception. (Martin, 2002)
It is not clear that there is a canonical interpretation of positive transparency, so we 
will have to see if we can explain all three available interpretations. Let us start with 
interpretation 4, which appears to be closest to consensual. On this interpretation, 
the positive transparency observation is that if one introspects one’s perceptual ex­
periences, one will end up attending to properties of the external kind. That is what 
I will mean by "positive transparency" until further notice.
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It should come as no surprise that neither virtualism nor any plausible general 
representational theory explains positive transparency in the strong sense of entail­
ing it or allowing us to deduce it. Representationalism is supposed to be a view 
about all experiences, while positive transparency is a claim about specifically per­
ceptual experiences and has never been construed otherwise. For example, nobody 
thinks that positive transparency is true of headache experiences, cognitive experi­
ences, and emotional feelings (as far as I know). Positive transparency highlights 
a peculiarity of perceptual experience, so we should not expect a general account 
of consciousness to explain it. There is however a significant sense in which vir­
tualism explains positive transparency: from virtualism and auxiliary assumptions 
which are plausible in light of virtualism, we can infer positive transparency. The 
relevant auxiliary assumptions are the following:
The external content thesis: The contents of perceptual experiences involve ex­
ternal properties.
Closure under compositum of awareness (CCA): Awareness of a relational state 
such as standing in R to a  requires awareness of the components of a .
The external content thesis is more or less forced on us by virtualism. For if virtu­
alism is true, nothing but its content can distinguish a perceptual experience from 
a non-perceptual experience.6 The only contents which are plausibly characteristic 
of perceptual experiences are those involving such properties as colors and shapes 
understood as mind-independent properties— straightforwardly external properties. 
This means that the contents of perceptual phenomenal states involve external prop­
erties.
The rationale behind CCA is that nothing distinguishes two relational states 
which involve the same relation except for the relata they involve. Take for example 
these two states:
6"Perceptual" here indicates a certain kind of phenomenology, not a certain kind of etiology; 
there can be hallucinatory perceptual experiences.
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owning a Volvo
owning a Mazda
There is no difference between these states aside from the object owned. It therefore 
seems that, to be aware of or attending to Bob's state of owning a Mazda (as opposed 
to his state of owning something), one would have to be aware of or attending to a 
Volvo. This reasoning can be repeated at the level of the relata when these are states 
of affairs. Take for example these two propositions:
There is green jelly on the table.
There is blue jelly on the table.
There is no difference between these two propositions aside from the colors they 
involve. It therefore seems that awareness of one of these states of affairs in par­
ticular requires awareness of the color involved in it—some kind of cognizing or 
consciousness of the color, depending on how "awareness" is understood exactly. 
Assuming this is right, being aware of standing in R to the proposition that there is 
green jelly on the table would require being aware of greenness.
Positive transparency falls directly out of virtualism given CCA and the external 
content thesis: from the external content thesis and virtualism, we know that every 
perceptual phenomenal state is a relational state of standing in R to a proposition 
involving external properties; from this and CCA, it follows that awareness of a 
perceptual phenomenal state requires awareness of external properties.
This explanation of type-4 transparency extends to other kinds of positive trans­
parency. Take first the claim that when one introspects a perceptual experience, 
one ends up attending to properties which one experiences as properties of external 
objects (interpretation 3). Presumably, to experience a property as a property of an 
external object is to experience it as a property had by something which has prop­
erties which make the object external. To a first approximation, it seems plausible 
that these external-making properties are precisely properties of the external kind.
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If this right, attending to an external property that one experiences is ipso facto at­
tending to a property that one experiences as a property of an external object. That 
is to say that type-4 transparency implies type-3 transparency.
This is not true of type-2 transparency (the claim that if one introspects a percep­
tual experience, one will end up attending to properties which will seem to one to be 
properties of external objects). Personally, I have doubts about type-2 transparency. 
It seems to me perfectly possible to suspend all belief about the external world while 
introspecting one’s experiences, and in these circumstances it would not epistem- 
ically seem to one that the properties one finds in introspection are properties of 
external objects. Still, we can explain the observation to the extent that it is correct 
based on the fact that the world normally seems to us epistemically to be the way 
it is represented in our experience. Given the external content thesis, CCA, and 
this additional assumption, we can derive type-2 transparency for the normal case. 
Virtualists are not alone in having to posit that the world normally seems to us to be 
the way we experience it in order to explain type-2 transparency, because this posit 
is not part of the idea that experiences are intentional or representational (there are 
representations which are more desire-like than belief-like).
2.3 The place of consciousness in nature
One of the most important roles representationalism can play is to guide our inquiry 
into the relation between consciousness and the physical world. In this section 
I ask whether virtualism can play this role as well as other general, ecumenical 
representational theories. I begin by distinguishing two questions regarding the 
place of consciousness in nature.
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2.3.1 The metaphysical and scientific questions
There are two central questions regarding the relation between phenomenal and 
physical states:
The metaphysical question What metaphysical relations hold uniformly between 
phenomenal and physical states?
The scientific question Which phenomenal states accompany which physical states?
The correct answer to the metaphysical question will tell us which of identity, super- 
venience, causation, realization, determination, ecetera hold between phenomenal 
states and physical states. The correct, complete answer to the scientific question 
may be expected to specify a systematic mapping between phenomenal states and 
physical or functional states. This mapping would determine which phenomenal 
states go with which physical states. As Chalmers (1996: 214) points out, a truly 
satisfactory answer to this question would arguably have to fit on a t-shirt.
The metaphysical and scientific questions are clearly distinct. A number of 
philosophers appear to think that they have solved the metaphysical puzzle with­
out addressing the scientific question. They think, for example, that considerations 
pertaining to causal closure show that phenomenal states are identical to physi­
cal states, but they offer no account of which phenomenal states are identical with 
which physical states. Conversely, neuroscientists do not as a general rule seem to 
be preoccupied by the metaphysical question. For them it makes little difference 
whether phenomenal states are identical to physical states or not. Their primary 
concern is to discover which phenomenal states go with which physical states, be­
cause that is all that one needs to know in order to predict all relevant conscious 
events.
While the metaphysical and scientific questions are logically distinct, it is not 
unreasonable to expect an answer to one to bear on the other. In particular, it seems 
likely that a fully satisfactory answer to the scientific question—one that relates
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phenomenal states and physieal states via an equation that (its on a t-shirt— would 
militate for the identity theory of phenomenal and physical states. For one thing, 
it would alleviate worries about multiple realizability. It would also attenuate the 
impression that the mind-body relation is arbitrary, which speaks against identity. 
For example, the theory could conceivably be taken to suggest that inverted qualia 
cases are not metaphysically possible. It could potentially do this by giving us a 
better grasp of the nature of consciousness and exhibiting its structure. The theory 
could not show with certainty that Chalmers’ (1996) zombies are impossible (not 
if it is formulated as a nomic generalization, as it should be) but it would plausibly 
sway a number of skeptics.
I will now survey the applications of representationalism with respect to the 
scientific and metaphysical problems, and ask whether virtualism lends itself to the 
same applications.
2.3.2 Virtualism and the scientific problem
One of the principal attractions of representationalism is its ability to give us a bet­
ter handle on the internal structure of consciousness. Virtualism does this at least 
as well as any form of representationalism. First, it ascribes a relational structure to 
phenomenal states. This alone is potentially illuminating. As we will see in chapter 
5, this simple fact can shed light on puzzles about the nature of sensory modali­
ties and the relation between perceptual and non-perceptual experiences. The fact 
that the relata of R which characterize phenomenal states according to virtualism 
are propositions is also promising. Propositions exhibit internal structure and can 
be described formally. This is what helps with the regimentation problem men­
tioned in introduction (which is part of the scientific problem). Virtualism provides 
a framework in which to articulate and regiment the natures of phenomenal states. 
This is just what we need in order to formulate clear, precise, and fully general hy­
potheses about how phenomenal states relate to each other and physical states. Here
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are some examples of interesting generalizations which can only be expressed in a 
framework like that provided by virtualism (R is the relation posited by virtualism):
Phenomenal consistency It is impossible to stand in R to inconsistent proposi­
tions.
Phenomenal composition Necessarily, if a stands in R to both P and Q, a stands 
in R to PAQ.
Phenomenal decomposition Necessarily, if a stands in R to PAQ, a stands in R to 
both P and Q.
I don’t know that any of these principles is true, but T hnd them prima facie plau­
sible.7 Tn any case, the important is that they illustrate the potential explanatory 
power of the framework. Phenomenal composition and consistency, for example, 
together entail that if one stands in R to P (experiences P), one cannot experience 
-iP. This might provide a fundamental explanation of the gestalt shifts one experi­
ences with Necker cubes and the like (this would explain why we never see the cube 
both ways at once).
Another potential application I see for these principles is an explanation of the 
unity of consciousness. I take it (following Bayne and Chalmers 2003) that it is 
necessary and sufficient for one’s phenomenal states to be unified at a lime that they 
all be entailed by some phenomenal state one is in at that time (the total phenom­
enal state one instantiates at that time). This by itself does not explain unity but 
merely defines it more precisely.8 To explain the facts about unity so defined, we 
must at least explain 1) why all of one’s phenomenal states are always entailed by
7There has been some discussions of putatively inconsistent experiences, e.g. in Crane (1988), 
O’Shaughncssy (1957), and Sorenson (2002). I find that it is generally possible to explain seemingly 
inconsistent experiences as rapid alternations between distinct, internally consistent experiences. 
This interpretation is strongly suggested by the fact that the consistency of experience is as a general 
rule extremely robust: no matter how much drug one takes or how tired one is, somehow one always 
ends up with a logically consistent image of the world. This is even true in dreams, which are 
otherwise quite unconstrained. What one experiences might not always square with one’s conception 
of the world, but consciousness is remarkably reluctant to present us with an impossible world.
8Of course, one might want to recognize other kinds of unity.
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some phenomena] state one is in and 2) why tuples of people or other aggregates 
of conscious beings do not have experiences which unify the experiences of their 
members, e.g. why the mereological sum of me and my mother (call it MAM) does 
not have phenomenal states unifying our experiences. That is to say that we must 
explain both the unity there is and the unity there is not.
Observation 1 is straightforwardly explained by phenomenal composition and 
decomposition together: by composition, someone who stands in R to both P and 
Q also stands in R to PAQ; by decomposition, this state itself entails standing in R 
to P and standing in R to Q. This explanation is also consistent with observation 2, 
because my component phenomenal states are not the phenomenal states of MAM, 
so it does not follow by composition that MAM has any experience which unifies 
them.9
A related application of the virtualist framework would be to explain the pro­
ductivity of phenomenal consciousness. Like thought, experience comes in a huge 
variety. It seems plausible that the variety of experience is generated through some 
productive combination mechanism. One can easily imagine a parallel to Todor’s 
Language of Thought strategy applied to phenomenal states within the virtualist 
framework. We can imagine that there are basic ingredients of phenomenal states
9Of course, this explanation seems superficial because it is glossed in terms of persons. This 
makes it a little too easy to give an explanation consistent with observation 2. But just say that the 
following is true:
Phenomenal contagion If a part of a physical system S stands in R to P and no part of S stands in 
R to a proposition incompatible with P, then S stands in R to P.
The idea behind phenomenal contagion is that phenomenal states spread to higher structures as much 
as they can without risk of generating inconsistent states. Assuming that phenomenal states are had 
at the most basic level by parts of persons, contagion, composition and decomposition together 
predict roughly what we find in introspection: by contagion, and given that all the experiences had 
by parts of me are consistent, I have all these experiences; by composition and decomposition, 
they are all unified. What is remarkable is that this simple and elegant explanation of observation 
1 is in line with observation 2: even though MAM and I share parts which instantiate phenomenal 
states, MAM cannot have experiences which unify my mother’s and mine through contagion because 
our experiences are inconsistent. They are inconsistent because we always experience different, 
incompatible properties as being instantiated at locations which are subjectively the same for us. For 
example, my current visual content says that what is "right in front" has such and such quality. My 
mom’s visual content ascribes different, incompatible properties to what is right in front of her. If 
both of our contents are about a generic "what is in front"—the same thing in both contents—, they 
are inconsistent.
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associated with the various constituents of the propositions or states of affairs we 
can experience (e.g. properties), and that all phenomenal states are formed by com­
bining these ingredients. The content of a complex phenomenal state would be 
determined by the contributions of its constituents in much the same way that the 
content of a sentence is determined by the semantic values of its constituents.
But enough speculation. My point is that it is not hard to see how the struc­
ture virtualism adds to consciousness could be put to use. The importance of this 
point cannot be overemphasized. Without a framework like that provided by virtu­
alism, consciousness is shapeless and elusive. To make progress toward a general 
solution to the scientific problem, we need a language in which to state precise gen­
eralizations about consciousness. Virtualism promises this: it promises a formal 
framework in which to state the Newtonian laws of consciousness—perhaps not the 
principles stated above, but hopefully similarly simple principles.
Some reductive representational theories purport to do more for the scientific 
problem than virtualism. Dretske’s (1995) and Tye’s (1995) theories, in particular, 
are potential solutions to this problem, because they provide general mappings be­
tween phenomenal states and physical-functional states. But there are good reasons 
to reject these theories, some of which were summarized in the preceding chapter 
(section 1.2). If they are false, they do nothing for the scientific problem. Our con­
cern, in any case, is to assess whether virtualism can help with the scientific problem 
as much as the other general representational theories most representationalists can 
accept.
2.3.3 Virtualism and the metaphysical question
Before we ask whether virtualism can do the job of representationalism with respect 
to the metaphysical problem, we must first clarify what this job is.
There are two main ways representationalism could conceivably help with the 
metaphysical problem independently of what it can do for the scientific problem.
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First, it could provide independent support for one metaphysical theory or the other. 
For example, it could help us see that the identity theory is true (or false). Rep- 
resentationalism is more often than not taken to support physicalism, not dualism, 
so I will only consider it in this role.10 Given virtualism’s complete agnosticism 
regarding the realizers of phenomenal states, it should also be fairly clear that it 
is just as good as any other form of representationalism as far as supporting du­
alism goes. Second, representationalism could undercut the evidence against one 
metaphysical view or the other. This is different from supporting one view or the 
other: sometimes showing that an argument for P is unsound does not provide any 
independent evidence for -«P but merely undercuts the evidence for P. Here I am 
not aware of purported applications which are friendly to dualism. What has been 
suggested is that representationalism helps undercut the zombie and knowledge ar­
guments against physicalism (c.f. Tye 1999, Jackson 2003). Representationalism 
can also help with the metaphysical problem in virtue of helping with the scientific 
problem, but we already discussed the relation between virtualism and the scientific 
problem.
I don’t think representationalism provides much support for physicalism. Of 
course, physicalist versions of the view such as Dretske’s, Tye’s, and Lycan’s the­
ories directly imply physicalism.* 11 Aside from the fact that there are good reasons 
to reject these theories which do not rely on general arguments against physicalism, 
there is the problem that they do not provide independent support for physicalism: 
no one who finds physicalism or functionalism unattractive will find them attrac­
tive. If these theories do not help convince the skeptics, they do not provide support 
for physicalism in any interesting sense. It is also true of nonreductive versions of 
representationalism (including virtualism) that they provide no support for physi­
calism independently of whatever impact they might have on the scientific problem. 
One might have thought that identifying phenomenal states with intentional states
10 An exception is Pautz (2006), who argues for dualism from an intentionalist perspective.
11 To keep things simple, I count functionalism as a kind of physicalism.
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would help. But no one thinks that phenomenal states are mere intentional states 
(except maybe for people who think that intentional states are all phenomenal, but 
this would defeat the reductionist agenda). Extant nonreductive representationalist 
views claim at best that phenomenal states are a special phenomenal kind of inten­
tional state. Anyone who sees a problem with phenomenal states being physical or 
functional should remain unmoved.
Whether representationalism undercuts arguments against physicalism is a more 
complicated matter. In practice, the evidence for dualism reduces to a reasoning of 
this form:
The generic case for dualism
1. Phenomenal states intuitively seem to be X.
2. That phenomenal states intuitively seem to be X is good evidence against 
physicalism.
Therefore, there is good evidence against physicalism.
This is not how the arguments for dualism are normally presented, but what they boil 
down to in practice—the points we have ended up debating. Officially, the main 
arguments for dualism have this form: "phenomenal states are X; if phenomenal 
states are X, physicalism is false; therefore, physicalism is false". But the debate 
has taken a psychological turn due to the nature of the relevant Xs. As it is, the 
key question is whether how phenomenal states intuitively seem to be is a good 
indicator that dualism is the correct view.
In the case of Chalmers’ zombie argument, the first premise of the case for du­
alism is that zombies intuitively seem conceivable (X is the property of not being 
a priori entailed by physical states). In the case of Jackson’s knowledge argument, 
the first premise is that it appears possible to know all the physical facts without 
knowing certain facts about the nature of consciousness (X is the property of hav­
ing a nature that is not known automatically upon knowing all the physical facts).
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Both starting points are highly plausible at least on some reading. In each case, a 
favorable reading of the first claim can be adopted and all the burden of the argu­
ment shifted onto the second claim, which asserts that the intuitively plausible fact 
indicates the falsity of physicalism.
The main reasons for disagreeing with the second claim which have been ad­
vanced fall into three categories: appeals to broadly speaking semantic features 
of the relevant statements or concepts (e.g., a posteriori necessity or indexicality; 
Perry 2001); appeals to a special kind of concept (phenomenal concepts; c.f. Loar 
1990, Lycan 2003; 1996a, Tye 2000: 30); appeals to the hypothesis that dualist 
intuitions have their source in a systematic conflation of experiences with their ob­
jects (Jackson 2003; to some extent Harman 1990). The first strategy has not to 
my knowledge been associated with representationalism. The second strategy is 
endorsed by representationalists Lycan and Tye, but it does not obviously draw on 
representationalism. (The strategy is to claim that the concepts we use in grasping 
experiences are "recognitional" or relevantly like perceptually grounded concepts.) 
The last approach, however, is quintessential^ representational.
In a nutshell, the claim is that we systematically conflate the properties we rep­
resent in experience with properties of our experiences. Since, the argument goes, 
the properties we represent, at least in the case of color experience, are not entailed 
by physical facts (they are not instantiated at all), this gives rise to the illusion that 
phenomenal facts are not entailed by or identical to physical facts, illusion which 
manifests itself in the intuitive appeal of Chalmers’ and Jackson’s starting points. 
Here is Jackson on Jackson:
There is a redness about sensing red (a yellowness about sensing yel­
low, and so on). We naturally think of the redness as a property we are 
acquainted with when we sense red and as the property Mary finds out 
about on her release. We may want to distinguish redness as a prop­
erty of objects from redness as a property of an area of our visual field,
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perhaps using 'red*’ for the latter. Either way, what it is like is, on the 
picture, a matter of having redness or redness*, knowing what it is like 
is knowing about redness or redness*, and the knowledge argument is 
an argument to the conclusion that Mary does not know about redness 
or redness*— that is, about the property we are, according to the pic­
ture, acquainted with when we sense red. [...] intentionalism tells us 
that there is no such property. To suppose otherwise is to mistake an 
intentional property for an instantiated one. (Jackson 2003)
Jackson goes on to argue that redness or redness*, the property that dualists such as 
his old self conflate with a property of experiences, is not even instantiated in this 
world. This property is not entailed by physical facts, but that is compatible with 
physicalism because it is a mere intentional property.
The negative transparency thesis does most of the explanatory work for Jack- 
son. Indeed, the above passage follows his discussion of negative transparency. In 
a nutshell, Jackson’s reply to his old self is that a) negative transparency is true; b) 
negative transparency shows that experiences do not instantiate redness or redness*; 
c) the knowledge argument is about redness or redness*; therefore, the knowledge 
argument does not bear on consciousness. If this is how representationalism under­
cuts the evidence for dualism, any representationalist view which supports negative 
transparency can do the job (including virtualism).
I must say that I do not find Jackson’s response entirely satisfactory. It does not 
seem hard to keep the distinction between instantiated properties and represented 
properties straight, once one has seen it. Suppose we think of experiences of red 
as phenomenal representations of redness which do not instantiate any redness-like 
properties (in some sense or other of "representation"). Doesn’t it still seem that 
experiences of red fail to be entailed by physical states, or that one could know all 
the physical facts while not knowing what it’s like to be in such a state? While the 
representationalist view can provide an explanation of one possible kind of cogni-
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tive illusion, it is not clear that we cannot avoid this illusion while preserving the 
intuition that fuels dualist sentiments.
There is however a further move one can make within the representationalist 
framework beyond Jackson's reply. This one involves positive transparency. If 
positive transparency is true, we systematically attend to external features such as 
redness when attending to our experiences. That is to say that we systematically 
attend to features which are not parts of our experiences but merely represented 
by them. This observation could go some way toward explaining our purported 
tendency to conflate our phenomenal states with properties like redness which are 
neither physical nor instantiated. It might, after all, be very hard if not impossible 
to keep the distinction between phenomenal states and their objects straight. This 
response would be further reinforced if it turned out that grasping an experience 
in order to reason competently about it required attending to it introspectively or 
attending to a "faint copy" in imagination (Tye 2000, ch.2 suggests something like 
this).
The foregoing strikes me as a potent reply to arguments against physicalism, 
and it works just as well on the virtualist view as on any other representationalist 
view. The reply is highly speculative, but it seems to be the best representationalism 
enables (maybe not the best available to physicalists). I conclude that virtualism, 
with plausible auxiliary assumptions, can help physicalism at least to the extent that 
representationalism may reasonably be taken to help it.
2.4 The place of consciousness in the mind
A theory which assimilates experience to a species of "intentionality" might natu­
rally be expected to shed light on the relation between consciousness and proposi­
tional attitudes. There are a number of central questions one could expect such a 
l2Alter (2006) presents an objection along these lines.
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theory to throw new light on, including the following two:
The epistemic role of experience What role do experiences play in the justifica­
tion of beliefs?
The semantic role of experience What role do experiences play in grounding the 
contents of propositional attitudes?
Virtualism might seem less promising than other representational theories as far as 
answering these questions goes because it does not explicitly ascribe a common na­
ture to experiences and propositional attitudes. But here it is important to keep in 
mind that other theories fail at this too, for reasons covered in chapter 1. Unless ex­
periences are implausibly said to be canonical attitudes such as beliefs and desires, 
there is no clear content to the claim that they are intentional states or attitudes.
Of course, that is only to say that virtualism does no worse than other represen­
tational theories. The virtualist can in fact do better. I won’t be able to explain how 
in detail here, but I want to sketch the overall picture.
It is best to start with the semantic role of experience. Most theorists would 
agree that experience is not only a source of evidence about the world, but also a 
source of content: it is largely through experience that we acquire the ability to think 
about the world that surrounds us. Although this was not the point of it, this fact is 
brought into sharp focus by Jackson’s Mary thought experiment: there is a strong 
intuition that Mary cannot acquire the concept RED— the normal one that normally 
sighted people have—until she experiences red. The problem for the virtualist is to 
explain why this might be.13
I suggest that experience furnishes the mind with content by realizing canonical 
propositional attitudes. We have seen that experiences are not canonical proposi­
tional attitudes, but this does not mean that they cannot be realizers or constituents
1 ’There is also another problem, that of grounding reference to particulars. This will be discussed 
(also briefly) in chapter 8.
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of canonical propositional attitudes. Suppose for example that you have an experi­
ence of a certain colored shape in front of you. This experience by itself does not 
constitute a belief. However, it seems to me that it could well be an important player 
in the causal network of states (occurrent and potential) which constitutes or real­
izes your belief that there is something colored in front of you. On the output side, 
at least, it can have all the (defeasible) inferential connections we would expect a 
belief-realizing state to bear to other states.
We get a more rounded picture of the role experiences can play when we con­
sider non-perceptual experiences. Mental imagery, whether visual, auditory or pro­
prioceptive, is extremely pervasive. On the virtualist view, these "imagistic" ex­
periences are of a kind with perceptual experiences. As I will argue in chapter 6, 
plausibly the only essential difference between them and perceptual experiences is 
that they have more general contents (for example, they represent determinables 
such as redness rather than specific shapes of red). If we grant this, we can also 
grant a more important role to experience in realizing propositional attitudes: imag­
istic experiences can provide the contents of the general beliefs and desires which 
they realize through suitable connections with other states.
Cognitive feelings also seem to play a major role in cognition. I am thinking 
of the feeling of deja vu, the feeling that something is right (or not right), the feel­
ing of being confused, the feeling of similarity, the feeling of wanting something, 
etc. These feelings are like signposts we follow as we reason our way through the 
problems of life. For example, if you ask me, "are you sure about this?", I will look 
inside for that feeling of conviction. I know whether 1 have met someone before by 
the feeling I have while looking at them—do they feel familiar or not?14
We can distinguish two kinds of propositional attitude which derive from phe­
nomenal states. The first, which we could call conscious attitudes, are attitudes 
14Goldman (1993) argues along these lines.
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which consist in having suitably related occurrent and potential experiences. * 1'1 Hav­
ing an experience of red suitably related to a feeling of conviction, sensory imagery, 
and all other phenomenal states one is in a position to token might be an example 
of a conscious attitude. Conscious attitudes can themselves realize other attitudes 
through their interconnections and relations they stand in to non-experiences (e.g. 
entities in one’s environment). These other attitudes could be called external at­
titudes (they are external to consciousness). A possible example of an external 
attitude would be a thought that H2O is F which one has in virtue of a) having a 
(conscious) thought to the effect that the watery stuff around here is F; b) the fact 
that the watery stuff around here is H2O; c) further dispositions which amount to 
one’s being interested primarily in the basic structure of the watery stuff around 
here as far as F-ness goes. I talk about how certain intentional states can derive 
from others in more detail in Bourget (forthcoming).
When I say that experience furnishes the mind with content by realizing atti­
tudes, I don’t mean to imply that thinking requires the capacity for phenomenal 
consciousness. This is a further claim I am not making here (though I am sympa­
thetic to it). What I am suggesting is that our propositional attitudes are in actual 
fact largely realized by phenomenal states. It seems to me that this position is a 
nearly inevitable extension of the widely endorsed functionalist and dispositional- 
ist views of attitudes. 16 If you hold such a view, whether you are an internalist or 
an externalist about content (but especially if you fall in the former category), you 
should agree that experience is a central realizer of thought: there is so much of it, it 
cannot but play a central role in shaping the high-level causal patterns which make 
up thought.
l5Conscious attitudes should not be conflated with what I call "phenomenal attitudes" in Bourget 
(forthcoming). Phenomenal attitudes are phenomenal states which are also propositional attitudes.
I don’t think there are phenomenal attitudes (at least no canonical propositional attitudes which are 
phenomenal states), but I have no qualms with conscious attitudes.
l6Schwitzgebcl (2002) makes a good case for a dispositionalism about attitudes which gives a 
central role to phenomenal states.
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An extended discussion of the epistemic role of experience would take us too 
far away from our topic, but it is not hard to see in outline which way a virtualist 
should go on this matter. The key concern is that, as Davidson famously puts its, 
only a belief can justify a belief. Since phenomenal states are not more belief­
like than desire-like on the virtualist view, it might seem that they cannot justify 
beliefs directly. They could still provide evidence for beliefs in the same kind of 
way that footsteps provide evidence that someone has passed by, but this sort of 
picture of how experiences justify beliefs about the external world is widely held to 
be untenable.17
The solution to this problem again lies in functionalism about attitudes. While 
no single experience constitutes a belief on its own, groups of experiences, some ac­
tual and some potential, with their causal connections, may be said to either realize 
or be beliefs. Functionalism about attitudes offers an alternative to the two preced­
ing accounts of the epistemic role of experience: in the basic cases of perceptual 
justification which are of interest here, individual experiences neither directly jus­
tify beliefs nor serve as evidence for beliefs; rather, they constitute beliefs when 
present in sufficient numbers and suitably connected. While this view does not 
have all the epistemological advantages of a direct justification theory, it does seem 
to avoid the main pitfalls of the traditional alternative.
I am aware that the preceding accounts of the semantic and epistemic roles of 
experience are all too sketchy. I offer them primarily as proofs of concept for more 
sophisticated accounts compatible with virtualism. T will return to the content­
grounding role of experience in sections 6.5 and 8.2.
l7See Brewer’s (1999) extended case against this view, or Johnston (2006) on the “Wallpaper 
view”.
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2.5 Summary
In this chapter I have tried to show that virtualism can play the theoretical role rep­
resentational theories should be expected to play: to account for the possibility of 
illusion without sense-data, to explain negative and positive transparency, to provide 
a framework in which the scientific problem can be tackled fruitfully, to offer a pos­
sible explanation of dualist intuitions, and to shed light on the interactions between 
the different departments of the mind.
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Part II
A case for virtualism
Chapter 3
Experience in plain language
Having introduced virtualism and illustrated some of its applications, I will now 
make a case for the theory in this and the next two chapters. There is no shortage 
of objections and alternatives to representational theories of consciousness. I don’t 
expect the argument I will present to obliterate all sources of opposition. However,
I think this argument provides good independent evidence: it ought to have consid­
erable weight when we assess the totality of evidence at the end of the day. 1 will 
turn to objections in chapters 6-8.
One major difficulty with consciousness which must be attended to at the outset 
is that the language we (philosophers) use to talk about it is not well grounded 
in everyday speech. The definition of experience I have been working with, in 
particular, is largely ostensive. We cannot use the traditional analytic and linguistic 
tools with terms which are not grounded in everyday speech. My aim in this chapter 
is to present a way of describing phenomenal states precisely in everyday language. 
I refer to the thesis to be defended in this chapter as the perceptual conception o f 
sensory experience (PCSE). The perceptual conception of sensory experience is the 
starting point of my case for virtualism.
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Overview of the case for virtualism
1. The perceptual conception of sensory experience is correct, (this chapter)
2. If the perceptual conception of sensory experience is correct, sensory virtual­
ism is true, (chapter 4)
3. If sensory virtualism is true, virtualism is true, (chapter 5)
Therefore, virtualism is true.
To a first approximation, the perceptual conception of sensory experience says that 
sensory phenomenal states can be referred to as episodes of seeing, hearing, tasting, 
ecetera, on intensional readings of these expressions. The perceptual conception 
of sensory experience is only a thesis about sensory experience, and I will be con­
cerned exclusively with sensory experiences and phenomenal states in this and the 
next chapter. For the sake of legibility, I will use "phenomenal states" and "experi­
ences" without qualification to refer to sensory phenomenal states and experiences. 
Sensory experiences include experiences in the familiar sensory modalities (touch, 
sight, etc.) as well as bodily experiences such as pain experiences. For present 
purposes I do not count sensory imagination as a kind of sensory experience.
3.1 Intensional perceivings
In chapter 2 we saw in passing that perceptual ascriptions can lend themselves to 
two kinds of reading: intensional and material readings. On a material reading of 
"a sees an F" (seem), this statement can only be true if there is an F that a sees. By 
contrast, on the intensional reading (seej) the statement can typically be true even if 
there is no F that a sees. It is worth considering more examples of intensional uses 
of perceptual verbs. To start with "see":
• I see a strange shape on my left. I think my retina is damaged.
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• I see colored shapes spinning in front of me, but I know there are no such 
things there.
• I see flashes all over the place—will you stop poking my brain with this elec­
trode !
Anscombe (1965) gives examples which illustrate intensional uses of "hear" and 
"smell":
• With this hearing aid, when you talk I hear some screeching noises; no low 
tones and the consonants are very indistinct.
• I hear a ringing in my ears.
• I keep on smelling the smell of burning rubber when, as I find out, there is no 
such thing.
For "feel" and "perceive":
• 1 feel something in my back even though there is nothing there.
• I feel a painful sensation in my leg, but 1 don’t have a leg anymore!
• I perceive a blue expanse when I put the lenses on.
Intensional readings of perceptual verbs are available in other languages than En­
glish. In French, for example, direct translations of the previous statements are all 
perfectly intelligible and normal. To illustrate:
• Je vois une forme bizarre ä ma gauche; je crois que ma retine est endom- 
magee.
• J ’entends un scillement dans mes oreilles.
• Je sens une sensation douleureuse dans majambe, mais je n’ai plus de jambe!
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One might think that "feel" is a special case in that there is no material reading of it 
which contrasts with the intensional reading. In the case of "see", everyone agrees 
that there is a reading of "I see an F" on which there has to be an F one is suitably 
related to in order for this statement to be true. In the case of "feel", there might 
seem to be no such reading, because it might seem that "I feel pain", for example, 
simply means that I am in pain, which never requires the presence of an object.
It is important to see that there is in fact a material reading of "feel". Recall the 
last time you hit a toe on a door frame. You most likely felt a painful sensation in 
your toe. If you had paid close attention to the phenomenology of your experience 
instead of trying to distract yourself from the pain by swearing and contorting your­
self, you could have felt the sensation spread and contract with time. Most likely, 
you eventually noticed that the sensation you had been experiencing was receding 
from your toe. Throughout this experience, you could have referred to the sensation 
in your toe as a pain: you could have perfectly well said that you felt pain in your 
toe.
This example illustrates the fact that there are natural uses of "sensation" and 
"pain" on which these terms designate things of a sort that can be found in parts 
of the body and be characterized as having various spatio-temporal properties (e.g. 
contracting and spreading). "Sensation" and "pain", understood this way, do not 
refer to experiences or mental states: I can say that I have a sensation or pain in 
my toe in this sense, but I cannot say that I have an experience in my toe. So there 
seems to be readings of "sensation" and "pain" on which they pick out other things 
than experiences. The things they pick out furthermore seem to be the objects of 
bodily experiences, that is, the things that we naturally claim to be feeling when 
undergoing such experiences ("I felt pain in my toe"; "I felt an unpleasant sensation 
in my chest"). "Pain" and "sensation" can also be used to refer to mental states, 
but these two uses should not be conflated. Here, I will use "sensation" and "pain"
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exclusively to refer to the objects of bodily experiences, in as much as possible.1
"Feel" is subject to the same ambiguity as "pain", because one can say that 
one "feels pain" in either sense of "pain": one can feel the mental state of pain in 
(roughly) the sense of having it, and one can feel a painful sensation in a different 
sense of "feel". It is this second use of "feel" which lends itself to either material or 
intensional readings. On the material reading, "I feel pain" can only be true if there 
exists a painful sensation that I feel; not so on the intensional reading.
It is worth noting that while intensional readings are weaker than material read­
ings in one respect (they have a kind of "existence neutrality"), they are sometimes 
stronger in another: to a first approximation, to say that one seesj an F is to say 
something substantive about how the world appears to one, but to say that one seesm 
an F is not to say anything substantive about how the world appears to one. For ex­
ample, one can seem a ship as a blip on a radar screen, as a big ship-like object, or 
as a light source in a fog. Seeingm an F might require that an F appears one way 
or another, but there are virtually no constraints on how it can appear to one. By 
contrast, intensional readings of perceptual ascriptions of the form " a  0-s an F" 
have substantive implications regarding how the world appears to one.
What, exactly, is the difference between intensional and material readings of 
perceptual ascriptions?
We standardly distinguish three marks of intensional contexts: substitution re­
sistance, existence neutrality, and non-specificity. A context resists substitution 
when changing a term in it for a co-extensive term can result in a change in the truth 
value of the embedding sentence. On the standard account, a context is existence-
1 Brentano notes the tendency to conflate experiences and sensations:
A further basis for this illusion [that experiences of bodily sensations do not “present” 
anything, in Brentano’s sense] is the fact that the quality which precedes the feeling 
and the feeling itself do not have two distinct names. The physical phenomenon which 
appears along with the feeling of pain is also called pain. ... we say that we feel pain 
in the foot. This is an equivocation, such as, indeed, we often find when different 
things are closely related to one another. (Brentano 1874: 84)
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neutral when existential quantifiers and singular terms occurring in it do not have 
their usual existential import. Non-specificity is best explained through an example. 
Take statement 3.1, an example from Forbes (2008).
(3.1) Oedipus is looking for a member of his family.
The specific reading of this statement is given by 3.2.
(3.2) 3 x ( f  amily Member (Oedipus, x) A lookingFor(Oedipus,x))
By contrast, the non-specific reading of 3.1 is one on which it does not entail 3.2. 
On this reading, Oedipus does not care who he finds so long as the person is a 
member of his family.
While fairly standard, the preceding account of intensionality is not without 
problems. In particular, Forbes (2006; 2008) gives several examples of contexts 
which appear to satisfy some but not all of these marks of intensionality. Coburn 
(1977) makes a parallel observation regarding the intensionality of perceptual verbs.
Given that the three "marks of intensionality" can potentially come apart, we 
would do best to regard them as characterizing potentially independent kinds of 
intensionality. Rather than talk about intensionality without qualification, we should 
talk about contexts which resist substitution, exhibit existence neutrality, or lend 
themselves to unspecific readings.
Here I am primarily interested in existence neutrality. I believe that perceptual 
verbs can exhibit all marks of intensionality, but existence neutrality is the most 
relevant to my project.
In fact, the kind of intensionality which interests me here is not exactly existence 
neutrality as glossed above. I characterized existence-neutral readings as readings 
on which "existential quantifiers and singular terms do not have their usual exis­
tential import". This account does not apply to a statement such as 3.3, because 
this statement contains no existential quantifiers or singular terms as part of the
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complement of the verb.2
(3.3) I ordered cars.
Yet 3.3 seems susceptible to the same kind of ambiguity as "I ordered a car". More 
specifically, there is a reading of 3.3 on which it entails that there are cars I ordered 
(the material reading), and there is another reading on which it has no such impli­
cation (the intensional reading). On the intensional reading, but not on the material 
reading, the statement could be true even if there were no such things as cars. Like­
wise, a statement such as 3.4 can be read in at least two ways which parallel the 
material and intensional readings of "I ordered a car".
(3.4) Bob ordered every new car.
On its material reading, statement 3.4 would be vacuously true if there were no new 
cars in the domain of discourse, because it says merely that every new car is such 
that it has been ordered by Bob. By contrast, statement 3.4 would not automatically 
be satisfied on its intensional reading if there were no new cars, because this reading 
entails that Bob has performed an act of a certain kind, and the fact that there are no 
new cars does not entail that Bob has performed such an act.
These examples point toward a broader kind of intensionality than existence 
neutrality as defined above, and this kind of intensionality is more directly relevant 
to my aims here. This more general phenomenon is best characterized in terms 
of quantifier scope. Some statements of the form " a  </>-s S" can be read either 
materially or intensionally. On a material reading, the argument of ( f )  specified by S 
is or involves a variable bound by a quantifier located outside the arguments of ( f ) .  
On an intensional reading, the proposition expressed involves no quantification of 
this kind.
_______________________________  •
"Of course, the statement does contain a quantifier according to the widely accepted view that all 
NPs are generalized quantifiers (Westerstähl 2008), namely "cars". But it is unclear how to extend 
the notion of an existential quantifier to all relevant generalized quantifiers consistently with the 
present account of existence neutrality: we cannot say that existential quantifiers support existential 
generalization, because existence-neutral contexts undermine existential generalization.
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Material reading A reading of an expression of the form "a  0-s S", where 0 is a 
verb and S complements 0, is material just in case its assigns the expression 
a logical form in which the argument of 0 specified by S is or involves a 
variable bound by a quantifier located outside the arguments of 0.
Intensional reading A reading of an expression of the form "a  0-s S", where 0 is 
a verb and S complements 0, is intensional just in case it is not material.
For the purposes of illustration, let us assume that names contribute individuals to 
logical form. Given this assumption (and setting aside complications pertaining to 
tense), the material reading of "Alice ordered a painting" ascribes it the following 
logical form:
(3.5) 3x(painting(x) Aordered(Alice,x))
This is a material reading because the second argument of the relation specified by 
"a painting" is a variable bound by a quantifier outside the arguments of the relation. 
By contrast, the intensional reading of this expression assigns it a logical form in 
which the second argument of the relation is not (and does not involve) a variable 
bound by a quantifier outside the argument. On this alternate reading, the statement 
does not entail that there is any painting. We will see in the next chapter what is 
the logical form of such a statement on its intensional reading. I want to leave all 
options open for now. Multiple possibilities will be assessed in the next chapter.
A potential flaw of the present definition of intensional readings is that some 
statements which do not intuitively seem intensional in any way might turn out 
intensional. In particular, a statement such as "Alice sees Bob" might be thought 
to have only one possible reading: see(Alice,Bob), which involves no quantifiers at 
all. If this is correct, "Alice sees Bob" is always intensional on my definition, which 
might seem inconsistent with the normal usage of "intensional".
This issue could be addressed by stipulating that a proposition of the form 
"0(___, a)", where a  is an individual or an entity constituted in part by an individ-
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ual, always constitutes a material reading. Having said this, I prefer the unmodified 
definition because I believe that perceptual ascriptions such as "Alice sees Bob" are 
capable of material readings even on this definition, and that the material readings 
are in fact the most commonly intended ones. On broadly descriptivist views of the 
logical role of names, they contribute the logical equivalent of (possibly rigidilied) 
definitive descriptions to propositions. They are therefore quantificational expres­
sions. On such a view it is natural to allow the quantifier contributed by "Bob" in 
"Alice sees Bob" to take either wide scope or narrow scope over the argument of 
•"see". The wide scope reading is material, while the narrow scope reading is inten- 
sional. On a broadly descriptivist view of names, then, it is not true that all readings 
of "Alice sees Bob" are intensional. I’ll discuss some evidence for this position in 
section 4.6 after having introduced necessary background material. We will see at 
the same time that the understanding of the intensional / material distinction I am 
proposing is in line with the leading account of intensional transitives in Montague 
semantics.
While my definition of intensional readings is not meant to capture all features 
commonly attributed to intensional contexts, it worth noting that intensional read­
ings as defined above are not unrelated to non-specific readings and substitution 
resistance. Indeed, intensional readings seem to be exactly the same as non-specific 
readings on my definition of the former. They also seem to coincide with the failure 
of substitutivity of co-extensive terms as far as definite descriptions go. When a 
definite description takes wide scope over a predicate, the resulting logical form in­
volves an existential quantifier outside the argument of the predicate. The resulting 
reading is therefore material. Co-extensive definite descriptions with wide scope 
are also arguably interchangeable salva veritate. On the other hand, definite de­
scriptions which have narrow scope do not result in intensional readings and are 
arguably not as a general rule interchangeable salva veritate. So intensionality and 
the failure of substitutivity of co-extensive terms go together as far as predicates
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involving definite descriptions and no other quantificational expressions go.
I will refer to the states ascribed on intensional readings of perceptual ascriptions 
as intensional perceivings.
Intensional perceiving A state ascribable using a locution of the form "a  </>-s S", 
where (j) is a perceptual verb used intensionally and S complements (J).
The perceptual ascriptions with which I began this section are all naturally read as 
ascribing intensional perceivings in this sense.3
A few claims I am not making need to be flagged before continuing. I claim that 
it is typically possible to read perceptual ascriptions in an intensional manner, but I 
do not claim that this is always possible. For example, I suspect that the statement 
"I see the man next door" has no (meaningful) intensional reading. This is fine for 
my purposes. I also do not claim that the intensional reading of "see" is a reading 
on which it can be true for any property F that one sees an F without there being an 
F. For example, T cannot seej an object without there being an object, because my 
seeing an object requires that I (an object) exist. The fallibility of intensional seeings 
is limited just like the fallibility of belief (necessary propositions and contingent 
propositions such as that something is believed cannot be believed falsely). It is 
precisely this observation which led me to think of the distinction purely in terms 
of logical form and quantification.
Ayer (1940) draws a distinction which is superficially similar to my intensional 
/ material distinction:
If I say that I am seeing a stick which looks crooked, I do not imply 
that anything really is crooked ... or if, being subject to an illusion of 
double vision, I say that I am perceiving two pieces of paper, I need not 
be implying that there really are two pieces of paper there. But surely,
’Anscombe’s burning rubber example might be an exception: the definite description "the smell 
of burning rubber" is more naturally read as having wide scope. But one could say "I smell smell 
34" instead, where smell 34 is the smell o f burning rubber.
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it may be said, if the two pieces of paper really are perceived they must 
both exist in some sense, even if not as material things. The answer to 
this objection is that it is based on a misunderstanding of the way in 
which I am using the word "perceive". I am using it here in such a way 
that to say of an object that it is perceived does not entail saying that 
it exists in any sense at all. And this is a perfectly correct and familiar 
usage of the word. (Ayer 1940: ch 1)
Ayer seems to want to highlight the possibility of intensional readings of perceptual 
ascriptions in something like my sense. This passage is followed by a summary 
of the main features of the two kinds of reading of perceptual ascriptions he wants 
to distinguish. In one sense of "see", Ayer claims, "it is necessary that what is 
seen should really exist, but not necessary that it should have the qualities that it 
appears to have." In another, "it is not possible that anything should seem to have 
qualities that it does not really have, but also not necessary that what is seen should 
really exist." Ayer’s distinction appears to turn on what I call intensionality and 
what we might refer to as appearance neutrality. It is similar to the intensional / 
material distinction I have drawn, in that, at least as far as perceptual predicates of 
the form "(f)-s an F" go, it separates readings which are existence-neutral but are 
not appearance-neutral (intensional readings) from others which are not existence- 
neutral but are appearance-neutral (material readings).
Having said this, there are important differences between Ayer’s characteriza­
tion of these features of perceptual ascriptions and mine. First, Ayer’s characteriza­
tion of the existence neutrality of intensional readings seems to carry a commitment 
to Meinongian objects. He appears to be saying that it is (in practice) possible for 
there to be an object jc such that one can correctly say of jc that it is perceived with­
out its existing ("to say of an object that it is perceived does not entail saying that 
it exists in any sense at all"). This claim commits one to there being non-existent 
objects. By contrast, my characterization of intensional readings does not: I am
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only committed to it being (in practice) possible to see an F without there being an 
F. All that this requires is that the determiner occurring as part of the complement 
of "see" not take wide scope over the latter, as in “I requested a diamond table”. I 
will explain how this works in section 4.6.
Ayer’s characterization of appearance neutrality (or non-neutrality) also differs 
significantly from mine. His claim that there is a sense of "see" on which "it is not 
possible that anything should seem to have qualities that it does not really have" 
is rather puzzling. This is supposed to be a feature of intensional readings, those 
readings which exhibit something like existence neutrality. This claim is puzzling 
because when one says that one "sees; an F", it is unclear that one can be construed 
as talking about any object one sees. It is consequently unclear how to understand 
Ayer’s reference to the "it" that seems a certain way in such a state. My characteriza­
tion of appearance neutrality does not have this shortcoming, because it is not stated 
as a relation between the object one perceives and the manner in which it appears: 
I merely said that intensional readings but not material readings carry substantive 
implications regarding how the world appears to one.
These differences between Ayer’s formulation and mine make all the difference 
when it comes to Austin’s criticisms of Ayer. Take first this passage from Sense and 
Sensibilia:
... you may remember that he [AyerJ said earlier, as explicitly as could 
be, that there is a "correct and familiar" usage of "perceive" which is 
such that "to say of an object that it is perceived docs not entail saying 
that it exists in any sense at all". On this there is no possible comment 
except that there isn’t. (Austin 1962: 95)
Austin is right: it is not possible for there to be an x which does not exist. But this 
passage does not contain any argument against intensional readings of perceptual 
ascriptions as defined here.
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Austin criticizes other features of Ayer’s account which are not part of the 
intensional-material distinction I am proposing. In particular, a number of Ayer’s 
examples are flawed, and Austin correctly points this out. Austin also objects to 
details of Ayer’s characterization of the appearance neutrality of material readings 
which are not part of my account. Aside from the above passage, the only part of 
Austin’s discussion which might reasonably seem to carry over to my characteriza­
tion of the intensional / material distinction is the part where he insists that Ayer has 
not revealed a distinction between two senses of "perceive" but something else of 
lesser importance—that we can "stretch" the "ordinary usage" of perceptual verbs 
in exceptional circumstances:
Since, in this exceptional situation, though there is only one piece of 
paper I seem to see two, I may want to say "I am perceiving two pieces 
of paper" faute de mieux, knowing quite well that the situation isn’t re­
ally that in which these words are perfectly appropriate. But the fact 
that an exceptional situation may thus induce me to use words primar­
ily appropriate for a different, normal situation is nothing like enough 
to establish that there are, in general, two different, normal ("correct 
and familiar") senses of the words I use, or of any one of them. To 
produce a rather baffling abnormality like double vision could estab­
lish only, at most, that ordinary usage sometimes has to be stretched to 
accommodate exceptional situations. (Austin 1962: 91)
Here again, Austin is picking on a relatively superficial feature of Ayer’s exposition. 
Ayer does imply at times that there are two senses of "perceive", but this is not part 
of the intensional / material distinction. What matters is that perceptual predicates 
such as "0-s an F" can be read as ascribing two different kinds of state (intensional 
and material perceivings). This can be the case without perceptual verbs being am­
biguous. Indeed, the definitions of intensional and material readings I gave nearly 
imply that the intensional / material distinction lies in an ambiguity in logical form
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rather than a lexical ambiguity. In this regard, my approach is in line with leading 
accounts of the intensional / material ambiguity (see section 4.6).
One point which must be conceded is that intensional readings are atypical, in 
that material readings are usually intended. But this does not mean that they are 
not available as part of ordinary language. There is a simple explanation of their 
atypicality. First, our aim when talking about what we "perceive" is normally to 
communicate what there is in the environment, and only material readings encode 
this. There is also the fact that it is typically harder to tell what one perceives in 
the intensional sense than it is in the material sense, because intensional readings 
capture aspects of how the world appears to one "subjectively". It is comparatively 
easier to determine what objects one is being perceptually affected by. So material 
readings are usually both less committal and more to the point. This goes a long 
way toward explaining why they have default status in an ordinary conversational 
context.
3.2 Intensional perceivings and phenomenology
My aim in this section is to clarify the relation between intensional perceivings and 
phenomenal states.
3.2.1 Phenomenal uses of perceptual verbs
Intensional perceivings are generally accompanied by experiences. Normally, when 
one seesj an F, one also experiences an F. For example, normally when you seej 
a flash of light, you experience a flash of light; normally, when you see; a red 
expanse, you experience a red expanse; normally, when you seej a tree shape, you 
experience a tree shape; and so on. The same is true of intensional perceivings in 
other modalities. For example, normally, if you feelj a sensation in your back, you 
experience a sensation in your back.
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On the other hand, we sometimes ascribe intensional perceivings in absence 
of corresponding phenomenal states. For example, if I say that Bob sees thieves 
everywhere, I don’t mean to suggest that Bob instantiates phenomenal states of any 
kind. Or one might say that one can hear Walter Cronkite talk even though Cronkite 
isn’t there and the phenomenology of one’s experience at the time involves nothing 
Cronkite-specihc. This could perhaps be the case in virtue of one’s taking a certain 
(apparent) voice to be the voice of Walter Cronkite. There might also be a sense of 
"feelj" which implies no phenomenology. For example, it might be that "Bob feelsj 
a threat" does not imply that Bob instantiates any phenomenal state.
While some intensional perceptual ascriptions might not be intended to ascribe 
phenomenal states, we can distinguish a kind of reading of intensional perceptual 
ascriptions on which they are equivalent to "experiencing" ascriptions in our tech­
nical sense. In the phenomenal sense, to say that one (f)-s S, for any expression S 
which complements the perceptual verb 0, is simply to say that one experiences 
S in the relevant modality. To see a red ball in the phenomenal sense (seep), for 
example, is simply to visually experience a red ball.
The following story illustrates the phenomenal use of "see". Imagine that you 
have just undergone surgery to receive a cerebral implant that is supposed to aug­
ment your visualization abilities. A nurse will perform some tests on you to verify 
that the implant functions properly. She begins by attaching a device on your scalp.
-  Now tell me if you see a blue grid.
She flips a switch, which results in your experiencing a green but slightly bluish 
grid for the briefest moment. Having been primed to expect a blue grid, you take it 
to be blue.
-  Yes, I saw a blue grid.
The nurse initially seems satisfied by your response, but her expression quickly 
changes into a frown as she takes a second look at her console.
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-  I got the settings wrong. You’ve really seen a blue grid?
-  Yes I have.
-  Something is not right. I will run a scan of your short-term visual 
memory.
A moment later...
-  Thanks God you haven’t really seen a blue grid! Why on Earth did 
you say you had? You don’t know the difference between green and 
blue?
-  Oh, well, sorry. I really thought it was blue. Doesn’t that count as 
seeing it blue, anyway?
-  No, it doesn’t.
It is natural to take the nurse to be asking whether you sawp a blue grid (whether 
you visually experienced a blue grid). This example at least makes clear that there 
is a sense of "see" on which seeing something involves visually experiencing it.
One might think that something else than experience is involved in this kind of 
seeing, so it is worth considering the options. What else could the nurse have meant 
when she asked if you saw a blue grid in addition to your experiencing a blue grid? 
The nurse did not want to know whether you thought (believed, judged, etc.) that 
there really was a blue grid in front of you, because she knew that there was not and 
did not expect to convince you that there was. She did not want to know about the 
external cause or normal cause of the state you were in either. She knew about its 
external cause already, and insisting that the state you were in is normally caused 
by blue grids would not satisfy her. She might reply: "for all I know you’re one of 
those inverts— I want to know how things appeared to you". She was also not asking 
about your physiological condition. Indirectly, perhaps, she was (if physicalism is 
true), but her meaning was not "are you in such and such brain state", because she
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knows that you would not have been able to answer such a question. So, seeing 
a blue grid in the nurse’s sense does not conceptually require that some condition 
pertaining to judgments, the causes of the experience, or one’s physiology obtains. 
It also does not seem to be a matter of having an experience of a certain kind while a 
disjunction or other logical combination of these conditions obtains. There seems to 
be nothing else for the nurse to be asking about but phenomenology. Consequently, 
it seems that by "see a blue grid", she meant "visually experience a blue grid". In 
general, when we speak of seeing! things of the sort we can perceive independently 
of judging that things are thus and so, we mean seeing in the phenomenal sense. 
Seeing; flashes, grids, colors, shapes, etc, on the default understanding, are states of 
visually experiencing flashes, grids, colors, shapes, etc.4
What goes for sight goes for other modalities. Suppose for example that you 
are hearing a ringing in your ears. Typically, part of what you mean when you 
say that you are hearing a ringing is that you are having an experience of a certain 
kind, namely, an aural experience of a ringing in your hear. What else might you 
intend to say? Normally, to say that you are hearing a ringing is not to say anything 
about your beliefs, your environment, your physical state, or the current or normal 
circumstances of your state, because you could conceivably hear a ringing whatever 
your beliefs or the state of your body or environment. As in the case of blue grids, 
there seems to be nothing for the expression "hearing a ringing" to pick out but a 
certain experiencing state. Likewise for other modalities. If I say that I am feeling 
pain in my phantom arm, for example, all I am talking about is the experience I am 
undergoing.
Phenomenal readings of perceptual ascriptions can also be brought out by re­
flection on the grounds of certain ascriptions. Suppose that you get up from your 
bed too quickly and "see stars" as a result of this. You say, "Oh! I see stars". That 
you are seeing stars is something that you would normally realize spontaneously.
4Jackson (1977) and Chisholm (1948; 1950) distinguish phenomenal readings of "look" state­
ments in this way.
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As a result, it is plausible that you would normally come to notice that you are 
seeing stars either perceptually or introspectively: normally, your ground for assert­
ing that you see stars is either a perceptual judgment or an introspective judgment. 
Now, you do not normally make any relevant perceptual judgments when you find 
yourself seeing stars. As a general rule, you know full well that there are no specks 
of light in front of you. So it seems that the basis of your assertion, in the nor­
mal case at least, must be an introspective judgment. It is plausible that there are 
only two kinds of mental state we can introspect: attitudes and phenomenal states. 
Since seeing) stars does not seem to involve having an attitude or making a judg­
ment about stars,5 this makes it seems likely that it consists in nothing more than 
a phenomenal state. The same line of argument straightforwardly applies to other 
intensional phenomenal ascriptions.
In addition to illustrating a phenomenal use of a perceptual verb, the preceding 
example illustrates an important observation regarding such uses. It is clear that 
when one says that one seesp stars, one does not mean that one is perceivingp ce­
lestial bodies. The word "stars" here functions as a shorthand for something like 
"multiple brilliant specks of lights". The use of such shorthands in phenomenal 
perceptual ascriptions is common and can obscure the distinction between phenom­
enal and non-phenomenal ascriptions. If I say that I saw a car, an elephant, or an 
alien while hallucinating, for example, I might seem to be using "saw" in some 
non-phenomenal intensional sense, because I arguably cannot experience a car, an 
elephant, or an alien (in the technical sense of "experience"; I can in the everyday 
sense). But this is generally not the case. Typically, someone who claims to have 
seen a car, an elephant, an alien or any other "high level" entity in a hallucinatory 
context does not intend the ascription to be taken literally. If I report that I saw a 
pink elephant in my lounge while under the effect of LSD, I don’t mean that I saw 
a member of the taxonomic family of elephantidae in any sense of "saw". I mean
5See Bourget (forthcoming).
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that I saw,, something pink with certain readily perceptible features of elephants. 
Similarly, when I say that I saw a car in my dream, I don’t mean to imply that I 
saw an artifact whose primary function was to transport people and goods in such 
and such manner. I mean that I sawp something with certain superficial car features. 
We often use loaded terms like these as shorthands for more accurate descriptions 
of what we see in the phenomenal sense, and this practice can create an illusion 
that we mean "see" in some other sense. I have used and will continue to use such 
shorthands for legibility’s sake, but it is important to keep this in mind.
Of course, it might be that we can literally seep many different kinds of high- 
level entity such as artifacts and life forms. We don’t have to take a stand on this 
matter for present purposes. The point is that, even if we suppose that we cannot 
experience such entities, we should not take the fact that most candidate phenome­
nal uses of perceptual verbs in real life involve high-level terms to suggest that there 
are few or no such uses.
While intensional and phenomenal readings of perceptual ascriptions generally 
go together, the intensional / material distinction is in fact orthogonal to the phenom­
enal / non-phenomenal distinction. Contrary to the intensional / material distinction, 
the phenomenal / non-phenomenal distinction appears to be a distinction between 
two kinds of understanding of "see", as opposed to the logical role of surrounding 
expressions in the statement. For example, Bob does not see thieves in the same 
sense in which one can see color patches. Seeing in the first sense is primarily a 
cognitive or epistemic phenomenon (perhaps one that involves some phenomenol­
ogy, but it is not the same as experiencing in the technical sense). Let us mark 
non-phenomenal readings with a "c" subscript (for "cognitive" or "causal", labels 
which arguably characterize the two main kinds of non-phenomenal reading). All 
of the following combinations of subscripts are valid:
(3.6) I seejp a round shape
Entails that I am experiencing a round shape, but not that there is a round
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shape.
(3.7) I seemp a popular colored shape
Entails that there is a colored shape which is popular, and that I am 
experiencing it.
(3.8) I seejc a bad omen
Entails that I take there to be a bad omen, but not that there is one.
(3.9) I seemc a bad omen
Entails that there is a bad omen, and that I am aware of it (but perhaps not as 
such).
Material-phenomenal readings of perceptual ascriptions ascribe more than phenom­
enal states. Readings of the type required by statement 3.7, in particular, do not as­
cribe states which are individuated solely by what it is like to be in them. Statement 
3.7 ascribes a property of roughly this form:
Xx{3y(popularColoredShape(y) /\seep(x,y)))
This property is not a phenomenal state even though its instantiation requires having 
an experience of a certain general kind (an experience of a colored shape). By 
contrast, statement 3.6 plausibly ascribes a pure phenomenal state.
The availability of "mp" readings of perceptual ascriptions can be traced back 
to the availability of material readings of "experiencing" ascriptions. A statement 
such as 3.10, for example, naturally lends itself to a material reading along the same 
lines as statement 3.7.
(3.10) I am experiencing a popular colored shape.
This statement does not ascribe a pure phenomenal state on its material reading. So 
while there are uses of perceptual ascriptions which are equivalent to "experiencing" 
ascriptions, the latter do not all ascribe pure phenomenal states, because they are
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themselves subject to the material / intensional ambiguity. To ascribe a phenomenal 
state and nothing more using a perceptual verb, one must use it both phenomenally 
and intensionally.
I am going to refer to perceptual ascriptions which ascribe phenomenal states 
(and nothing else) as pure phenomenal ascriptions.
Pure phenomenal ascription A perceptual ascription of the form "NP 0 S" in 
which the predicate "0 S" denotes the state denoted by "0-ly experiencing! 
S".
I will refer to the states ascribed by pure phenomenal ascriptions as phenomenal 
perceivings.
Phenomenal perceiving A state ascribed by a pure phenomenal ascription.
We can think of phenomenal perceivings as phenomenal states which can be re­
ferred to as states of 0-ing certain things (where 0 is a perceptual verb).
I will for the most part leave out "i" and "p" subscripts from now on. Intensional 
and phenomenal readings should be assumed unless the context clearly indicates 
otherwise.
3.2.2 The perceptual conception of sensory experience
We can now state the perceptual conception of sensory experience more precisely.
The perceptual conception of sensory experience (PCSE) For every sensory phe­
nomenal state e in modality 0, there is a phenomenal perceiving i in modality 
0 such that e = i.
My case for PCSE starts from the observation that all sensory phenomenal states 
can in principle be designated using constructions of the form
0-ly experiencing) S,
where 0 specifies a sensory modality and S complements the verb. My argument 
for PCSE goes as follows:
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The argument for PCSE
1. Every sensory phenomenal state in modality (p is a state of (p-ly experiencing] 
something in modality </).
2. Every state of (p-\y experiencing] something in modality 0 is a phenomenal 
perceiving in modality (p.
Therefore, for every sensory phenomenal state e in modality (p, there is 
a phenomenal perceiving i in modality </> such that e = i.
Philosophers writing on consciousness systematically designate phenomenal states 
as states of (p-ly experiencing certain things. For example, we say that visually 
experience colors and shapes, or that we aurally experience sounds. We can also 
describe more complex states using the same language, e.g. the state in which one 
visually experiences a bright surface framed by a dark region and punctuated with 
little black marks. Premise 1 therefore seems prima facie plausible. We do not nor­
mally describe bodily experiences as states in which we bodily experience certain 
things— normally, we only describe them as states in which we experience certain 
sensations. Still, the "bodily" qualification does not hurt, and it seems possible to 
describe bodily experiences as states in which we bodily experience certain things.
While premise 1 is prima facie plausible, there are two major potential excep­
tions to it.
First, disjunctivism might reasonably be taken to imply that premise 1 is not 
true of many (if not all) phenomenal states. Recall that disjunctivists deny that the 
same phenomenal states can occur in veridical and non-veridical perception. If this 
were correct, it would seem that one must explicitly or implicitly specify whether a 
state is of the veridical or non-veridical kind in order to successfully pick it out, and 
expressions of the form "</>-ly experiencing S" do not seem to do that.
Let us suppose that states of vertically  and non-veridically experiencing an F 
are distinct phenomenal states as the objection requires. Then the question arises
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as to which kind of experiencing phenomenal perceivings are, because we know al­
ready that phenomenal perceivings are phenomenal states and experiencing states as 
well. There are three possibilities: all phenomenal perceivings are non-veridical ex- 
periencings, all phenomenal perceivings are veridical experiencings, or some phe­
nomenal perceivings are veridical experiencings while some are non-veridical ex­
periencings.
The first possibility might initially seem plausible since our main examples 
of intensional and phenomenal perceivings are all illusory or hallucinatory. But 
the only reason I had to focus on non-veridical cases is that the contrast between 
perceiving! and perceivingm is less obvious in veridical cases, because, normally, 
one simultaneously perceivesj and perceivesm in veridical cases. Prima facie— 
absent independent evidence for disjunctivism of the kind I’ll discuss later—, there 
does not seem to be any reason to think that phenomenal perceivings occur only 
when what one perceives in them does not obtain. The state of seeingjp stars, for 
example, could very well be instantiated by someone who really is facing brilliant 
specks of light. So it seems that seeingjp stars is something that one can do whether 
there are stars or not, in the relevant sense of "stars". Or consider this case reported 
by Treisman and Schmidt (1982). Apparently, subjects presented in rapid succes­
sion with a pink X and a yellow T reliably "see" a solid, steady pink T. Illusions of 
this kind plausibly involve phenomenal perceivings which are phenomenally iden­
tical to actual veridical phenomenal states. Disjunctivists deny that this is possible, 
but one can only deny this possibility based on independent evidence for disjunc­
tivism; prima facie, the possibility is genuine. This example and the example of 
seeingjp stars seem to me to constitute a good prima facie case against all three of 
the aforementioned possibilities.
It also helps to reflect on how perceptual verbs are in fact used. Imagine for 
example that you are hallucinating a pink elephant in your lounge. As a result, you 
say, "I see a pink elephant", meaning of course "seejp". If you are like the aver-
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age person, learning that there is a pink elephant in front of you (or that there is 
not) would never cause you to take back your statement. I am here merely stating 
a fact about how "seeing" locutions are used, not proposing a far-fetched thought 
experiment. It is a fact that laymen describe their phenomenal states using percep­
tual verbs independently of what there is to perceive around them, and this strongly 
suggests that phenomenal perceivings are independent of one’s environment.
Another potential source of counterexamples to premise 1 is experiences which 
reflect certain kinds of perceptual variation, e.g. blur, perspective, and double vi­
sion. A phenomenal state which reflects perspective in its phenomenology cannot 
readily be designated as a state of visually experiencing X or a state of having a 
visual experience of X, for any X. Similarly, it is not obvious at first how to capture 
the phenomenology of blurry or double visual experiences by filling in the X.
In response to this, notice that the phenomenology of these experiences is hard 
to capture simpliciter. This is most evident in the case of perspective. I don’t know 
how to intrinsically characterize the phenomenal character of a visual experience in 
a way that would capture the effect of perspective. I can say that I am having an 
experience of an F of the kind that one has when one looks at an F from such and 
such viewpoint, but I cannot directly characterize the phenomenal character of the 
experience, whether using an "experiencing___" locution or not.
This suggests that the reason why experiences which reflect the effects of per­
ceptual variation— the tricky ones often brought up as putative counterexamples to 
representationalism, in any case— are not readily describable as visual experienc- 
ings of certain entities is that we have an insufficient grasp on what is to be described 
in this way, and not that this cannot be done in principle. One should at least agree 
that the nature of these experiences is elusive conceptually. As a result, proper 
methodology recommends that we extend to them whatever theory works best for 
other states. We should take simpler phenomenal states such as experiencing a red 
square, see what is true of them, then generalize to the more complex cases. Since
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most simple experiences can be described as states of <j>-ly experiencing certain 
things, it seems a reasonable strategy to tentatively suppose that all can in principle.
I will return to perceptual variation in chapter 6, where I will supply more evidence 
to show that the relevant experiences do not make exception to PCSE or virtualism. 
For now, I move on to the second premise of the argument for PCSE.
Let F be the function which maps states of (j)-\y experiencing certain things to 
phenomenal perceivings as follows, for any phrase S which can complement the 
verb to experience:
visually experiencing) S => seeingjp S 
aurally experiencing) S => hearingjp S 
bodily experiencing) S => feelingjp S
For example, the value of F for the state of visually experiencing) a green square 
is the state of seeingjp a green square. The value of F for the state of bodily 
experiencing) a sensation in your left leg is the state of feeling)p a sensation in your 
left leg.
Given this specification of F, we can show not only that premise 2 of the argu­
ment for PCSE is true but that the following stronger thesis holds:
Identity thesis For every state e of (j)-\y experiencing) something, e = F(e).
The identity thesis is true by construction. First, F is defined for all experiencing) 
states. Second, for all e, it is true by the definitions of F and phenomenal perceivings 
that ¥{e) = e, because to 0 S on a pure phenomenal reading is by definition to 
experience) S in the relevant modality.
There is another line of argument for PCSE which is worth mentioning briefly. 
In introduction we saw that the word "experience", in everyday language, can only 
be used to pick out phenomenal states when combined with the somewhat metaphor­
ical "what it’s like". While I hope that I have succeeded in directing your attention
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to the right phenomenon by talking about "what it’s like", I am under no illusion 
of having offered a definition of phenomenal states in everyday language. I merely 
gestured toward the concept. The realization that I had to engage in such hand- 
waving to explain what I mean by "phenomenal state" gave me serious doubts about 
this notion until I found that these states could be described precisely in plain lan­
guage using perceptual verbs. One reason to endorse the perceptual conception of 
sensory experience is that if it is wrong there is arguably no way to spell out—as 
opposed to merely gesturing toward— the general notion of a phenomenal state in 
everyday language. By contrast, given the perceptual conception of sensory experi­
ence, we can say simply that a phenomenal state is a state in which one perceivesjp 
something. The distinction between phenomenal and non-phenomenal perceivings 
still has to be explained through examples, but at least it is there to be used in ev­
eryday language. Since it is already part of the folk conceptual repertoire, it is not 
significantly harder to convey than the distinction between the different meanings 
of the word "bank".
3.3 The basic-derivative distinction revisited
In chapter 1, I drew a distinction between basic and derivative phenomenal states: 
the latter, but not the former, are mere states of instantiating phenomenal states 
distinct from themselves. I will conclude this chapter by relating this distinction 
with yet another distinction between two kinds of perceptual ascription. This is 
the last preparatory step before we can turn to the case for virtualism in the next 
chapters.
All perceptual predicates which lend themselves to pure phenomenal readings 
have the form "0-ing S" or "0-s S", where S complements the verb. In some pure 
phenomenal ascriptions, S is a bare infinitive clause, a participial clause, or a small 
clause. Here are some examples:
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(3.11) She secs | a pink elephant IIy ].
(3.12) She hears [ noise move around the room ].
(3.13) She feels [ the sensation intensify in her stomach ].
(3.14) She sees [ a round shape (be) in front of herself ].
(3.15) She feels [ a sensation (be) in her chest ].
(3.16) She sees [ a man dancing ].
(3.17) She hears [ a noise fading ].
Statements 3.11, 3.12, and 3.13 illustrate the use of bare infinitive clauses as com­
plements of perceptual verbs. 3.14 and 3.15 illustrate the use of small clauses as 
complements. Statements 3.16 and 3.17 have participial clauses as complements. 
These three kinds of ascription are not unrelated.6 They are also importantly dif­
ferent from other kinds of ascription. I will refer to the states they ascribe as B- 
perceivings. T will refer to states which cannot be ascribed using bare infinitive, 
participial or small clause complements as D-perceivings.
Here are examples of perceptual ascriptions which plausibly ascribe D-perceivings 
while lending themselves to pure phenomenal readings:
(3.18) He sees [ a pink elephant ].
(3.19) He hears [ some noise ].
(3.20) He feels [ a sensation ].
(3.21) He feels [ something J.
All four examples involve "determiner phrases" (a sometimes controversial label) as
complements of perceptual verbs. While there are many more grammatical types of
6Small clauses are arguably contractions of bare infinitive clauses, and participial clauses are 
nearly synonymous with their bare infinitive counterparts on intensional readings (though not on 
other readings they allow; see Dcclerck 1982, Felser 1999).
perceptual ascription, arguably only ascriptions of the "(j) DP" type and those which 
define B-perceivings lend themselves to pure phenomenal readings. I will say more 
about potential exceptions below.
The distinction between B-perceivings and D-perceivings is important because 
it corresponds to a large extent to the distinction between basic and derivative phe­
nomenal states: all basic phenomenal states are (phenomenal) B-perceivings (hence 
the "B" and "D" labels). I will refer to this thesis as "PCSE+":
PCSE+ For every basic sensory phenomenal state e in modality </), there is a phe­
nomenal B-perceiving i in modality (J) such that e -  i.
PCSE+ is the claim which will be the starting point of my argument for virtualism 
in the next chapter. Given PCSE, we can establish PCSE+ by showing that every 
basic phenomenal state which is a phenomenal perceiving is a B-perceiving. Put 
differently, we need to show that every D-perceiving is derivative if phenomenal.
That D-perceivings are at best derivative phenomenal states is obvious in some 
cases. Take for example the state of feeling something (3.21). This state can be 
realized by any number of more specific phenomenal states, and it cannot obtain 
without another phenomenal state realizing it. The D-perceiving seeing a pink ele­
phant is also a derivative state, because this is not something that one can do by 
itself. To see a pink elephant, one has to see a pink elephant do something or other: 
fly, walk, bath, sit there, etc. The state of seeing something red also doesn’t seem 
to be capable of instantiation on its own. In order to see something red, one need 
at least see something be red. The state of seeing something red is derivative on the 
wide variety of more specific B-perceivings which involve redness.
Of course, there is a question as to whether seeingp something be red is not also 
a derivative state. Perhaps one can only directly seep determinate shades of red, and 
perhaps one needs to seep an object as having a particular shape in order to seep it as 
having a certain color. But what matters for now is that phenomenal D-perceivings 
are derivative. That some phenomenal B-perceivings are also derivative is allowed
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by PCSE+.
Aside from D-perceivings ascribed by predicates of the form "(f)-s DP", there 
are two other types of perceptual ascription which might be thought to allow pure 
phenomenal readings:
(3.22) I hear that Bob has graduated.
(3.23) I hear Bob.
Perceptual predicates with "that"-clauses as complements do not lend themselves 
to pure phenomenal readings. Note first that only the verbs to hear, to feel, and 
to see accept "that"-clauses (one cannot smell that ... or taste that ...). In the case 
of "hear that" and "feel that", the states ascribed have plainly nothing to do with 
phenomenology. This is less obvious in the case of "see that", because one tends 
to use "see that" when one has relevant experiences (sometimes merely cognitive 
experiences). Still, it is perfectly acceptable to say that one sees that such and such 
is the case without having any relevant experiences. One might want to distinguish 
this use of "see that" from a more perceptual one, but I don’ t see where to draw the 
line. "Seeing that" seems to me to be a dead metaphor. The fact that "hearing that" 
and "feeling that" have clearly nothing to do with perception strongly suggests this.
In any case, there is another reason why perceptual ascriptions complemented 
by "that"-clauses do not allow pure phenomenal readings. The reason is that they 
are factive: seeing that P entails that P is the case. I argued earlier that phenomenal 
perceivings are independent of external facts. Even if  it were possible to seep that P, 
the state ascribed would not be independent o f the fact that P. At best, seeingp that 
P is a matter of instantiating a certain phenomenal state while a certain fact obtains. 
It is not a state individuated solely by what it ’s like to be in it.
We can remain neutral on whether perceptual predicates with simple noun com­
plements (e.g. "see Bob") have pure phenomenal readings. In this case it is at least 
clear that if constructions of this kind have pure phenomenal readings, the states
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they ascribe are derivative phenomenal states: if one can seep an individual (e.g. 
Bob), that is at least in part in virtue of seeingp some of its features. There is no 
mere seeing a bare individual in the phenomenal sense of "see". Just ask yourself 
what it’s like to see Bob. Nothing in particular. Of course, this does not mean that 
it is impossible to see bare individuals in some non-phenomenal sense. Note also 
that this does not mean that we seep individuals by seeingp generic facts (e.g. by 
seeing something be Bob-like): it could be that seeingp Bob (if possible at all) is 
grounded in such states as seeingp Bob walk, stand still, wear a red t-shirt, ecetera, 
which could be phenomenal B-perceivings. (But it could also be that there is no 
such thing as seeingp Bob.)
The role of time in experience provides further evidence for PCSE+. While B- 
perceivings appear to ascribe experiences of time, change, events, and actions, this 
is not true of phenomenal D-perceivings. So another way to approach the present 
question is to ask whether the basic phenomenal states are states in which we ex­
perience time, events, actions, etc. We tend to think of visual experiences as static 
snapshots which give the illusion of movement in the same way that cinematogra­
phy gives the illusion of movement through rapidly changing frames, but this cannot 
be right: if there is an illusion of movement at the cinema, that is because there is 
an experience of change; the experience of change itself cannot be an illusion. If we 
did not experience change itself, we could at best have the illusion of experiencing 
change in the sense that we could be unaware of the fact that we do not experience 
change. But I do have a positive phenomenal impression of experiencing things in 
time (and positively seem to positively seem to ...). It therefore seems plausible that 
we experience time, change, events, and actions. Since it is hard to see how such 
experiences could be realized by experiences which are not experiences of time, 
change, events, or actions, it seems plausible that they are basic phenomenal states. 
This supports the view that the basic phenomenal states are B-perceivings.
The view that we experience change has had its critics, but the main basis of
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the criticism has traditionally been that we cannot experience change because this 
would require experiences to be temporally extended (see Dainton 2008; 2000). No 
such constraint applies if virtualism is true. Just like a judgment can bear on a 
different period of time than it itself lasts, an instantaneous experience could well 
have as content a state of affairs which spans a certain amount of time. We should 
therefore not deny the phenomenological datum on this ground. Besides, it is not 
true that experiences would have to be extended in time in order to capture change 
if virtualism were false. For example, it is compatible with the sense-datum theory 
that experiences and sense data are subject to continuous change in the same way 
that an object moving continuously in space has an instantaneous velocity given by 
^  for one spatial dimension x.
While the view that we experience change supports the view that the basic phe­
nomenal states are B-perceivings, it is worth stressing that the latter does not re­
quire the former. We could just as well take the most basic experiences to be B- 
perceivings of things merely being some way or other in a timeless manner. I men­
tioned the matter only as additional evidence for the view that all basic phenomenal 
states are B-perceivings.
It must be emphasized that PCSE+ is compatible with a number of different 
stances on DP-based perceptual ascriptions. In particular, PCSE+ allows that some 
or even all DP-based perceptual ascriptions ascribe B-perceivings. For example, it 
is consistent with PCSE+ that seeing f a flying pink elephant ] is the very same state 
as seeing [ a pink elephant flying ]. Even if there were no phenomenal D-perceivings 
at all, nothing wrong would follow for PCSE+. Some of the examples used above 
would be incorrect if this were the case, but PCSE+ follows from PCSE on the 
assumption that there are no D-perceivings, so we would not need these examples. 
The case for virtualism would merely be simplified.
3.4 Summary
In this chapter I have argued that basic phenomenal states are perceptual states of 
a certain kind. I have first distinguished between intensional and material readings 
of perceptual ascriptions. The distinction between the two is one of logical form. 
I have then distinguished between the phenomenal and non-phenomenal senses of 
"see" and other perceptual verbs. I have argued that sensory phenomenal states can 
all be picked out using perceptual verbs intensionally and phenomenally. I have 
further argued that the basic phenomenal states are more specifically phenomenal 
B-perceivings. This last claim, PCSE+, will be the starting point of my argument 
for virtualism in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
Sensory virtualism
In this chapter, I will argue from the perceptual conception of sensory experience 
defended in the preceding chapter to the sensory virtual ist view' (SV) defined in 
chapter 1.
Sensory virtualism (SV) For any sensory modality 0, there is a relation R such 
that: 1) For any basic phenomenal state s in 0, there is some proposition P 
such that s = standing in R to P; 2) R is virtual with respect to basic phenom­
enal states.
I will refer to claim 1 as sensory propositionalism. This chapter focuses almost ex­
clusively on sensory propositionalism, because sensory propositionalism warrants 
claim 2 in light of the considerations in section 3.2.2 of the preceding chapter.
SV is a theory of sensory phenomenal states, not a general theory of conscious­
ness like virtualism, so I will only talk about sensory phenomenal states in this 
chapter. I will continue to use the terms "phenomenal state" and "experience" with­
out qualification to refer to sensory phenomenal states and experiences.
4.1 From PCSE+ to sensory propositionalism
The point of introducing the perceptual conception of sensory experience in the 
preceding chapter was that we have a much better pre-theoretic handle on what 
seeings and other perceivings are than "experiences". We at least have a much 
better handle on the semantics of perceptual verbs than we have in the case of the 
technical terms "experience" and "phenomenal state". Since the only way that I 
know of persuading someone of the correctness of sensory virtualism if they do not 
find it introspectively self-evident is to appeal to considerations which have to do 
with the semantics of the terms used to describe phenomenal states, I wanted to 
secure the best language possible— the language of phenomenal perceivings.1
My overall argument for sensory propositionalism goes as follows.
The overall argument for sensory propositionalism
1. For every basic sensory phenomenal state e in modality 0, there is a phenom­
enal B-perceiving i in modality 0 such that e = i. (PCSE+)
2. For every modality 0, there is a relation R such that, for every phenomenal 
B-perceiving i in 0, there is a proposition P such that i = standing in R to P.
3. If (1) and (2), sensory propositionalism is true.
Therefore, sensory propositionalism is true.
Premise 1 has been defended in the preceding chapter. Since premise 3 is trivial, I 
will concentrate on premise 2. I take it that premise 2 is true if the following is true:
The proposition expressed by an ascription of a phenomenal B-perceiving 
of the form "a  0-s S" has the form 0 (a ,P ) , where P is a proposition.2
1 Having said this, the argument to follow could probably be recast in the "experiencing" lan­
guage, at the cost of slightly weaker linguistic intuitions. If you are not convinced about PCSE+, 
substitute all perceptual predicates for "experiencing" predicates in what follows.
2One might balk at the assumption that the nature of consciousness can be inferred from the
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Before we delve into the case for premise 2, it is worth noting that it is perfectly 
compatible with sensory propositionalism that phenomenal perceivings cannot be 
glossed using "that"-clauses (as noted in section 3.3). There are ways of stating 
relations to propositions or states of affairs which don’t use explicit "that"-clauses. 
For example:
(4.1) I want [ to learn Spanish ].
(4.2) I tried [ taking the bus ].
The clausal complements in these sentences are naturally read as designating propo­
sitions or states of affairs: I want learn(I, Spanish), I tried take(I,bus). Yet "that"- 
clause glosses do not sound right:
(4.3) * I want that I learn Spanish.
(4.4) * I tried that I be taking the bus.
Even though "that"-clause glosses do not work with all of them, constructions of 
these types are commonly analyzed as ascribing relations to propositions (see for 
example Bealer & Monnich 1981, p. 164).
Another objection need to be addressed at the outset. One might say that phe­
nomenal B-perceivings cannot be relations to propositions because propositions are 
abstract objects and abstract objects cannot be seen (because they cannot affect us 
causally). One response to this objection is that our understanding of propositions
logical form of phenomenal ascriptions. I believe that this assumption is harmless for two main 
reasons. First, it is unclear what the relevant facts about the internal structure of phenomenal states 
might be if they are not facts about logical form. Second, it does not really matter if all we can 
show is that phenomenal ascriptions have a certain logical form. The principal aim of the virtualist 
framework is to provide something close to a logic of phenomenal ascriptions: a precise language 
in which to describe phenomenal states and their inter-relations, and some ground rules captur­
ing important generalities about phenomenal states. Even if the virtualist thesis had to be limited 
to a claim about the logic of phenomenal ascriptions, none of its applications would be compromised.
Note also that I am here helping myself to an account of the semantics of NPs which I will later 
reject. In light of what I say in section 4.6, we should allow that "a " contributes a generalized 
quantifier to the proposition expressed, but this does not affect the point that the ascription expresses 
a relation between something and P.
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is sufficiently broad to include entities capable of bearing eausal connections to 
other things. For example, we count scenes, instantiations of properties, and states 
of affairs as propositions. An alternative response is that it is false that all seeings 
require causal connections to relevant objects. In particular, it seems plausible that 
phenomenal and/or intensional seeings do not require such connections.
I will now state a simple argument for premise 2 of the argument for sensory 
propositionalism.
4.2 A quick argument
Suppose that I am undergoing a strange hallucination. 1 could very well say:
(4.5) What I seep is true / false.
(4.6) What I seep is likely to happen / unlikely to happen.
(4.7) What I seep is possible / impossible.
4.5- 4.7 seem to trivially entail 4.8-4.10.
(4.8) There is an a such that I seep a and x is true / false.
(4.9) There is an a such that I seep a and a is likely to happen / unlikely to happen.
(4.10) There is an a such that I seep a and a is possible / impossible.
4.5- 4.7 do not directly ascribe phenomenal B-perceivings, but if phenomenal B- 
perceivings are the basic phenomenal states as PCSE+ implies, 4.5-4.7 can only 
be made true by my instantiating certain phenomenal B-perceivings. Now, given 
the overtly dyadic use of "see" in 4.8-4.10, it seems clear that 4.5-4.7 can only be 
made true by my instantiating phenomenal B-perceivings which have a relational 
structure, i.e. states of standing in the seeingp relation to certain entities. Moreover, 
it seems that the entities I stand in the seeingp relation to in these states must be
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propositions. For what else could have the properties ascribed to x  in 4.8-4.10? We 
also say that events are unlikely to happen or are impossible, but events make per­
fectly fine propositions on our account of propositions.3 We also say that sentences 
are true or false, but we can stipulate that this is a case where I am not talking about 
hallucinating sentences. It seems that for statement 4.5 to be true, for example, it 
has to be the case that there is a proposition x such that I stand in the seeingp relation 
to x and x is true / false.
Of course, this only establishes that some phenomenal B-perceivings satisfy 
premise 2 of the case for sensory propositionalism (that some phenomenal B-perceivings 
are relations to propositions). But notice that nothing specific has been said about 
what I am hallucinating. It seems plausible that my statements could be true what­
ever I am hallucinating. If this is correct, we can conclude that all phenomenal 
B-perceivings are relations to propositions, because each such perceiving should 
serve as truth maker for at least one possible true utterance of the form of 4.5-4.7.
Inferential connections between 4.5-4.7 and arbitrary ascriptions of specific phe­
nomenal B-perceivings also militate for a generalization of our conclusion. For 
example, the following argument appears to be valid:
1. I seeip an elephant fly.
2. It is impossible that an elephant flies.
Therefore, what I seep is impossible.
Given that, as we just saw, the conclusion entails 
3x(seep(I,x) A impossible(x)),
explaining the validity of this inference requires that we assign premise 1 the form
3That might seem like an ad hoc extension of the meaning of "proposition", but instantiations 
of properties (a natural understanding of events) are naturally regarded as states of affairs (Wetzel 
2008), and SOAs are natural candidates to play the canonical role of propositions.
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and premise 2 the form
impossible(P).
Since any phenomenal B-perceiving can play the role of premise 1 in such an argu­
ment (given a suitable premise 2), it seems that all phenomenal B-perceivings are 
relations to propositions.
I will now discuss a lengthier line of argument for the claim that phenomenal 
B-perceivings are relations to propositions. First I will argue that all phenomenal 
perceivings have a relational structure as opposed to a monadic structure. Then I 
will argue that the objects of phenomenal B-perceivings (what one is related to in 
them) are propositions as opposed to entities of some other kind.
4.3 The relational analysis of experience
We want to know whether the proposition expressed by a statement of the form "a
seesip S" has the form R (a ,__) or F(a): whether it ascribes a relational property
or a monadic property. Jackson(1975; 1977) and Lycan (1987) raise some serious 
difficulties with monadic analyzes of perceptual ascriptions. I will not repeat their 
arguments here. I want to consider a different problem which arises with statements 
which appear to quantify over what one sees, hears, smells, etc. I think this problem 
cuts a little bit deeper than those raised by Jackson and Lycan. I will start with 
seeings.
Imagine that an "experience effector" is inserted into your brain and connected 
to a drawing pad. An artist is drawing on the pad, and you experience what she 
draws. The effector makes you experience what the artist actually means to repre­
sent, not the drawing itself. The artist could rightly say:
(4.11) You see everything I draw.
(4.12) You saw something I drew.
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These sentenees are partieularly hard to analyze for the monadist. Other diffieult 
cases include:
(4.13) Everything I see is not the case.
(4.14) I see what you see (in my hallucination).
(4.15) There is something I don’t see. (Describing an ongoing hallucination)
The problem for the monadist is that these claims, like those I discussed in the pre­
ceding section, are naturally heard as quantifying over things seen in the phenome­
nal sense. Setting aside niceties of tense and other complications, the propositions 
expressed seem to have the following forms as far as the quantifiers and properties 
involved in them go:
\/x(draw(I ,jc) —► see(you,x))
3x(drew(I,x) f\saw(you,x))
Vjc(see(I,x) —+ ->iscase(x))
Vx(see(you,x) —> see(I,x)) or 3x(see(you,x) A\/y(see(you,y) —> jc = 
y) Asee(I,x)) (alternate reading)
3x~isee(/,x)
One can also use an unquestionably referential term as grammatical object of "see":
(4.16) I didn’t see that. (Describing a dream by pointing at something on TV.) 
Here it seems that the proposition expressed must be
- 'saw(I, a)
where a  stands for what is being pointed at.
Arguably, none of the preceding statements are pure phenomenal ascriptions 
(they do not merely ascribe phenomenal states), because they only allow material 
readings. Still, they are phenomenal ascriptions, in that they involve the verb to
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seep, not to seec. If the only analysis of the verb to seep which works with them is 
a relational one, presumably this is true of pure phenomenal ascriptions as well.
Let us think about how a monadist could analyze the preceding statements. 
Some might perhaps be analyzable by quantifying over monadic seeing properties. 
For example, 4.14 on our first reading could perhaps lend itself to an analysis such 
as this:
V</) (seeing(</)) A (f>(you) —> </>(/))
(for any property </>, if 0 is a seeing property and you have it, then I 
have it)
But this higher-order strategy fails miserably for 4.11, 4.12 and 4.13, because in 
these cases it makes no doubt that something else than a seeing property is being 
quantified over: the artist is not drawing a seeing property (or so I stipulate).
Alternatively, one could be tempted to give the logical form of 4.1 1 along the 
lines of
* \/x(draw(I,x) —> seex{you))
or
* Vx(draw(I,x) —> seex^iy(you)).
It does not really matter how the x is attached to the predicate on the RHS. The prob­
lem with this is nothing subtle: the formula is only well-formed if seex and seex_iy 
are interpreted as predicate symbols which have nothing to do with the variable jc. 
That is, one might as well write
\/x(draw(I,x) —> F(you)).
One might think that all the monadist needs is a little bit of lambda abstraction:
* \/x(draw(I,x) —> (ky(kz(seey(z)))(x))(you))
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But the lambda operator can only bind a free variable. If seev(z) is intended to stand 
for something else than see(z,y), it does not contain a variable bound by Ay, and 
the predicate has (for all we know) nothing to do with what is being drawn.
To avoid using "see" as a binary predicate, the monadist must analyze statements 
4.11 -4.15 along these lines:
seeE ve ryt h ingIDraw (yo u) 
seeSomethingIDraw(you) 
what SeelsNotT heCase(I)
These are well-formed formula, and one can stipulate that their truth conditions are 
as they should be. However, it seems far-fetched to suppose that this really is what 
the statements express. This seems far-fetched because "everything", "something", 
and "what", have well-defined semantics: they introduce variables. Given what we 
know of the semantics of these expressions, it is not psychologically realistic to say 
that the propositions expressed by statements 4.11-4.15 have the above forms. This 
is something we can agree on without agreeing on the details of the logical forms 
of the relevant statements. Parallel remarks apply to the demonstrative in 4.16, the 
pronoun "I" in 4.11 and 4.12, and the pronoun "you" in 4.14: the pronouns, at least, 
unquestionably refer to individuals or generalized quantifiers,4 so the above cannot 
give the form of the propositions expressed by these statements. This is where my 
examples are more problematic than those given by Jackson and Lycan.
But the worse problem for the monadist approach only comes out when we turn 
to the matter of inferences. Jackson (1977) and Barwise (1981) consider inferences 
of the following kind:
I see an F G.
Therefore, I see a G.
4See section 4.6 regarding generalized quantifiers.
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Inferences of this type are not strictly valid. For example, if I see a fake rabbit, it 
does not follow that I see a rabbit. By contrast, the following seem valid:
(4.17) You seep everything I draw.
I drawj a man dancing.
Therefore, you seejp a man dancing.
(4.18) I seep everything you seep.
You seejp a pink elephant fly.
Therefore, I seejp a pink elephant fly.
(4.19) I don’t seep anything you seep.
You seejp a rabbit.
Therefore, I don’t seejp a rabbit.
Explaining the validity of these inferences would seem to require that we ana­
lyze the premises relationally. For example, argument 4.17 would become:
Vx(draw(I,x) —>' see p (you , x ))
d raw (I , AM a nDan cing)
.'. seep(you,AManDancing)
What AManDancing stands for will be discussed in the next section. Whatever it 
is, it must be one of the things that the variable in the major premise ranges over, 
and "I see a man dancing" has to be analyzed as ascribing a relation to this thing. 
Otherwise it is not possible to explain the validity of the inference.
These inferences are not only a problem for the monadist on their own. They 
also license the claim I made earlier that seep should be analyzed relationality both 
on material and on intensional readings. Since any statement of the form "I seejp 
S" can validly be inferred through arguments of the above form, all such statements 
must be analyzed relationally.
126
The argument I have presented in this section so far extends to other modalities. 
Take for example the following statements.
(4.20) I heard the same thing as you (but we were both hallucinating).
(4.21) I hear everything you describe (but I know there is no sound).
(4.22) I feel what you feel in your arm (but I only have a phantom arm).
(4.23) I can feel what you describe (but I know there is nothing there).
All seem to involve quantification over things perceived, and all can serve as premises 
of valid arguments which parallel the above. For example:
(4.24) I heard the same thing as you.
You heard noise coming from the left.
Therefore, I heard noise coming from the left.
(4.25) I can feel what you describe.
You describe a painful sensation.
Therefore, I can feel a painful sensation.
In this section I have argued that phenomenal perceivings are states of standing 
in certain relations to certain entities. When one says that a  0-s S (where the 
perceptual verb 0 is used phenomenally and intensionally), one is saying that a  
stands in the 0-ing relation to a certain entity.
4.4 The objects of experience
We have seen that phenomenal perceivings are relational states. It remains to see 
if phenomenal B-perceivings are more specifically relations to propositions. While
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the relational analysis applies both to B- and D-perceivings, 1 don't think that D- 
perceivings are relations to propositions, so I will only talk about B-perceivings in 
this section.
There are many candidate objects for B-perceivings, but we can divide them 
up into a few large classes. The relata of B-perceivings could be: a) individuals 
(including ordinary objects, tropes, and events qua particulars), b) properties of 
individuals (which I will just call "properties"), c) sets of properties of individuals, 
d) propositions (including SOAs and certain kinds of event), or e) entities of other 
kinds. I will discuss each possibility in turn.
Take first the suggestion that what we seep in phenomenal B-perceivings are 
individuals. This can be cashed out in one of two ways:
I seeip an F i{ f  = 3jc(F(jc) A \{/(x) A seep(I,x))
I seejp an F y/ = seep( l , a),  where a  is an individual to be specified
("an F y/" is a clause, e.g. "a rabbit run")
The first analysis is that favored by sense-datum theorists. The problems it faces 
are well known, and I will not repeat them here. I only want to remark on two points 
which seem to me to refute it beyond any doubt.
The first point is that the proposed analysis does not capture the difference be­
tween merely seeing an F y/ and seeing an F both y/ and <f>, whatever the additional 
properties are. Right now I see a can of Coca-Cola sit on my desk. According to 
the proposed analysis, this means that there is an x which is a Coke can, sits on my 
desk, and is seen by me. But the can also has the property of having been produced 
by Amatil Inc from Sydney. If we apply the analysis from right to left, we get that 
I am seeing a Coke can made by Amatil Inc sit on my desk. This is true on a mate­
rial reading, but we are interested in the logical form of the intensional phenomenal 
reading, and such a reading must capture the nature of my experience and nothing 
more. The statement about Amatil Inc does not. It does not help to suppose that
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the individuals we see in phenomenal seeings are mental sense data: whatever the 
objects, they will have infinitely many properties we can't experience.
This problem could be remedied to some extent by restricting the analysis to 
properties one can see. One might say:
I see an F y/ = 3x(F(x) A y/(x) Asee(/,x)),  where F and y/ are visually 
experiencable properties.
This helps, but we can still reasonably expect the account to overgenerate. Note 
first that we would have to count as visually experiencable all properties which 
can in principle be visually experienced. Otherwise the analysis would not cover 
some possible kinds of visual experience. Now suppose (as is plausible) that the 
property of being very far away from a small object is (in principle) perceptible 
visually. Arguably everything which actually exists and can be perceived has this 
property, including mental particulars (if any): everything which exists in a given 
corner of the universe is very far away from some particle in a different corner 
of the universe. Given what we have established so far, it follows on the present 
analysis that whenever 1 seejp something, 1 seejp something very far away from a 
small object. This strikes me as obviously false.
The second problem is that the immaterial individuals sense-datum theorists 
need to posit in order to account for hallucination clearly can’t bear such properties 
as being bigger than an elephant. Yet one can see something being of a given size 
without there being anything of that size. This requires that the analysis be changed 
to make use of "primed properties":
I seejp an F y/ = 3x(F'(x) A y/(jc) Asee(I,x))
I find that I am short of spare concepts to dehne the required primed properties. 
For each property that I have a concept for which is such that I could conceivably 
be said to seejp something bearing it, I can readily imagine having a hallucination 
of something having that property. In other words, for any given property, either I
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cannot make sense of seeingjp something having it, or I can seejp something hav­
ing it without there being anything which has it. This leaves no room for primed 
properties.
The second way of cashing out the idea that the relata of phenomenal B-percei- 
vings are individuals is even less appealing. It requires that everyone who sees a 
pink elephant fly stands in the seeing relation to the very same particular.5 One can 
see a pink elephant fly without there being any flying pink elephant or trope of the 
property of being a flying pink elephant, so the particular in question could not be 
a flying pink elephant or a trope of being a flying pink elephant. This makes it hard 
to see what it might be.
Let us now turn to the property account of the objects of phenomenal B-percei- 
vings. On this approach, one might say for example that someone who seesjp a pink 
elephant fly stands in the seeing relation to the first-order property of being a flying 
pink elephant.
Problems arise for this view once we consider slightly more complex examples:
(4.26) I see a large number of bright particles floating in front of me.
(4.27) I see two entities floating in front of me.
Case 4.26 is problematic if we read it as ascribing a state of seeing an indetermi­
nate number of particles (as in the speckled hen case). It is arguably possible to 
experience (hence seep) an indeterminate number of objects. How could an object 
property characterize one’s state in such cases? To say that what one sees is the 
property of being one of an indeterminate number of objects would seem to mis­
construe the character of the experience: in some cases at least, when one sees an 
indeterminate number of objects, there is not a single object that one determinately 
sees.
sThis constraint could perhaps be relaxed, but this would break some of the inferences we dis­
cussed in the preceding section. There is also no comfortable resting place between this and saying 
that every experiential event involves a relation to a different particular, which is nearly unintelligible 
(what about overlapping events?).
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Case 4.27 is even more problematic. If what I see in this case were a property, 
it would have to be the property of being two entities floating in front of me. But 
no individual could possibly have the property of being two entities. My experience 
would therefore be necessarily false. It clearly is not, so what I see is not a property.
The preceding problems could conceivably be addressed by taking the relevant 
properties to be properties of states of affairs instead of properties of individuals. 
The relevant properties might be said to be involving a large number o f bright par­
ticles floating in front o f me and involving two entities floating at such and such 
locations. But properties of states of affairs are arguably the same as properties of 
the world, and such properties count as propositions for our purposes. This is not an 
entirely ad hoc maneuver, because properties of the world are naturally described as 
sets of possible worlds, or using predicate logic (our criterion of propositionhood). 
Also, some theorists explicitly take propositions to be world properties (c.f. Soames 
2005).
Another problem with the property approach is that it does not seem to do justice 
to the inferential role experiences play. There is a range of views about the extent 
and manner of the justification provided for everyday beliefs about the external 
world by experience, but nearly everyone seems to agree that experiences can in 
some sense be "endorsed" or "taken at face value", and it seems that the judgments 
arrived at by endorsing our experiences often have existential import. If I take 
my current visual experience at face value, for instance, I will judge that I am in 
presence of a bright surface. It is hard to see how I could arrive at this judgment 
through mere endorsement if my experience related me to a mere uninstantiated 
property. Why would I arrive at an existential judgment rather than a universal one? 
Or why not conclude that there are five objects instantiating the property?
Of course, a causal explanation of the quantified judgments we arrive at through 
experience might still be possible. But a rational explanation of a perceptual judg­
ment to the effect that there are two elephants in front of oneself when one merely
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experiences the property being an elephant does not seem possible. Arguably, for 
such an explanation to be possible, there must be logical implication from the con­
tent of the experience to the content of the judgment, or one must have some back­
ground beliefs which justify the judgment in light of the fact that one has the ex­
perience. The first condition is not meant by experiences which have properties of 
individuals as contents. The second condition would typically not be meant either: 
who believes that experiences of the property being an elephant normally occur in 
presence of two elephants? On the other hand, if my experience relates me to a 
proposition, the content of my belief when I endorse my experience can simply be 
the content of my experience. My belief that there are two elephants in front of me 
can be justified by my experience of the fact that there are two elephants in front of 
me.6
A more theoretical difficulty with properties is that it is hard to see how such 
an account could lend itself to a compositional explanation of the variety of experi­
ences we can undergo. As noted in chapter 2, the large diversity of experiences we 
can undergo is likely generated by some combination mechanism. On the proposi­
tional approach, it is reasonably clear how this could work at an abstract level. For 
the sake of illustration, we can imagine a kind of language of experience along the 
lines of Fodor’s Language of Thought. What one experiences would be a proposi­
tion corresponding to a sentence in this language. The contents of phenomenal sen­
tences would be determined through recursive rules operating on their constituents. 
If what we experience were properties, on the other hand, it is hard to see how this 
kind of compositional system might work. An explanation based on this account of 
the contents of experience would have to begin by articulating the internal structure 
of properties, which is far more elusive than the internal structure of propositions.
One might hope to avoid some of the preceding difficulties by positing that 
what we experience are sets of properties rather than properties. One problem with
6One might think that a virtualist cannot consistently talk of experiencing facts. I will address 
this objection in section 7.2.
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this approach parallels the many-property problem Jackson (1975) raises against 
adverbialism. Take for example the state of seeingjp a yellow circle to the left of a 
green square. If we cash this out as seeingp the set {yellow, circle, left of, green, 
square}, we lose all distinctions between different ways of seeingp these properties, 
for example, between the aforementioned experience and seeing^ a yellow square 
to the left of a green circle. The same goes if we take the set {yellow circle, left of, 
green square}. In this case, we conflate the two different positions the two objects 
experienced could be in. To capture the precise character of one’s experience, we 
must invoke a set containing a single all-encompassing property of being a yellow 
circle on the left o f a green square, which takes us back to the single property 
approach, but with a superfluous formal complexity.
Most of the preceding problems could easily be avoided by an account which 
takes the objects of experiences to be more exotic entities than we have considered 
so far. For example, perhaps higher-order properties have the requisite fineness of 
grain to avoid some of the problems I raised for the first-order property approach. 
If not, sets of propositions will probably deal with all the problems. My only qualm 
with these accounts is that they seem phenomenologically inaccurate. It does not 
seem far fetched to say that we experience propositions, provided that we count state 
of affairs-like entities under this heading. As we will see in chapter 7, disjunctives 
rest their position almost entirely on the putative phenomenological datum that ex­
perience acquaints us with simple, first-order states of affairs. I will argue in chapter 
7 that the propositional approach, broadly construed, can largely accommodate this 
observation. On the other hand, it seems prima facie phenomenologically inaccu­
rate to say that our basic experiences are experiences of properties of properties, set 
of propositions, or more complex abstract objects. Since the propositional approach 
also has the advantage of simplicity, I think that the problems we uncovered for the 
simple accounts discussed so far strongly militate for this approach.
The conclusion of the preceding section was that phenomenal perceivings are
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states of standing in modality-specific relations to certain entities. In this section, 
I have argued that, in the case of phenomenal B-perceivings, the relevant entities 
are propositions. When I say that I seejp an elephant flying, for example, I am 
expressing the proposition that I stand in the seeingp relation to the proposition that 
an elephant is flying, or:
seep(I, [3x(elephant(x) A flying (*))]),
where [S] denotes the proposition symbolized by formula S (as in Bealer 1979). 
This completes my case for sensory propositionalism.
4.5 The virtual character of phenomenal perceivings
So far I have focused exclusively on the case for sensory propositionalism, the first 
component of sensory virtualism. To establish sensory virtualism, we also need 
to show that the relations which are constitutive of phenomenal B-perceivings are 
virtual.
For this, we need only refer back to section 3.2.2, where I argued that phe­
nomenal perceivings are states one can be in independently of whether what one 
perceives obtains or not. I gave realistic (if not real) examples which illustrate this. 
These examples show that the seeingp, hearingp, eeetera relations are virtual. I will 
discuss the virtual character of phenomenal perceivings at greater length in chapters 
7 and 8 in response to the case for disjunctivism.
This completes my case for sensory virtualism. In the next section I will discuss 
the semantics of D-perceivings. While not essential to the virtualist position, the 
points in this section throw useful light on a number of issues I have so far left 
unaddressed and provide additional motivations for sensory propositionalism.
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4.6 The semantics of D-perceiving ascriptions
When I introduced intensional readings of perceptual ascriptions in section 3.1, I 
defined them as readings which do not have a certain logical form. I did not of­
fer a positive characterization of their logical forms. The account of phenomenal 
B-perceivings I gave in the preceding section answers this question as far as ascrip­
tions of phenomenal B-perceivings go. In this section I will try to shed some light 
on the case of phenomenal D-perceivings. I will not talk about non-phenomenal D- 
perceiving ascriptions— there are too many different kinds, and they are not directly 
relevant to our purposes here. I will conclude the section by drawing some conclu­
sions regarding the relation between phenomenal D-perceivings and phenomenal 
B-perceivings.
In section 3.3, we saw that there are plausibly two types of ascription of phe­
nomenal D-perceivings: "NP </>-s DP" and "NP (f)-s N" ascriptions, where "DP" 
stands for a determiner phrase and "N" stands for a noun. There are other kinds 
of ascription of D-perceivings (e.g. "that"-clause ascriptions), but it is plausible 
that they do not lend themselves to phenomenal readings, so I will set them aside. 
Assuming that perceptual verbs denote relations in ascriptions of phenomenal D- 
perceivings just like in all other perceptual ascriptions discussed so far, the question 
is what one is related to in phenomenal D-perceivings. For example, assuming that 
"sees" denotes a relation in "Alice seesjp a rabbit", the question is what Alice has to 
be related to in order to seejp a rabbit. I will discuss "NP ( f ) - s  DP" ascriptions first, 
then I will talk briefly about the general case of "NP 0-s NP" ascriptions.
The potential objects of the phenomenal D-perceivings ascribed with DP com­
plements are the same as in the case of phenomenal B-perceivings. Individuals and 
properties of individuals raise the same problems as before with minor adaptations— 
individuals yield material readings, and properties of individuals are too coarse­
grained. Propositions are excluded because they are the objects of B-perceivings 
and B-perceivings are by definition not D-perceivings. We must therefore consider
135
more complex or abstract entities.
A good candidate kind of entity is generalized quantifiers. In logic, generalized 
quantifiers are characterized as sets of sets of individuals (see Barwise and Cooper 
1981, Westerstähl 2008). That is to say that they are second order properties. To 
keep things simple, we can restrict our attention to generalized quantifiers which 
can be described with lamba formulas of the form
?iQ(xl/(P(x)AQ(x))),
where i// stands for a regular quantifier ("some", "every") and the "P(x)M conjunct 
is optional. For example, the entity one is related to when one seesjp a rabbit could 
be the property hQ(3x(rabbit(x)  A 0W))-  In words, this is the property of being a 
property had by a rabbit.
Montague (1973) treats transitive intensional verbs with DP complements as 
denoting relations to generalizer quantifiers. His approach is now widely accepted 
(with some variations) among semanticists (Dowty et al 1981; Forbes 2008; West­
erstähl 2008).7 One of its main virtues is that it meshes well with the fact that "NP 
V DP" ascriptions allow both intensional and material readings. More specifically, 
the difference between intensional and material readings turns out to be simply a 
difference in the order of predication on this view as far as DP ascriptions go. Here 
I am going beyond the standard treatment, but this claim is not hard to verify. Con­
sider the property of being seen by me, Ax(see(I,x)).  If we predicate this property 
of AQ(3x(rabbit(x) AQ(x)) )t the resulting proposition reduces to
see(fi XQ{3x{rabbit{x) A Q (*)))) ,
which is just the proposition expressed by "I see a rabbit" on the intensional reading 
of this statement according to the Montague-style account. Reversing the order of 
predication and predicating XQ{fix(rabbit(x) A Q{x))) of Ax(see(I,x)),  we get the 
proposition
7Interestingly, Montague (1973) does not extend this account to perceptual verbs, because he 
does not treat them as intensional verbs. The reasons for this are not clear.
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3a:(rabbit(x) Asee(I,x)),
which is just the proposition expressed by "I see a rabbit" on the material reading 
of this statement. On Montague’s treatment of DP ascriptions, the ambiguity be­
tween intensional and material readings corresponds to an ambiguity in the order of 
predication.
Montague’s treatment of DP ascriptions can be extended to all NP ascriptions. 
In section 3.1 I noted that a statement such as "Alice sees Bob" might seem to have 
no material reading if it is always read as expressing the proposition see(Alice,Bob). 
But in modem semantics, names do not denote individuals. Rather, they denote gen­
eralized quantifiers— all NPs denote generalized quantifiers (Barwise and Cooper 
1981 ;Westerstahl 2008; Ruys and Winter 2001). The quantifier denoted by "Alice", 
for example, can be represented as A,Q(3x(Alice * (a ) A Q( a )) ).  This account is pri­
marily motivated by its ability to explain how simple nouns combine with quantified 
noun phrases, for example, in 4.28 (ibid.).
(4.28) Alice and her lawyers wanted to call.
If "Alice" and "her lawyers" both denote second-order properties (sets of proper­
ties), the denotation of the sentence’s subject can be derived through set operations. 
In this case it would be the set of properties had by Alice and all her lawyers (if 
any).
On the present account, we would expect "Alice seesp Bob" to have at least two 
readings:
(4.29) 3a(Alice* (a) Aseep(x,X,Q(3y(Bob* (y) A(9(y)))))
(4.30) 3a(Alice* (a) A 3y(Bob* (y) Aseep(x,y)))
4.29 is an intensional reading, while 4.30 is a material reading. 4.29 illustrates the 
logical form a pure phenomenal ascription of the form "NP sees N" would have, 
however counterintuitive this reading might be (I am not convinced that such states 
of affairs really are possible; see 3.1 and 7.2).
137
Extending our account of DP ascriptions to all NP ascriptions has the side ben­
efit of legitimizing my decision to call intensional perceivings "intensional". As I 
acknowledged in section 3.1, my choice of terminology might have seemed inap­
propriate in light of the common belief that a statement such as "Alice sees Bob" 
should always be read as expressing the proposition see(Alice,Bob). But it turns 
out that this statement has a material reading (4.30), and that this reading is by far 
the most natural. My material / intensional distinction turns out to be in line with 
prior usage.
One significant virtue of the preceding account of phenomenal D-perceivings is 
that it yields a simple explanation of how phenomenal B-perceivings realize phe­
nomenal D-perceivings (recall that phenomenal D-perceivings are derivative). It 
seems plausible that a D-perceiving which consists in standing in a relation R to a 
generalized quantifier i// is realized by a B-perceiving which consists in standing in 
R to a proposition P when P contains y/. To give a full account of when a proposition 
contains a quantifier would require an account of the structure of propositions, but 
it is plausible on a first pass that P contains y/ just in case P entails that something 
(a property) instantiates y/. Take for example the quantifier designated by "a rabbit" 
(XQ{3x(rabbit(x) A <2(jc)))). The proposition expressed by "a rabbit runs" entails 
that some property instantiates the quantifier designated by "a rabbit", namely, the 
property of running. So seeingjp a rabbit run is one way (one realizer) of seeingjp a 
rabbit.
There is of course a risk that this account overgenerates. The proposition ex­
pressed by "a rabbit runs" entails not only that something has the quantifier des­
ignated by "a rabbit", but also that something has the quantifiers designated by "a 
proposition", "a number", "a set", etc. It entails every necessary truth, hence real­
izes any state of seeing y/, where y/ is a quantifier occurring in a necessary truth 
of the form "y/ is F". So when you see a rabbit, you also see a set, a proposition, 
a number, etc. I don’t find this to be obviously unacceptable. I suspect that this
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merely shows that there is not much it is like to see any of these things. If seeing 
any of these things amounts to nothing more than seeing the unique unstructured 
necessary proposition or state of affairs, we should not expect that there is much 
associated phenomenology. It does not seem far-fetched to suppose that all phe­
nomenal experiences involve in the background an experience of The True.
In any case, it should be possible to impose more constraints on a B-perceiving 
realizing a D-perceiving if required. To do this, we would need a theory of the 
structure of the propositions we experience. I cannot provide such a theory here, 
but I don’t see any principled difficulty. Either the propositions we experience have 
structure or they do not. If they do, we should be able to uncover it. If they do not, 
then the preceding account should be sufficient.
This account of phenomenal D-perceivings and their grounds seems not only 
well motivated, its coherence with our propositionalist account of B-perceivings 
arguably lends further support to the latter. However, one obvious objection need 
be addressed. Earlier I rejected higher-order properties as objects of B-perceivings 
on phenomenological grounds (among others). I am now saying that phenomenal 
D-perceivings are relations to higher-order properties. Should not the phenomeno­
logical point carry over to D-perceivings?
My point against higher-order properties only applies to basic phenomenal states. 
The point is that when one introspects the most basic phenomenal states one can un­
dergo, it never occurs to one that they might be relations to higher-order properties 
or more complex or abstract entities. If they seem relational, they seem at most to 
relate us to proposition-like things with fairly simple first-order structure. The point 
does not extend to derivative phenomenal states (D-perceivings) because these are 
not directly introspectible. When you notice that you seejp something, you notice 
this by noticing that you seejp something having certain features. Then you can 
choose to describe your state more abstractly as a mere seeingjp of "something". 
Since derivative phenomenal states are essentially abstractions of basic phenome-
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nal states, it befits them to have a more abstraet strueture.
4.7 Summary
In this chapter I presented a prima facie case for sensory virtualism based on PCSE+, 
the view that the basic phenomenal states are phenomenal B-perceivings. I began 
with a simple argument to the effect that sensory propositional ism, the first tenet 
of sensory virtualism, offers the most plausible account of the semantics of ascrip­
tions of phenomenal perceivings which appear to quantify over propositions. I then 
elaborated a more complex argument which proceeds by elimination of the two 
main alternatives to sensory propositionalism: the view that phenomenal perceiv­
ings are monadic states, and the view that phenomenal B-perceivings are relations 
to non-propositions. Given that phenomenal perceivings are independent of one’s 
environment (as argued in section 3.2.2), sensory propositionalism implies sensory 
virtualism. I concluded the chapter with a brief discussion of the semantics of D- 
perceivings ascriptions and the relation between D-perceivings and B-perceivings.
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Chapter 5
Pure virtualism
In the previous chapter, I presented a case for sensory virtualism (SV). The virtualist 
theory I want to defend is strictly stronger than SV:
(Pure) virtualism There is a relation R such that: 1) For any basic phenomenal 
state s, there is a proposition P such that 5 = standing in R to P; 2) R is virtual 
with respect to basic phenomenal states.
For the duration of this chapter, I will refer to this theory as "pure virtualism" in or­
der to avoid any confusion with the weaker SV. I will now argue for pure virtualism 
based on SV. I will argue that SV is not a good resting point: if one is attracted to 
SV, one should go all the way and endorse pure virtualism. I will begin by delineat­
ing the options we are left with given SV and the considerations which militate for 
it. Then I will discuss two problems one has to face if one wants to hold to SV while 
rejecting the pure virtualist view. I will conclude with responses to some arguments 
which might seem to favor a weaker position than pure virtualism.
5.1 Beyond the senses
SV applies only to experiences which belong to certain sensory modalities. On the 
face of it, it does not apply to cognitive and emotional experiences, which are not
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readily associated with sensory modalities. But it seems highly plausible that all ex­
periences are similar in nature: if sensory experiences consist in standing in virtual 
relations to propositions, it seems probable that all experiences have this structure 
as well. The question is how we should generalize from SV to all experiences. We 
have two options: we can endorse pure virtualism, or we can find some way of ex­
tending SV to cognitive and emotional experiences. I will say more about each of 
these options before arguing for the first.
5.1.1 More on pure virtualism
Pure virtualism does not say anything about the nature of the relation R it posits. 
As such, the theory is incomplete. And it is hard to see how it could be true without 
having some idea of what relation R is. Fortunately, we now have all the material 
we need to specify it.
The relation which I believe makes pure virtualism true is the introspectively 
salient relation which is part of seeingp, hearingp, smellingp, feelingp, etc. I will 
refer to this relation as the experiencing relation. The experiencing relation is part 
of seeingp and other acts of phenomenal perception in that seeingp x, hearingp jc, 
ecetera all consist at least in part in experiencing x.
The experiencing relation The introspectively salient relation which is at least 
partly constitutive of seeingp, hearingp, smellingp, feelingp, etc.
That there is an experiencing relation should be clear from the fact that we system­
atically describe all phenomenal perceivings as cases of experiencing something, in 
the technical sense of "experiencing": when one seesp stars, one experiences stars; 
when one smellsp a rubber smell, one experiences a rubber smell; when one feelsp 
a sensation, one experiences a sensation; and so on. I discussed this matter at some 
length in chapter 3. It is also hard to make sense of the fact that everyone agrees 
that all phenomenal perceivings have something in common (that all are phenom-
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enal states) without positing some property which is constitutive of all of them.1 
Given the relational structure of phenomenal perceivings, it seems quite plausible 
that the property they have in common is a relation.
To say that there is an experiencing relation as defined above is not yet to say that 
pure virtualism is true: it could be that experiences involve more than standing in 
the experiencing relation to certain contents, but also (for example) further elements 
corresponding to their specific modalities. However, the experiencing relation is a 
good candidate to play the role of R in the pure virtualist theory. I will refer to the 
claim that pure virtualism is satisfied by the experiencing relation as virtualism+.
Virtualism+ (Pure) virtualism is true, and relation R is the experiencing relation.
One potential difficulty with virtualism+ is that it is not immediately obvious that it 
is compatible with the considerations which led us to SV. For we found that every 
basic phenomenal state in a given modality (f) is a state of standing in the (J)-ing 
relation to a proposition. Can a phenomenal state be both a state of standing in the 
seeing relation to P and a state of standing in the experiencing relation to P?
Yes, provided that we can in principle give a pleonastic analysis of the seeing 
relation. To illustrate what I mean, take statements 5.1 and 5.2.
(5.1) Alice ran a marathon.
(5.2) Bob is circling the roundabout.
There is arguably nothing more to running a marathon than participating (perhaps 
properly) in a marathon, because a marathon is an event in which one runs. Simi­
larly, there is nothing more to circling a roundabout than following the contour of a 
roundabout, because roundabouts are (at least roughly) circular. On the virtualist-h 
view, the experiencing relation is to seeingjp something red what the act of following
1 Disjunctivists sometimes say that veridical and non-veridical experiences have nothing in com­
mon. This is a logical falsehood. What disjunctivists really mean is that veridical and non-veridical 
experiences do not share properties of a certain kind (most likely that they do not share phenomenal 
characters).
143
the contour is to circling a roundabout: there is nothing more to seeingjp something 
red than experiencing! something red, because to seep is just to experience an entity
of the visual kind, and what "something red" denotes in the "seejp ___" context is
an entity of that kind.
What is a visual (auditory, tactile, etc.) proposition or quantifier? On a first pass, 
it seems that a visual proposition is one that involves color properties and no other 
properties but modality-neutral properties (e.g. spatial and temporal properties). 
Aural entities might be characterized by their involvement of sound properties (e.g. 
pitch). It is less clear what the properties characteristic of touch and other modali­
ties might be. But the matter is of little importance from the standpoint of the pure 
virtualist theory, because modalities are not part of the theory. For the pure virtu- 
alist, modalities do not cut nature at her joints. It might be hard to make explicit 
exactly what the folk mean by "visual", "auditory", ecetera, but this is not a task that 
we need to achieve in order to develop a complete virtualist account of phenomenal 
character.
5.1.2 Impure virtualism
Pure virtualism(+) is one way of generalizing from SV to all phenomenal states. 
But this theory might well seem too strong. As noted at the end of chapter 1, 
some representationalists hold that an experience’s modality affects its phenomenal 
character independently of its content. Visually experiencing a shape and tactilely 
experiencing the same shape, for example, might be thought to be two phenomenal 
states with the same content but distinct phenomenal characters. Pure virtualism 
does not allow this. So before we adopt pure virtualism, we need to consider a 
weaker generalization of SV which gives some role to modalities or modality-like 
factors in the determination of phenomenal characters. The view Chalmers (2004) 
calls impure representationalism is the representational theory which best matches 
this job description. We can call its counterpart in the virtualist framework impure
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virtual ism.
Impure virtualism (IV) For any manner of representation M, there is a relation R 
such that: 1) For any basic phenomenal state s which has M there is some 
proposition P such that 5 = standing in R to P; 2) R is virtual with respect to 
basic phenomenal states.
We can leave the question of what a manner of representation is largely open for 
now. For the moment, let us assume only that every phenomenal state has a manner 
of representation. Without this assumption, IV would not cover all phenomenal 
states, so it would not really be a competitor to pure virtualism qua generalization 
of sensory virtualism. We can for the time being take manners of representation to 
correspond to sensory modalities and other kinds of experience we have found it 
useful to distinguish so far, e.g. cognitive and emotional experiences.
IV, like SV, is strictly weaker than pure virtualism. It is not an opposing view 
but an alternative stopping point. We can call the position according to which IV is 
correct but pure virtualism is not "IV-".
IV- IV is true, but pure virtualism is false.
There is good reason to think that some generalization of SV is true. Allowing for 
sufficiently many interpretations of the notion of a manner of representation, this 
means that either pure virtualism is true or IV- is true. In the rest of this chapter I 
will argue for pure virtualism principally by arguing against IV-.
5.2 The case for pure virtualism
Ultimately, the primary reason why I favor virtualism+ over IV- is that the former 
is simpler, clearer, and has considerably more explanatory power. But virtualism+ 
also seems more phenomenologically accurate to me. I want to begin by trying to 
bring this out.
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Imagine that you are looking at a Coke can on your desk. When you seejp a 
red can on your desk, you experience a certain scene: you stand in the experienc­
ing relation to a state of affairs such as 3xredCan(x). You can easily recognize 
something that is going on which is also going on when you hearp, smellp, tastep 
or feelp things: in each of these cases, as in your Coke can experience, you stand 
in the experiencing relation to something. Now try to find some aspect of the phe­
nomenology of your state of seeingp a red can which goes beyond the fact that you 
are experiencing a red can. Take a moment to try this.
One must not conclude that there is a phenomenal visualness to the seeingp 
state above and beyond its being an experience of a red can on the ground that it is a 
specifically visual experience. For being a visual experience might just be a matter 
of being an experience with color content (as the pure virtualist posits). Personally, 
however carefully I introspect, I am unable to discern anything in seeing^ a red 
can which is not also part of what it is to experience a red can (to stand in the 
experiencing relation to a state of affairs involving a red can).
In the rest of this section 1 will discuss two difficulties with IV- which militate 
for pure virtualism independently of the preceding phenomenological considera­
tions. These problems come out more clearly if we assume that IV- implies that 
there can be phenomenal states which have the same content but differ in phenom­
enal character. While IV- does not strictly speaking imply this, a proponent of IV- 
has to accept this. The reason is that there would be no clear counterexample to 
pure virtualism otherwise.2 As we will see in section 5.3, the case for IV- rests 
entirely on putative differences in phenomenology between experiences in different 
sensory modalities which do not correspond to differences in content. If there were 
no such examples, pure virtualism would seem to be by far the best theory given its 
simplicity. I will therefore assume that IV- commits one to there being distinct phe­
nomenal states with the same contents. Another assumption which I feel licensed
2That is, no clear counterexamples which leave IV intact.
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to make at this stage is that we should reject IV- unless there is an interpretation 
of IV which makes it a) plausible and b) at least as strong as sensory virtualism. 
There is good reason to think that sensory virtualism is merely a special case of the 
true general account of the structure of phenomenal states. If no interpretation of 
IV makes sensory virtualism a special case of IV, then there is good reason to think 
that the best characterization of the structure of phenomenal states is that provided 
by pure virtualism.
5.2.1 The problem of multimodal experiences
Phenomenology is generally unified. Right now, for instance, I seem to have a 
unified visual experience which brings together or subsumes all my other visual 
experiences. The same relation of subsumption holds between experiences across 
sensory modalities: I see the keys on my keyboard, I hear the noise they make 
as I hit them, and I also experience the noise together with the keys. I seem to 
have multimodal experiences: experiences which subsume simpler experiences in 
different sensory modalities.
The notion of experience subsumption is hard to analyze, but one thing that is 
fairly clear is that it requires entailment or necessitation: if ei subsumes e2, then ej 
necessitates e2- Intuitively, if an experience ej subsumes an experience e2, is a 
phenomenal part of e\. Since all phenomenal aspects of ej and e2 are essential to 
them, it would seem to follow that e2 is an essential part of ej if ej subsumes e2- It 
would therefore seem to follow that ej necessitates e2 if it subsumes it.
For present purposes, I will assume that there is nothing more to subsumption 
than necessitation: ei subsumes e2 just in case ei necessitates e2- See Bayne & 
Chalmers (2003) for more on subsumption and a defense of this equivalence. For 
our purposes, we need not think of the equivalence between subsumption and ne­
cessitation as a substantive thesis; we can think of it simply as defining one kind of 
subsumption or unity. The multimodal experiences I am interested in here are sim-
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ply the phenomenal states which necessitate phenomenal states in different sensory 
modalities.
In some cases, it might seem that multimodal experiences are nothing more than 
conjunctions of experiences in different modalities. My unified experience of the 
noise and the keys of my keyboard, for example, might be thought to be nothing 
more than the state of experiencing the keys at the same time as experiencing the 
noise they emit. However, other multimodal experiences are harder to reconstruct 
in this fashion. For example, it seems that I can experience a noise as coming from 
a dark shape in my environment, where I am experiencing the noise aurally and the 
shape visually. Call this experience e.
On the pure virtualist view, it is relatively easy to explain how an experience 
like e can subsume experiences in different modalities. Let us say for example that 
the content of e is 5.3.
(5.3) 3x3y (noise (x) A darkShape(y) A caused(y,x))
There are two kinds of visual and auditory experience e might reasonably be said 
to subsume. First, e plausibly subsumes two D-perceivings: seeingjp a dark shape 
and hearingjp a noise. Second, we could also say that e subsumes the B-perceivings 
seeingjp something be a dark shape and hearingjp something be a noise.
According to the account of phenomenal D-perceivings I gave in section 4.6, the 
subsumed experiences’ contents in the first case would be quantifiers 5.4 and 5.5.
(5.4) XQ(3x(noise(x) /\Q(x)))
(5.5) XQ(3x(darkShape(x) A Ö M ))
I suggested that a phenomenal B-perceiving involving a virtual relation R realizes 
(hence necessitates) a phenomenal D-perceiving also involving R when the former’s 
content entails that the latter’s content is instantiated. If pure virtualism is correct, 
the present experiences all involve the same virtual relation. The condition of entail- 
ment also obtains between their contents: 5.3 entails that 5.4 is instantiated by the
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property of being caused by a dark shape and that 5.5 is instantiated by the property 
of causing a noise. Our account of realization therefore provides an account of e’s 
unity if the experiences it subsumes are D-perceivings.
The components of e could also have full propositional contents (they could be 
B-perceivings):
(5.6) 3xdarkShape(x)
(5.7) 3x noise (x)
In this case the account of realization given in chapter 4 does not apply, because it 
only covers the cases of derivative phenomenal states. However, basic phenomenal 
states can also necessitate one another, and our current account is naturally extended 
to this case. To generalize the account, we can say that a phenomenal state s\ ne­
cessitates a phenomenal state S2 when that the content of s\ obtains entails that the 
content of S2 obtains. An immediate implication of this is that a basic phenomenal 
state S] necessitates a basic phenomenal state S2 when the former’s content entails 
the latter’s content. If this account is acceptable, the pure virtualist has a straight­
forward explanation of how an experience of content 5.3 can unify experiences of 
contents 5.6 and 5.7, because proposition 5.3 entails propositions 5.6 and 5.7.
Of course, the same overgeneralization worries we discussed in chapter 4 arise. 
But the same response applies. The account has the consequence that we experi­
ence every necessary truth all the time, but one way to see this is as proof that the 
phenomenology of an experience of a necessary truth is always the same, and that 
there is not much to it.
If this account turns out to be too liberal, an alternative is to say that a basic phe­
nomenal state s\ necessitates a basic phenomenal state S2 when the former’s content 
contains the latter’s content, where containment is something more demanding than 
entailment. As noted in chapter 4, spelling this out would require giving an ac­
count of proposition structure, but we may expect something along these lines to be
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correct if the simple entailment account proves untenable.
Now, this purely content-oriented way of deriving simple experiences from 
more complex ones works because all experiences are constituted by the same vir­
tual relation on the pure virtualist view. Within IV-, we need to add an explanation 
of how a subsuming experience’s manner of representation relates to the manners 
of representation of the experiences it subsumes.
The main difficulty here is to give a plausible account of the virtual relations 
which are constitutive of multimodal experiences. It is unclear what the virtual re­
lation constitutive of e could be. It is not just a visual experience or just an auditory 
experience. Should we say that it is both auditory and visual? There is a sense in 
which it is, but the visual and auditory relations are distinct on IV-. We must either 
choose which is constitutive of e or introduce a new relation for visual-and-auditory 
experiences (and all other combinations of modalities). It seems prima facie im­
plausible that e is constituted by the auditory or visual relation (but not the other), 
so we need to give an account of the combined visual-and-auditory relation which 
constitutes it.
Various accounts of the visual-and-auditory virtual relation are possible. For 
example:
(5.8) XxXP(x represents proposition P in part visually and in part aurally)
(5.9) XxXP(x represents proposition P both visually and aurally)
5.8 suffers from what we might call the wholeness problem', it does not seem to 
do justice to the fact that, in e, one does not merely experience a part of P visually 
while experiencing another part of it aurally: one also experiences the whole of P 
as well, including the relation of causation between the noise and the shape (which 
is not clearly accounted for on 5.8). In response to this, one might suggest 5.10.
(5.10) XxXP(x represents proposition P in part visually and in part aurally, and in 
whole neutrally)
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But 5.10 suffers from the duplication problem-, it seems to imply that one has two 
phenomenally distinct experiences of the noise involved in P (say): one auditory ex­
perience of the noise, and some other "neutral" experience of the noise. Whatever 
the neutral manner of representation is supposed to be, it should make for different 
phenomenal states than the auditory manner. For the virtual relation associated with 
the neutral manner would satisfy pure virtualism if it yielded the same phenomenal 
states as all other manners of representation.3 But I don’t have two distinct expe­
riences of exactly the same noise when undergoing an experience like e, so this 
seems wrong. 5.9 suffers from the same problem: it seems to imply that in e one 
experiences the whole of P both visually and aurally, while in fact one experiences 
it only once, but in a mixed way.
The preceding accounts of multimodal relations all face an additional difficulty. 
Unless different manners of representation (or constitutive virtual relations) can be 
associated with the same content, IV- is implausible. Let us say for the purposes of 
illustration that simple shape contents yield different experiences when they are rep­
resented in touch than when they are represented in vision. Then the two following 
multimodal phenomenal states should be possible:
e \ : A state in which one visually experiences a square, tactilely experi­
ences a circle, and experiences the square as being on top of the circle.
C2 : A state in which one tactilely experiences a square, visually experi­
ences a circle, and experiences the square as being on top of the circle.
Again for the purposes of illustration, we can suppose that these states have the 
content 3x3y(circle(x) A square(y) A onTopO f(y,x)). Call this proposition P. e\ 
and ei are both at once visual and tactile. On any of the preceding accounts, both 
would be states of standing in the visual-and-taetile virtual relation to P. That is to
say that they would be the same state. But e\ and e2 are clearly distinct.
3Of course, one might say that the neutral manner happens to yield the same phenomenal state 
as the auditory manner in the case of simple noise content. But the two manners of representation 
have to differ for some contents, and we could modify the example accordingly.
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This problem calls for an account of the virtual relations involved in multimodal 
experiences which individuates them more finely. One might think that e\ is a state 
in which one is related to P through a relation such as 5.11.
(5.11) XxXP(x represents proposition P visually as fa r  as squares go and tactilely 
as fa r as circles go)
The general idea is to specify what kinds of entity are experienced in what modali­
ties as part of the virtual relation. But one can presumably experience two entities 
of the same kind in different modalities as part of the same experience (if IV- is 
correct). For example, a phenomenal state such as the following should be possible 
if IV- is correct:
ey. A state in which one visually experiences a square, tactilely expe­
riences a square, and experiences the first square as being on top of the 
second square.
5.11 does not work with experiences like e3 . We would have to say that £ 3  involves 
a virtual relation such as this one:
(5.12) XxXP(x represents proposition P visually with regard to the square at 
location LI and tactilely with regard to the circle at location L2)
At this stage we have built all the content of the experience into the virtual relation. 
This strikes me as highly ad hoc.
Another problem with both 5.11 and 5.12 is that they seem inconsistent with 
sensory virtualism. It is reasonable to suppose that if multimodal experiences in­
volve complex, shape- and location-involving virtual relations like 5.11 and 5.12, 
so do unimodal experiences. But this would seem to contradict sensory virtualism, 
which asserts that all experiences in the same modality are constituted by the same 
virtual relation.
Whether 5.11 and 5.12 contradict sensory virtualism or not, they seem to require 
an interpretation of the manners of representation referred to in IV which makes the
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latter weaker than sensory virtualism in not assigning the same virtual relations to 
experiences in the same modalities. As I said at the beginning of this section, there 
is good reason to think that there is some true generalization of sensory virtualism 
which captures all its force. If the only way of making IV work is to make it weaker 
than sensory virtualism in some respect by allowing experience-specific virtual re­
lations, the only suitable generalization of sensory virtualism is that provided by 
pure virtualism.
Note also that 5.11 and 5.12 face the same dilemma between the wholeness 
problem and the duplication problem simpler approaches face. Relations 5.11 and 
5.12 do not capture the fact that the shapes experienced in states e\ and e3 are ex­
perienced as related to each other. To remedy this, we need additional clauses to 
the effect that one represents the whole of the contents of e\ and e3 in a "neutral" 
manner. But then it follows that one experiences the relevant shapes twice. This 
dilemma is perhaps the most difficult aspect of the problem of multimodal experi­
ences for impure virtualism.
Aside from the problem of specifying the virtual relations constitutive of mul­
timodal experiences, another difficulty multimodal experiences like e generate for 
IV- is that of explaining how they necessitate their components. The difficulty lies 
in explaining how one’s being in e could entail that one seesjp a dark shape without 
also entailing that one seesjp a noise, or how it could entail that one hearsjp a noise 
without also entailing that one hearsjp a dark shape. To show that e necessitates one 
of its component experiences e\, one would have to show that ct’s being in e, possi­
bly together with additional premises which are necessarily true, entails a's  being 
in e\. In order to show this, one would have to produce a suitable valid argument. 
Now consider statements 1-3 below, where Rc is the virtual relation involved in e. 
One would have to sketch a valid argument from 1 and possibly some necessary 
truths to 2, but which does not also yield 3.
1. a  stands in Re to 3x3y(noise(x) AdarkShape(y) A caused(y,x)).
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•2. a  stands in the auditory virtual relation to 3x noise (x).
3. a  stands in the visual virtual relation to 3xnoise(x).
The same applies to the visual experience subsumed by e: one would have to show 
that being in e entails standing in the visual virtual relation to 3xdarkShape(x) but 
not 3xdarkShape(x), even though both contents are related to the content of e in 
exactly the same way. It is very hard to see how this could be achieved; parity of 
reasoning suggests that it cannot be that 1 entails 2 but not 3.
Here it is important to keep in mind that a proponent of IV- is committed to 
there being some contents which can be represented in more than one manner of 
representation. Given that this is so, it would not do to describe Re as the visual- 
and-auditory relation and add the following as a (putatively necessary) premise:
If a  stands in the 0-and-i// virtual relation to a content which contains 
a content C compatible with modality 0, then a  stands in the 0 virtual 
relation to C.
Suppose for the sake of illustration that IV- allows shapes to be represented both au­
rally and visually. The above premise combined with 1 would entail both 2 and 3. 
Of course, this particular counterexample can be avoided by stipulating that shapes 
cannot be represented aurally (and they plausibly cannot). But we could construct 
a counterexample that fits whatever contents make exception to pure virtual ism ac­
cording to a proponent of IV-. IV- can explain subsumption using the above prin­
ciple only if every content is always represented in every manner it can be repre­
sented in when it is represented at all. This is highly dubious on the assumption that 
manners of representation affect the phenomenology of experience independently 
of content as proponents of IV- claim. Ultimately, the only way of explaining the 
entailment of subsumed experiences by subsuming experiences would seem to be 
to ascribe to unifying experiences highly complex, content-embedding virtual rela­
tions such that we ended up with for e\ and e  ^ above.
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At this point it is tempting to reject the assumption we have been making that 
multimodal experiences like e have the same kind of relational structure as the uni- 
modal experiences they subsume. For example, one might postulate that e is not a 
state of standing in a virtual relation to a content, but some kind of compound of 
visual and auditory experiences.
But multimodal experiences like e, ej, e2 and ej  are not mere conjunctions of 
unimodal experiences. In particular, e is not merely the state of hearingjp a noise 
and seeingip a dark shape, but a state in which one experiences a dark shape caus­
ing a noise. Neither can we obtain it from simpler experiences stuck together with 
the irreducible phenomenal glue Dainton (2000) calls "co-consciousness": how and 
why would co-consciousness between an experience of a noise and an experience of 
a shape result in an experience of the noise as caused by the shape? The problem is 
that a variety of relations can replace causation in experiences like e: one can expe­
rience a noise as coming from above a shape, as coming from underneath a shape, 
as coming before a shape in time, as starting when a shape appears, etc. The visual 
and auditory experiences which are subsumed by these multimodal experiences are 
always the same, but the subsuming experiences are all distinct. This shows that 
no single relation between unimodal experiences can account for all multimodal 
experiences— not logical conjunction, co-consciousness, co-introspection, simul­
taneity, or any other relation which has been thought to play the role of unifying 
experiences.
5.2.2 What is a manner of representation?
One of the main difficulties with IV- is that an interpretation of the notion of a 
manner of representation which makes it plausible is elusive. A manner of repre­
sentation, on the most natural understanding of this expression, is simply a way of 
representing. Any property of a representation constitutes a way of representing, 
so every set of phenomenal states arguably has a characteristic manner of represen-
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tation. For example, one could say that experiences in set {.s’o,...,^n} represent in 
the way, in that they are experiences with the property of being in {so,...,.9n}.
More importantly, there is a manner of representation all phenomenal states have: 
the phenomenal way of representing (i.e. representing with some phenomenal char­
acter, or representing consciously). This means that IV entails pure virtualism on the 
default reading: if IV is true, there is a virtual relation R corresponding to the phe­
nomenal way of representing such that all phenomenal states are states of standing 
in R to certain propositions. On the default reading of "manner of representation", 
then, IV- is clearly false, because IV entails pure virtualism.
At the other extreme, one could take manners of representation to be the max­
imally specific ways phenomenal states represent. Then every manner of repre­
sentation would be had by precisely one phenomenal state. On this reading, IV is 
equivalent to weak virtualism. This makes it highly plausible, but this makes IV- 
implausible in light of SV. As I mentioned earlier, it is plausible that SV generalizes. 
A proper generalization of SV would be at least as strong as SV, but weak virtualism 
is not. If there is no other reading of IV than that which makes it equivalent to weak 
virtualism, then the only candidate generalization of SV is the pure virtualist view.
The bottom line is that IV- is unsustainable unless it is possible to specify a 
technical notion of manner of representation which makes IV stronger than sensory 
virtualism but weaker than pure virtualism.
Sensory modalities
It is natural to begin by looking for some generalization of the concept of a sensory 
modality. There seems to be four reasonably natural ways of individuating sensory 
modalities. These four possible individuation criteria are distinguished by Grice 
( 1962; 1988):
• Normal external stimuli, e.g. visual experiences are experiences normally 
caused by light.
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• Characteristic representational contents, e.g. visual experiences represent col­
ors and shapes.
• Phenomenal characteristics, e.g. visual experiences have a certain visual phe­
nomenology.
• Organs and internal mechanisms, e.g. visual experiences are produced by a 
mechanism which spans the eyes, the optic nerves and the visual cortex.
We could specify these criteria more precisely, but this will do to start. For all I 
know, each of these ways of individuating modalities could be that which is rec­
ommended by the conventional meaning of "sensory modality" or "sense". I take 
no stand on this matter, and nothing in the rest of this chapter turns on this.4 I will 
write modalitystj, modalityrep, modalityphe, and modalityjnt for these different kinds 
of modality whenever disambiguation is necessary. I will also subscript modalities 
modifiers whenever appropriate. For example, one might say using this notation 
that the property of being a visualstj experience differs from the property of being 
a visualphe experience because the former requires a certain kind of cause but no 
specific phenomenology while the latter requires a certain kind of phenomenology 
but no specific kind of cause.
What makes non-sensory experiences non-sensory appears to be precisely that 
they are not caused by characteristic stimuli or produced by readily identifiable 
sensory mechanisms. As a result, it is difficult to make sense of the notion of a 
non-sensory modalitystj or non-sensory modalityjnt. If manners of representation 
are modalitiesstj or modalitieSjnt, non-sensory experiences don’t have manners of
4Some claims I made earlier are not neutral regarding the nature of modalities. As noted in 
section 5.1.1, pure virtualism requires that we understand the modalities referred to in SV along 
representational lines. My defense of SV itself is not entirely neutral. For example, it does not 
seem plausible that any phenomenal state essentially involves any sensory organ, so it does not 
seem plausible that any phenomenal state is identical to seeingjnt a certain content (an implication 
of PCSE on the assumption that the relevant modalities are individuated by internal mechanisms). 
Still, I don’t want to debate what a "sense" is in everyday life because this anthropological question 
is ultimately irrelevant to my goals. What matters is that there is an interpretation of SV along the 
lines of one of the preceding interpretations of "sensory modality" which is true, and that this thesis 
militates for pure virtualism.
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representation and IV is not a generalization of SV to non-sensory experiences (it 
does not apply to non-sensory experiences). This would not make IV implausible, 
but this would make it irrelevant to our discussion, because we want to know which 
generalization of SV to non-sensory experiences is the correct one.
It remains to see if we can dehne manners of representation by reference to 
modalitiesrep or modalitiesphe.
ModaIitiesrep
The modalityrep understanding of manners of representations leads back to the prob­
lem which made us reject the traditional formulations of representationalism in 
chapter 1: how should we understand the relevant representational contents? We 
found no other satisfactory way of clarifying the notion of content than those pro­
vided by pure virtualism, sensory virtualism, and weak virtualism. Rather than 
explain representationalism in terms of the notion of content, we decided to do the 
reverse and explain the notion of content in terms of virtualism: the content of an 
experience is simply the entity (the relatum) which makes pure virtualism, sensory 
virtualism, or weak virtualism true for this experience (we must choose one of the 
three).5 This does not mean that we must reject the notion of a modalityrep, but we 
can only understand modalitiesrep as individuated by the propositions which make 
specific virtualist theories true.
This stricture on content talk greatly complicates a full assessment of the mo­
dalityrep account of manners of representation, but one plausible assumption can 
allow us to avoid the complications. The assumption is that, for any given experi­
ence, the identities which satisfy all the true virtualist theories for that experience 
are all the same. So if e satisfies both sensory virtualism and weak virtualism, it is 
in both cases in virtue of its being a state of standing in a given relation R to a given
5We could also say that the content of an experience is the relatum which makes IV true for 
this experience, but then IV would be circular if manners of representation are supposed to be 
modalitiesrep.
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proposition P. This assumption seems prima facie plausible. It is also an instance of 
a more general principle to the effect that identical properties have identical parts. 
In the case of simple relational properties or states of the form Xx(R(x, a)),  this 
means that Xx(R(x, ot)) =  Ajc(V(jc,/3)) entails that V = R and a  =  ß.  This principle 
implies that if a phenomenal state is both a state of standing in R to P and a state of 
standing R’ to P \  then R = R’ and P = P \  In other words, the same virtual relation 
and proposition satisfy every virtualist theory for every phenomenal state, so every 
phenomenal state has at most one content.
If it is true that every phenomenal state has at most one content, the modalityrep 
account of manners of representation, combined with IV, does not allow that two 
distinct phenomenal states have the same content. The reason is that two phenom­
enal states which have the same content must have the same modalityrep. On IV 
with modalitiesrep as manners of representation, two states which have the same 
modalityrep are constituted by the same virtual relation. So, on IV with modalitiesrep 
as manners of representation, two states which have the same content are both 
states of standing in the same virtual relation to the same proposition (so are identi­
cal). IV therefore rules out distinct phenomenal states with the same content on the 
modalityrep account of manners of representation. As I noted earlier, IV must allow 
for this possibility in order for IV- to be plausible; otherwise, there would be no 
perceptible advantage to IV over the simpler pure virtualist theory. IV- is therefore 
unacceptable on the modalityrep account of manners of representation.
One might question the assumption that every phenomenal state has at most one 
content. That is, one might think that a phenomenal state could be both a state 
of standing in R to P and a state of standing in R’ to P’, where P is distinct from 
P \  Analogous problems to that just described still arise without the same-content 
assumption, but they are harder to bring out. A little bit of nomenclature is required 
to discuss the problems efficiently.
For any given partition T of a set of phenomenal states, let T-virtualism be
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defined as follows:
T-virtualism For any s in T, there is a relation R virtual with respect to basic phe­
nomenal states such that for any e in 5 , there is a proposition P such that e = 
standing in R to P.
Weak virtualism, sensory virtualism, and pure virtualism are all instances of T- 
virtualism. They are instances of T-virtualism in which T is the set of all singletons 
of phenomenal states, the set which sorts sensory phenomenal states by their sen­
sory modalities (on some understanding of modalities), and the set which includes 
only the set of all phenomenal states, respectively.
We can define the T-content of a phenomenal state e as the proposition which 
makes T-virtualism true for e. That is to say that e has T-content P just in case P is 
the unique proposition such that T-virtualism is true and
1. there is a set S in T such that e is in S and
2. there is a relation R virtual with respect to basic phenomenal states such that 
for any phenomenal state e in S there is a proposition Q such that e = stand­
ing in R to Q and
3. e = standing in R to P.
If we want to allow more than one content per phenomenal state, we need to un­
derstand modalitieSrep in terms of specific content types: we have to speak of T- 
modalitiesrep rather than modalitiesrep tout court. For example, we could say that 
manners of representation are Tiyy-modalitiesrep, where Vwv is the set of singletons 
of phenomenal states (the set T such that weak virtualism = T-virtualism). Twv~ 
modalitiesrep are modalities which are determined by the propositions which make 
weak virtualism true for specific experiences. We must now ask whether there is a 
set T such that T-virtualism is plausible and the manners of representations referred 
to in IV and (indirectly) in IV- can be understood as T-modalitiesrep.
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An obvious problem arises in the case where T  contains the set of all phenome­
nal states. Since T partitions the set of all phenomenal states, it can only contain one 
set in this case: the set of all phenomenal states. So, if T contains the set of all phe­
nomenal states, it is V py and we individuate modalities by Tpy-contents (the con­
tents which satisfy pure virtualism). If IV’s modalities are individuated in this man­
ner and it is non-vacuously satisfied, pure virtualism must be true, because the mere 
fact that some phenomenal state has a manner of representation (a T^-m odalityiep) 
entails that all phenomenal states satisfy pure virtualism. This makes IV- untenable. 
There is an equally obvious difficulty if we take T to be f^y: since sensory virtual­
ism only applies to sensory phenomenal states, non-phenomenal states do not have 
rsy-modalitiesrep.6
The problem with IV- if we take manners of representation to be rVy-moda- 
1 itiesrep is that it does not allow experiences with the same content (i.e. the same 
T/v/-content) to differ in phenomenal character, contrary to the requirement ex­
plained on page 146. The reason is that if an experience has P as T/v-content (on 
the rVv'-modalitieSi-ep account of IV’s manners of representation), it also has it as 
IVvz-content. Since an experience’s r^zy-content determines its TVK-modalityrep, 
it is not possible for two distinct experiences to have the same T/vz-content: if they 
have the same T/v-content, they also have the same manner of representation and 
involve the same virtual relation, so they are identical.
The key claim here is that if an experience has P as T/v/-content, it also has it 
as rVv-content. If e has any T/vz-content at all and the manners of representation 
referred to in IV are rwiz-modalitiesrep, e satisfies all the conditions listed above 
for having a IVy-content (otherwise it wouldn’t have a manner of representation).
6Of course, we could say that the manner of representation of a phenomenal state is its r,$v- 
modalityrep if any and some catch-all manner M* otherwise. Then every phenomenal state would 
be guaranteed to have a manner of representation. But this seems rather ad hoc. Besides, there is 
as much a need to distinguish between the various manners of representations of non-sensory phe­
nomenal states as there is a need to distinguish between the manners of representation of sensory 
phenomenal states. In particular, if different sensory experiences have different manners of repre­
sentation, then it is plausible that emotional experiences and sensory imagination also differ with 
respect to their manners of representation.
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The question is whether the same proposition satisfies both the conditions for rw y- 
content and the conditions for T/y-content for e. The key here is that, whatever 
elements of Twv and T/y e is in, we know that the relation, proposition and set of 
experience which satisfy conditions 1-3 for T/y-content for e also satisfy them for 
Tvyy-content, because all elements of Tyyy (singletons of phenomenal states) have 
supersets in T/y. So if proposition P, relation R and, set S satisfy conditions 1-3 
above for e and T/y, they satisfy the same conditions for e and Tvyy. Only one 
proposition can be the IVy-content of e, so the I"Vy-content of e is P (the same as 
its r/y-content).
Note that this argument applies to all content type pairs <  T i , ^  >  where all 
elements of Ti have supersets in IV. When this is the case, the same virtual relation 
and proposition which meet the conditions for ^-con ten t for an experience meet the 
conditions for V\ -content for the same experience, so an experience which has P as 
r 2-content automatically has it as Tj-content as well. This suggests an extension 
of the argument to rsy-modalitiesrep, because it seems that a plausible alternative 
to pure virtual!sm should be a theory on which the manners of representation of 
sensory phenomenal states correspond to sensory modalities or more comprehen­
sive categories (a plausible alternative to pure virtualism should be at least as strong 
as sensory virtualism). If the modalitiesrep referred to in IV were defined in such 
a way that IV meets this condition, a sensory phenomenal state which had P as 
T/y-content would also have it as Vsv-content, so it would not be possible for two 
distinct phenomenal states to have the same T/y-content (because they would also 
have the same manner of representation).
ModalitieSphc
If manners of representation cannot be defined as modalities^, modalitiesstj, or 
modalitiesrep consistently with IV-, it is natural to try to individuate them purely in 
terms of phenomenology, which would make them modalitiesphe. What, then, of
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the proposal that manners of representation correspond to phenomenal types?
The key question here is: what kinds of kind of phenomenal character indi­
viduate modalitieSphe? The answer to this question is crucial to the viability of 
IV-. Note in particular that IV would imply pure virtualism if all phenomenal types 
characterized modalitiesphc- On this understanding of IV, there would be a modality 
corresponding to the most general kind of phenomenal character (the kind which en­
compasses all phenomenal characters), and all phenomenal states would be identical 
to states of standing in the virtual relation associated with this kind to certain propo­
sitions, so pure virtualism would be satisfied. For IV- to be viable, there has to be a 
suitable characterization of the phenomenal kinds which individuate modalitiesphe-
One reasonable account of modalitiesphe is that visualphe experiences have visual 
content, auditoryp|ie experiences have auditory content, and so on. This is how one 
must think of phenomenally individuated modalities within the pure view. But this 
does not work within IV- if manners of representations are modalities, because IV- 
must allow that manners of representation float free of contents. The problem is 
to provide an account of modalitiesphe which does not make them a function of 
representational content or render IV- dubious in some other way.
The sensory modaIitiesjnt or modalitiesst, could perhaps serve as reference points. 
One could say for instance that a modalityphe is a phenomenal type of the kind that 
captures similarities in phenomenology of the kind we find between the phenome­
nal states normally caused by visual stimuli or activities in visual sensory organs. 
One problem with this is that there are well-known cross-modal effects in which 
experiences we would normally classify as belonging to one modalityphe are caused 
by stimuli associated with another modalityphe- For example, Sham et al. (2000) 
report that a single flash presented concurrently with multiple short beeps is nor­
mally perceived as multiple flashes. According to Sham et al., the illusion is so 
compelling that even subjects to whom it has been explained report seeing multiple 
flashes. Another example is provided by the classic experiment of McGurk & Mac-
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Donald (1976), in which the pairing of an auditory /ba/ with a visual experience 
of a mouth making the sound /ga/ results in an auditory experience of /da/. Such 
cross-modal effects are pervasive and systematic, particularly between the vision- 
audition and taste-smell modalitystj pairs (Thesen et al. 2004; Auvray and Spence 
2008; Bult et al. 2007). In addition to making it hard to assign specific modalitiesstj 
or modalitiesjnt to specific experiences, these phenomena show that experiences’ 
modalitiessti and modalitiesjnt do not systematically correspond to what we would 
otherwise think of as their modalitiesphe, insofar as we have a grasp on the latter. As 
a result, it is doubtful that modalitiesstj or modalitiesjnt could be used to elucidate 
the nature of modalitiesphe.
Another difficulty is that it is not obvious how to generalize from whatever ex­
amples of sensory modalitiesphe we might have. Let us say for the purposes of 
illustration that the visualphe phenomenal states are those which have visual content 
(they are the visualrep phenomenal states; most types of content would do here). We 
could then define modalitiesphe us sets of states which are similar to each other in the 
way that all visualphe phenomenal states are similar to each other. But visualphe phe­
nomenal states thus understood are similar to each other in many respects, including 
their contents. Personally, 1 cannot see what the relevant similarity is, aside perhaps 
from the fact that all visualphe phenomenal states are suites of perceivingp colored 
things, which is a fact about their contents. To clearly define modalitiesphe in this 
kind of way, one has to give some indication of what shared properties of visualrep 
experiences make them visualphe experiences other than their having contents of a 
certain kind.
If you think you know how to individuate modalitiesphe in a way which does not 
reduce them to modalitiesrcp, I suggest that you test your concept of a modalityp|ie by 
asking yourself what modalitiesp|ie there are exactly. How many sensory modalitiespjie 
are there? Is there only sight, hearing, touch, smell, and taste as children’s books 
would tend to suggest? Let us consider a few examples.
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Consider first the ease of pain. Are pain experiences in the same modalityphe as 
touch experiences? A skin irritation feels quite similar to the touch of an abrasive 
surface. On the other hand, headaches generally don’t feel like varieties of touch. 
Should we distinguish different kinds of pain, some which are touch experiences 
and others which are not?
Or consider the perception of hot and cold. Berkeley famously argues that an in­
tense heat is a pain,7 and he is certainly right that it is hard to see why we shouldn’t 
count an experience of intense heat as a pain experience. But a mild heat experience 
is clearly not a pain. So it is not clear whether experiences of heat are experiences 
of pain. It is correspondingly unclear whether experiences of heat are in the same 
modalityphe as experiences of pain. The same goes for touch experiences and expe­
riences of heat. There is something tactile about heat perception, but is it enough to 
make heat experiences touch experiences?
Are smell and taste really different modalitiesphe? They certainly seem to have 
a lot in common phenomenally when one smells a wine, but they are generally 
considered distinct. How are we to decide the matter?
Cognitive modalitiesphc are just as problematic as sensory modalitiesphe. First, 
is there such a thing as a specifically cognitive modalityphe? When you look at 
a scene and experience a distinctive phenomenology as you apprehend that some­
thing is missing, is the phenomenology part of your sensoryphe experience or part of 
a cognitivephe experience? When you use your sensory imagination, say when you 
visualize something, are you representing visuallyphe or cognitively-visuallyphe, or 
just cognitivelyphe? There is certainly a difference in phenomenal character com­
pared to ordinary perceptual experiences, but is it a difference that implies a differ­
ence in phenomenal modality?
How many non-sensory modalitiesphe are there? Does sensory imagination in­
volve a different phenomenal modality than other kinds of cognitive experience, say
7In the first dialogue of Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous in Opposition to Sceptics 
and Atheists.
165
pure phenomenal thoughts? Do emotional feelings fall under the same phenomenal 
modality as bodily experiences or sensory imagination?
How are we to go about answering all these questions? Assuming that moda- 
litieSphe are not equivalent to modalitiesrep, how are we to determine which differ­
ences in phenomenal character correspond to differences in modalityp|lc and which 
do not? This does not seem to me to be an empirical question. This is a criterial 
question whose answer ought to be contained in the very idea of a modalityphe. I 
have no clue what the answer to the question might be unless modalitiesphe are iden­
tified with modalitiesrep. This indicates to me that I have no idea what a modalityphe 
is supposed to be if it is not the same as a modalityrep. We will have to wait and see 
if someone can propose a suitable individuation criterion for modalitiesphe, but the 
odds look slim.
Other options
1 discussed four approaches to manners of representation inspired by the four stan­
dard accounts of sensory modalities. 1 am not aware of any other proposal. In 
fact, proponents of manners of representation such as Chalmers (2004) and Crane 
(2003) appear content with the default understanding of them ("ways of represent­
ing"). This is understandable because the default understanding works just fine 
within Chalmers’ and Crane’s theories. However, it does not work as an account 
of the manners of representation referred to in IV and IV-, because it results in an 
interpretation of IV on which IV entails pure virtualism. Since the prospects for a 
suitable account of manners of representation seem dim, I tentatively conclude that 
pure virtualism is a significantly more promising theory than IV-.
5.3 The case against pure virtualism
Several putative counterexamples to pure virtualism have been suggested which 
might seem to favor IV-, All such cases involve two experiences in different modal­
ities which allegedly have the same representational content while differing in phe­
nomenal character. I believe that these cases have received their fair share of atten­
tion in the literature, so I will keep my survey to a minimum.
5.3.1 Block’s examples
Block (1996) suggests a few mundane examples of experiences in different sen­
sory modalities which could allegedly have the same representational content while 
differing in phenomenal character. His best case is arguably that which involves 
two experiences of movement. One is an experience in which an individual hears 
something falling from above. The other is an experience in which an individual 
sees something falling from above. Block claims that two such experiences could 
have the same content while differing in phenomenal character (one has an auditory 
character, the other a visual character). Block appears to have intended this case as 
a counterexample to all representationalist views, but it is clear that it only threatens 
cross-modal views such as pure virtualism.
A common response to this case is that the auditory and visual experiences in 
question represent more than that something is falling from above: the auditory 
experience also represents auditory properties, and the visual experience represents 
colors and shapes. These differences, the response goes, account for the difference 
in phenomenal character between the two experiences.
Block (1996) responds that, while the full auditory and visual experiences have 
distinct contents, it is possible to isolate in imagination mere visual and auditory 
experiences of "something falling", and these can be seen to differ in phenomenal 
character.
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This rejoinder has the drawback of reducing Block's case to a mere thought ex­
periment. There is also good reason to question the intelligibility of the scenario. 
We are asked to imagine visualphe and auditoryphe experiences which merely repre­
sent that something is falling from above. Personally, I don’t know what colorless, 
soundless auditoryphe and visualphe experiences are like; I am unable to imagine 
such experiences. Whenever I try to imagine a visual experience, for example, I 
end up imagining an experience of a shape with a particular color. That is the only 
positive image I can form of a visual experience. This does not show that colorless 
visual experiences are impossible, but this means that T cannot confirm a priori that 
they are possible either.S *8
5.3.2 Synaesthesia
According to Galton (1980), synaesthesia is a condition in which experiences in 
multiple modalities occur in response to stimulation of one modality, e.g. when 
visual experiences occur in response to auditory stimulation. Rosenberg (2004) 
claims that synaesthesia is a counterexample to representationalism. More specifi­
cally, he claims that individuals who have visual experiences as a result of auditory 
or pain stimuli are counterexamples to representationalism. The idea appears to be 
that visual experiences triggered by sounds or pain do not represent their normal 
objects (colored expanses) but sounds or bodily damage, respectively.
SV might seem untouched by this argument since it allows visual experiences 
with sound or damage content. However, SV cannot accommodate Rosenberg’s 
apparent assumption that experiences represent the events or properties that cause
SI am implicitly relying on Chalmers’ (2002) distinction between positive and negative conceiv-
ability. A claim is negatively conceivable iff it cannot be ruled out on rational reflection. By contrast,
positive conceivability requires that one be in a position to form a positive conception of a situation 
satisfying the claim. Positive conceivability is strongly linked with the ability to experience a sit­
uation in imagination— it is unclear what else could constitute a positive conception of a situation 
except an episode of imagination or a perceptual experience. Block’s scenario seems to be at best
negatively conceivable. But negative conceivably is a much less reliable indicator of possibility than 
positive conceivability (ibid.).
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them. The reason is that it is clearly possible for two individuals to have different 
visual experiences in response to the same stimulus. SV does not allow different 
phenomenal states to have both the same content and the same modality. Given that 
we have good reasons to endorse SV, we should reject Rosenberg’s assumption that 
experiences represent what cause them.
It is also worth noting that this is a claim which friends of causal-informational 
theories of content for phenomenal states reject. On Dretske’s (1995) view, for 
example, an experience represents what it has the biological function of carrying 
information about. Synaesthetic visual experiences have the biological function of 
carrying information about colors and shapes like normal visual experiences, so 
they do not differ in content. Independently of commitments to a simplistic causal- 
informational theory of phenomenal content, I see no reason to think that synaes­
thetic visualphe experiences do not have colors and shapes as objects. Indeed, they 
are naturally described as cases of seeingp colors and shapes. Synaesthetic visual 
experiences caused by sound stimuli seem to be visualrep and visualphe even though 
they are auditorys t j— they seem to be perfectly ordinary visualphe experiences with 
unusual causes.
5.3.3 Facial vision
Some blind individuals have the ability to orient themselves and detect medium­
sized objects in their environment using echolocation. This phenomenon was ini­
tially dubbed "facial vision" because the subjects were thought to perceive their en­
vironments through the effects of light on their faces, but better studies have shown 
that echolocation is used, and that the ability is spread to the entire population, 
though far less developed in normally sighted individuals (see Ono, Fay & Tarbell 
1986 for a review).
Lopes (2000) claims that proficient human echolocators are counterexamples 
to representationalism. According to him, we should expect echolocation expe-
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riences of shape, distance, and other properties represented in vision to differ in 
phenomenology from visual experiences of the same properties:
[...] surely what it is like to hear a round, velvety object three metres 
away is not what it is like to (dimly) see a round, velvet object three 
metres away. Nor, for that matter, is the phenomenal character of an 
experience of hearing a triangular shape the same as that of touching a 
triangular shape. I conclude that Dretske’s representationalism is false. 
(Lopes 2000)
Lopes does not provide any evidence for his claim that what it’s like to "hear" an 
object is different from what it’s like to "see" it. Here it is particularly important 
to keep track of the different ways of individuating modalities outlined in section 
5.1.2. Since modalitiesphe are defined as modalities individuated by phenomenal 
character, it is trivially true that hearingphe a round object and seeingphe a round ob­
ject are phenomenally distinct states (if there are such states; assuming phenomenal 
modalities do not overlap). However, Lopes did nothing to establish that human 
echolocators hearphe visual properties, as opposed to merely hearings them.
There is in fact some evidence that human echolocation generates visualphc ex­
periences even though it is a kind of hearing«^. Ono, Fay & Tarbell (1986) report 
two relevant findings. First, the brain regions associated with human echolocation 
are largely the same as those normally associated with vision (and not audition). 
Second, The functional characteristics of human echolocation are similar to those 
of human vision: the perceived area of space appears to be roughly the same, and 
human echolocation appears to have the same kind of foveal-peripheral structure as 
vision. Lopes dismisses the Ono et al study as "inconclusive" and "very specula­
tive" with regard to the phenomenology of human echolocation without addressing 
the specific findings reported. Ono et al do not prove that echolocation generates 
visualphe experience, but I believe pace Lopes that the findings they report provide 
significant support for this conclusion.
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Note that this hypothesis is not in tension with the fact that blind human echolo- 
cators do not claim to "see": they know very well that they cannot seestj or seejnt, 
and they are not in a better position than us to tell whether the phenomenal charac­
ters or contents of their experiences are those of visualpiie or visualrcp experiences. 
The reason they do not claim to see is plausibly that they face an acute version 
of the problem of other minds. We assume that normally functioning individuals 
(vision-wise) all have visual experiences of the same kind because we assume that 
phenomenal types go with functional and physiological types. Absent evidence 
of the kind I just discussed regarding functional and physiological similarities be­
tween human echolocation and visualphe experience, neither the echolocators nor 
we would have any evidence to support the hypothesis that the former’s experiences 
are visualp|ie.
5.4 Summary
In this chapter 1 have argued for the pure virtualist theory based on sensory virtual- 
ism, the view defended in chapter 4. I have suggested that sensory virtualism must 
be generalized to all experiences. Pure virtualism is one generalization of sensory 
virtualism. 1 have suggested that it is more phenomenologically accurate than the 
alternative (IV-), and that the alternative faces serious difficulties. I have raised two 
problems for IV-: it cannot account for multimodal experiences, and it seems false 
unless the notion of a manner of representation it appeals to is given a technical def­
inition which is elusive. I have concluded with a brief discussion of three putative 
counterexamples to the kind of cross-modal representationalism which pure virtu­
alism exemplifies. One posits experiences which cannot be imagined, one trades on 
a bad theory of phenomenal content, and the other seems to rest on an equivocation 
between the different kinds ofthing one could designate as "modalities", in addition 
to running afoul of the scientific evidence there is on the question.
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Part III
Alternatives
Chapter 6
On the case for qualia
Virtualism analyzes basic phenomenal states into two components without remain­
der: relation R, and the propositional relata of R (the contents of phenomenal states). 
An immediate implication of this pure propositionalism is that the phenomenal 
characters of experiences supervene on their contents: any two experiences with 
the same content have the same phenomenal character. A number of putative coun­
terexamples to this superveniervce thesis have been suggested aside for the cross- 
modal cases discussed at the end of the preceding chapter. For example, it has been 
claimed that visual experiences of the kind we undergo when our vision is blurred 
can have the same contents as visual experiences resulting from clear vision even 
though the two kinds of experience differ in phenomenal character (Boghossian 
and Velleman 1989; Smith 2008). Other kinds of perceptual variation (e.g. per­
spective and double vision) have been suggested as sources of counterexamples to 
the supervenience thesis (Boghossian and Velleman 1989; Peacocke 1983). Gestalt 
phenomena (Peacocke 1983, Nickel 2006) and the possibility of spectrum inversion 
(Block 1996; 1998; 2003, Shoemaker 1994; 2000; 2001) have also been singled out. 
In addition to purportedly refuting propositionalism and representationalism, these 
cases constitute the main evidence for the existence of qualia. I will address these 
objections after preliminary remarks regarding the notion of content.
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6.1 The relevant notion of content
As typically formulated, the preceding challenges presuppose some understanding 
of the notion of phenomenal content which is compatible with rejecting virtual- 
ism and all but the weakest forms of representationalism: without such a notion of 
phenomenal content, one cannot say that certain variations in phenomenology are 
independent of variations in content and sensory modality. I discussed a number 
of theory-independent notions of content in chapter 1 (e.g. how things seem in an 
experience, what information an experience carries, etc.), but none of these kinds of 
content are relevant to our project. How, then, are we to make sense of the present 
objections?
The objections apply to virtualism, but they need to be reformulated. In chapter 
5, I claimed that the relation which satisfies virtualism is the experiencing relation. 
The experiencing relation is the salient relation that is common to seeingp, hearingp, 
and so on (p. 142). The cases mentioned above would refute the kind of virtualism I 
recommend (i.e. virtualism+) if they showed either a) that some phenomenal states 
do not involve standing in the experiencing relation to propositions or b) that there 
are possible distinct phenomenal states which involve standing in the virtual relation 
to the same proposition.
Option (a) can be set aside at this stage. The evidence I gave for the availabil­
ity of phenomenal readings of perceptual ascriptions and a propositional analysis 
of such ascriptions is not put in question by the cases at hand, so these cases do 
not throw doubt on the existence of the experiencing relation. It also seems highly 
plausible that the phenomenal states they refer to consist at least in part in standing 
in the experiencing relation to certain entities. For example, it makes no doubt that 
blurry visual experiences are seeingsp. At best, the case of blur shows that they 
are blurry seeingsp, or seeingsp accompanied by certain qualia. More generally, 
it seems plausible that all visual phenomenal states (however anomalous) involves 
seeingp something. Since all the examples mentioned are visual phenomenal states,
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none of them seems to challenge the claim that all phenomenal states involve stand­
ing in the experiencing relation to something. For the purposes of interpreting the 
present objections, we can take the content of an experience to be the entity one 
stands in the experiencing relation to in this experience.
The question, then, is whether two phenomenal states which consist at least in 
part in standing in the experiencing relation to a given content can differ in phe­
nomenal character due to the influence of blur, perspective, spectral inversion, etc 
on their phenomenology. If there were such states, virtualism+ would be false and 
the perceptual conception of experience discussed in 3.2 would be seriously threat­
ened. It would not be ruled out that virtualism is satisfied by some other relation 
than the experiencing relation, but I would see little reason to expect this.
6.2 Blurry and double vision
Boghossian and Velleman (1989) object to representationalism as follows1:
[...] you can see nearby objects double by focusing on distant objects 
behind them, and yet you cannot get yourself to see the number of 
nearby objects as doubling. And by unfocusing your eyes, you can see 
objects blurrily without being able to see them as being blurry. None of 
these experiences can be adequately described solely in terms of their 
intentional content.
Before we address the objection, it is important to note that no experience or phe­
nomenal state is intrinsically or essentially blurry. Blurry experiences are like blurry 
photographs. What makes a photograph blurry is not merely a matter of how its pix­
els are arranged, but also of how they are arranged compared to how things are: a 
picture of a fog or any other scene apt to cause a pixel pattern identical to that of a
1 A.D. Smith (2008) also discusses blur. However, his argument explicitly rests on the assumption 
that the contents of experiences are accuracy conditions, which we rejected in chapter 1.
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blurry photograph need not be blurry. Similarly, what makes an experience blurry 
is not merely a matter of what its phenomenal character is like, but also of how its 
phenomenal character relates to one’s environment. To a first approximation, what 
one normally means when one says that one’s vision is blurry is that one’s visual 
experiences are distorted in a certain way compared to the norm. In some cases, 
this is because one’s visual apparatus is malfunctioning. In other cases, one’s visual 
apparatus can be functioning correctly while receiving input from another apparatus 
(e.g., lenses, a camera, or a film) which distorts the final experience in a relevant 
way. Since blurriness is a contingent characteristic of visual experiences,* 2 it is mis­
leading to speak of "blurry experiences" in the same way that we speak of shape and 
pain experiences, which are essentially related to shapes and pain, respectively. To 
avoid confusion, I will refer to experiences occurring in blurry vision as b-events. I 
will refer to the phenomenal states instantiated in blurry vision as b-states.
Parallel remarks apply to double vision. To suffer from double vision is not 
to have experiences with a certain kind of phenomenal character, but to have ex­
periences whose phenomenal characters are distorted in a certain way compared 
to those of experiences one would normally have when looking at the same scene. 
We can refer to experiential events which are part of episodes of double vision as 
d-events and phenomenal states which are part of episodes of double vision as d- 
states. I will refer to experiences and phenomenal states which do not fall in the b- 
or d- category as normal experiences and normal phenomenal states, respectively.3
Boghossian and Velleman appear to be suggesting the following argument from 
blurry vision:
Boghossian and Velleman’s argument (blurry vision)
1. One does not always see anything as blurry when one is in a b-state.
2Here it is important to keep in mind that we are individuating experiences by their phenomenol­
ogy-
2Note that the preceding definitions of b-, d- and normal phenomenal states are non-rigid. These
qualifiers merely characterize how the state is produced in a given world.
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2. If (1), b-states cannot be described completely in terms of their contents.
3. If b-states cannot be described completely in terms of their contents, repre- 
sentationalism is false.
Therefore, representationalism is false.
Premise 1 has two natural readings:
1. One does not always believe that anything is blurry when one is in a b-state.
2. One does not always seep anything as blurry when one is in a b-state.
Subtle variations on these readings are possible, but these appear to cover the rele­
vant possibilities.
On the first reading, premise 1 seems undeniable for the simple reason that 
"blurry" is an adjective which does not apply to most of the objects we see when 
we see blurry. Normally, we don’t believe that the things we are looking at when 
our vision is blurred are blurry because that would be a category mistake—only 
the products of optical processes can be blurry. While premise 1 is undeniable on 
the first reading, premise 2 is questionable. In chapter 1, we went to great lengths 
to divorce phenomenal contents from propositional attitudes. I agree that the phe­
nomenal character of experience is generally not reflected in full in the beliefs one 
has about the world, but I lake this to show merely that phenomenal content floats 
free from belief content, not that phenomenal character floats free from phenom­
enal content. There is nothing in our notion of visual phenomenal content—what 
one seesp— to suggest that visual experiences’ contents are limited by the contents 
of beliefs.
The second reading of premise 1 also makes it undeniable. We should not expect 
the term "blurry" to always apply to the kinds of things we seep when we see blurry, 
because we do not generally seep these things as products of optical processes, 
and only a product of an optical process can be blurry. However, Boghossian and
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Velleman’s platitudinous observation in premise 1 does not on the face of it bear 
on the consequent of premise 2. Why could not the contents characteristic of b- 
states be contents which involve entities having properties other than blurriness? It 
is certainly not true in general that if an experience can be described as F and the 
experience’s phenomenal character is exhausted by its content, then property F is 
part of the content of the experience. For example, one of my visual experiences this 
morning resembled the latest Jim Carrey movie in some ways (anything resembles 
anything in some respects, after all). Clearly, propositionalism does not require that 
the property of resembling the latest Jim Carrey movie in some ways was part of 
the content of my experience. In general, contingent properties of experiences need 
have no echo in their contents.
The argument from double vision goes as follows:
Boghossian and Velleman’s argument (double vision)
1. One does not always see anything as doubled when one is in a d-state.
2. If (1), d-states cannot be described completely in terms of their contents.
3. If d-states cannot be described completely in terms of their contents, repre- 
sentationalism is false.
Therefore, representationalism is false.
Here too there are two reasonable readings of "see anything as". If Boghossian and 
Velleman mean seep, then premise 1 seems dubious, because we naturally describe 
d-states as states in which we seep multiple copies of a single object ("How many 
fingers do you see?"). On the other hand, if they mean something like "you cannot 
get yourself to believe that the number of nearby objects is doubling", then the point 
is irrelevant to virtualism. Of course we take double vision to be a kind of hallu­
cination or illusion; we don’t endorse the contents of these experiences. This does
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not the least suggests that the consequent of premise 2 is true, because phenomenal 
content is not tied to belief content.
A number of theorists take blur and double vision to be major challenges for rep- 
resentationalism even though they would not necessarily endorse exactly Boghos- 
sian and Velleman’s objections. 1 now want to suggest a general argument against 
the possibility of normal a phenomenal state having the same content as a b-state.
Consider the two series of experiences illustrated in figure 6.1. The images of
Figure 6.1: B-state series
So
^0 S 1 ... S4
the S series are analogous to the phenomenal characters of b-states which could be 
produced by looking at a square while one’s vision is becoming increasingly blurry. 
Those of the C series are analogous to experiences of a circular shape under parallel 
circumstances.
So and Sx clearly differ in content: So is a state in which one experiences and 
seesjp a square, while Sx is not. This is particularly clear in light of the fact that a) 
Cx and Sx could very well have the same phenomenal character (hence be the same 
phenomenal state) and b) there is no reason to think that Cx is a state in which one 
seesjp a square.
Given that So and Sx differ in content, there must be some difference in content 
between some consecutive pairs of experiences in the S series. Where should we
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locate this shift in the series? The only remotely plausible answer is that each two 
consecutive experiences in the series differ a little bit in content. But this would rule 
out that So (the normal state) has the same content as any other phenomenal state 
in its series (as any b-state in the series).4 We can construct similar gradual series 
starting from any normal experience and passing through any b-state. For each such 
series, we will have to postulate that the contents of the relevant phenomenal states 
differ at each step in order to explain how the starting point and the end point can 
differ in content. This strongly suggests that no normal state ever has the same 
content as a b-state.
A parallel argument applies to double vision. We can easily construct series 
of d-states analogous to the S and C series. Such series, like the S and C series, 
must contain consecutive experiences with different contents. All pairs of consec­
utive experiences are equally good candidates, so it is reasonable to conclude that 
all consecutive experiences differ in content, which in turns strongly suggests that 
double vision always makes a difference in content.
It is worth stressing that blur and double vision need not make a difference to 
the beliefs we form about the external world even if they make a difference to the 
contents of the experiences we base our beliefs on. If my vision suddenly became 
blurry, I would not revise my conception of the space around me for that: I would 
continue to believe that the objects in front of me have sharp edges at specific lo­
cations. I would simply disregard certain aspects of what my experience tells me 
about my environment. The content of my experience is given by what I seep as I 
undergo this experience, not by what I am inclined to believe.
Note also that the preceding argument is entirely independent of any account of 
the precise nature of the characteristic contents of b-states. Dretske (1995) suggests 
that b-states represent fuzzy properties. Tye (2002b) holds that they have indeter-
4Strictly speaking, this remains a logical possibility. For example, the contents of Sq an S2 could 
be the same even though S| differs in content from both Sq and St. But I take it that this possibility 
can be excluded without argument.
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minate contents, in the sense of contents which do not specify exactly how things 
are (where the boundaries of objects are, for example). I suspect that both accounts 
are true of certain kinds of b-state, but the matter is difficult to adjudicate. I am 
inclined to think that, more often than not, none of the terms so far employed to 
describe the contents of b-states are exactly right. I am at peace with these practical 
difficulties: I don’t see why we should expect it to be easy to put in words all the 
strange and subtle variations of perceptual experience. Public language is meant to 
capture important, publicly observable facts. The subjective effects of blurry vision, 
double vision and other types of perceptual distortion are not public observable and 
generally not important to us. It could conceivably be a requirement on a successful 
language and conceptual scheme that it makes us largely blind to such perceptual 
variations and enforces efficient thought and communication by not providing us 
with any means of stating the sorts of exotic states of affairs we experience when 
our perception of the world is distorted.
6.3 Perspective
Peacocke (1983) argues that variations in perspective do not always correspond to 
variations in content. One example he gives highlights the effect of distance:
Suppose you are standing on a road which stretches from you in a 
straight line to the horizon. There are two trees at the roadside, one 
a hundred yards from you, the other two hundred. Your experience 
represents these objects as being of the same physical height and other 
dimensions; that is, taking your experience at face value you would 
judge that the trees are roughly the same physical size ... Yet there is 
also some sense in which the nearer tree occupies more of your visual 
field than the more distant tree. (Peacocke 1983, ch. 1)
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The idea is that one’s experiences of the two trees on the road, ei and e2, could have 
the same content even if they had different phenomenal characters corresponding to 
the different apparent sizes of the trees. This would contradict representationalism 
and propositionalism. Peacocke runs similar arguments based on other kinds of 
variation in perspective.
Peacocke’s examples clearly bring out the fact that what we are presented with in 
vision are not mere three-dimensional scenes in Euclidean space or two-dimensional 
pixel arrays. But these are not the only possibilities.
To see that there are some differences in phenomenal content corresponding to 
variations in perspective, we need only consider series of variations in perspective 
analogous to the series of b-states discussed above. Imagine a series To .. Tx of ex­
periences of a tree seen from increasingly far away. Setting aside the phenomenol­
ogy associated with the surrounding landscape, one’s experience of the tree would 
in the limit case (Tx) be phenomenally identical to an experience of a simple dot, or 
something close to this. Clearly, this experience would not be a state of seeingjp a 
tree or tree shape (however, it could be a state of seeingm a tree). By the virtualist 
definition of phenomenal content, it follows that it is not an experience with tree 
content. But Tq would plausibly have tree content. At what point do experiences in 
the T series stop having tree content? The only plausible answer is that each change 
in distance affects what one seesp or represents a little bit: what one represents pro­
gressively changes from something that is definitely a tree shape to something that 
is definitely not a tree shape, with intermediaries that may well be neither (due to 
the vagueness of the term "tree shape"). Since the same reasoning applies to experi­
ences of any shape as well as other kinds of variation in perspective (e.g. variations 
in viewing angle), it seems reasonable to conclude that all phenomenal differences 
which correspond to differences in perspective correspond to differences in content.
While there clearly seems to be differences in content which correspond to dif­
ferences in perspective, it is hard to tell what these differences are exactly. Lycan
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(1996b) suggests that visual experiences have multiple layers of content. An expe­
rience could, for instance, represent objects in objective three-dimensional space at 
one level and objects in an egocentric space at another level. Lycan suggests that the 
two experiences in Peacocke’s example (ei and e2 ) could share a layer of content 
(the objective one) while differing in another layer of content. Tye (1996) suggests 
that the difference in content between ej and e2 is one in situation-dependent prop­
erties such as being large from here. There are many other candidate accounts of 
the phenomenal character of perspective. For example, Thomas Reid held that per­
ceived visual space has a spherical geometry (Reid 2000 ch 6, section 9; see also 
Van Cleve 2002). Kant and most theorists of Reid’s time disagreed with him, but 
nowadays the consensus among psychophysicists and psychologists appears to be 
that visual space is even more exotic than Reid thought. Lunenberg’s (1950; 1947) 
and Blank’s (1958) theory that perceived visual space has a hyperbolic geometry 
made consensus for most of the second half of the 20th century (see Wagner 2006). 
Recently, even the widespread assumption that visual space has three dimensions 
and a constant curvature has been challenged (see French 1987, Wagner 2006).
Today, none of the aforementioned theories seems to dominate. There is, it 
seems to me, a deep difficulty with characterizing the perspectival aspect of visual 
experience. As in the case of blur, the problem seems to be that our concepts are 
geared toward describing a perspective-independent world. We are wired to sys­
tematically look past the variations in phenomenology caused by perspective. The 
result is that we simply cannot articulate how the world is given to us in visual 
experience. At most, we can say that we are presented with that kind of state of 
affairs. Again, I don’t think this should deter us from propositionalism. It is clear 
in light of the argument given above that variations in perspective correspond to 
variations in content. The root of the problem is that we are unable to characterize 
the relevant variations in phenomenology— it is not that the theory is false, but that 
the explanandum is elusive.
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6.4 Gestalt effects
Gestalt effects are another common source of objections to propositionalism. I 
will begin with Nickel’s (2006) objection from grouping effects. Nickel illustrates 
grouping effects with figures 6.2A and 6.2B.
Figure 6.2: Grouping effects
A
He explains the effect as follows:
In [figure 6.2A], you can see the squares corresponding to 1,3, 5, 7, 
and 9 as prominent, or you can see 2, 4, 6, and 8 as prominent. You 
may also be able to see other groupings as relatively more prominent, 
such as 1,2, 3, 5, and 8, which form a “ T” . Consider two successive 
viewings of [figure 6.2A]. Suppose that you see one grouping of tiles 
during the first viewing, a different grouping during the second. You 
can have these different experiences without changing where you look.
For instance, you can continue to focus your vision on the center of 
figure 6.2A and still have the different experiences. (284)
Nickel then argues that differences in phenomenology which correspond to differ­
ences in what group appears prominent do not correspond to differences in content 
between the relevant experiences. For the purposes of illustration, let us compare 
two specific experiences. In ej, squares 1,2, 3, 5, and 8 are seen as grouped in a "T"
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shape. In e2, squares 2, 4, 5, 6 and 8 are seen as grouped in a cross shape. Nickel’s 
argument proceeds in two steps. He first argues that the sets of possible worlds at 
which ei and e2 are true are exactly the same. He refers to this claim as PW. He 
then argues that if this first point is correct, ei and e2 do not differ in content. He 
refers to this conditional claim as Sameness.
Nickel does not offer a systematic argument for PW. Instead, he argues for PW 
by ruling out various accounts of how the sets of worlds at which ei and e2 are true 
might differ.
Given our notion of phenomenal content, there is an obvious account of the dif­
ference in content between ej and e2- We naturally describe the difference between 
ej and e2 as a difference in the groups one sees the squares as belonging to in these 
experiences (a T-shaped group in one case, a cross-shaped group in the other). If 
one sees something as an F, then one seesjp something being F. What one seesp 
is what one’s experience represents (on the conception of phenomenal content we 
adopted). Therefore, ej and differ in content, because one represents the squares 
as belonging to different groups in these experiences.
But Nickel anticipates this reply. In response, he asks the representationalist to 
explain what a group is exactly. He suggests that the relevant notion of group would 
have to be explicated in terms of prominence. He then argues that this leads to 
difficulties for the representationalist because prominence must in turn be explained 
in terms of effects on a perceiver.
It seems to me that the groups in question might be thought of more simply as 
solid objects or similar entities: when we see squares as grouped, we see them as 
forming solid objects. That is to say that we see them as bound together in the same 
kind of way that a solid object’s parts are bound together. So one sees a T for real— 
a continuous, cohesive, T-shaped lump of something. On this account, the contents 
of ei and e2 are not true at the same worlds: the content of ej requires that a solid, 
T-shaped arrangement of squares exists but not a cross-shaped one, while that of e2
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requires that a solid, cross-shaped arrangement of squares exists but not a T-shaped 
one. This proposal is not considered by Nickel, and it clearly avoids the difficulties 
associated with the prominence account Nickel discusses.
Peacocke (1983, ch 1) also discusses the phenomenology of grouping. Instead 
of squares, he uses the example of rows of dots, but the considerations are essen­
tially the same. Rather than positing grouping sensations as Peacocke suggests we 
must, we can explain the phenomenology of dot groupings in terms of ascriptions 
of ties between the dots (invisible ties holding the dots together in formation).
Peacocke also discusses the Necker cube effect. Here matters are complicated 
by the elusiveness of the phenomenology and content of perspective. However, 
there is at least one thing we can say about this effect: as the perspective from 
which we see the cube seems to change, we see different parts of the cube as be­
ing being located at the front. Given the relation between seeing as and phenomenal 
content noted earlier, we may reasonably conclude from this that the relevant gestalt 
shifts correspond to differences in which part of the cube is represented as being in 
front. It remains to explain what "in front” means in this context. This is a poten­
tially difficult task, but one might reasonably expect a solution along the lines of 
Peacocke’s (1992) own. That is, one might expect that relations such as in front o f  
behind, to the left o f (etc.) between objects of experience can be precisely defined 
in terms of an egocentric space.
6.5 Cognitive experience
So far 1 have said little in defense of the applicability of virtualism to non-perceptual 
experiences (i.e. cognitive and emotional experiences) aside for the general argu­
ments against manners of representation in the preceding chapter. It has been sug­
gested that non-perceptual experiences are different in kind from perceptual experi­
ences, in that the difference between these two kinds of experience lies in something
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else than their contents. It is certainly true that perceptual and non-perceptual ex­
perience differ in many respects aside for their contents. For one thing, the former 
normally occur in the process of perceivingc external objects of certain kinds, but 
not the latter. But I don’t think there is any difference in the phenomenal states 
instantiated in the two kinds of experience beyond the contents one is related to in 
them. This is what virtualism requires, and this is what the arguments against IV- 
presented in chapter 5 tend to suggest. In this section I will discuss the case of 
cognitive experiences in more detail. I will leave emotional experiences for the next 
section.
Cognitive experiences should be distinguished from other kinds of mental state 
which are sometimes described as "conscious thoughts". There is a common use of 
"conscious thought" on which "conscious" has roughly the same meaning it has in 
"conscious effort". In this sense, a conscious thought is roughly a thought that one 
has deliberately or in such a way that makes the fact that one is having it in some 
sense accessible to oneself. While there might be a kind of phenomenology typi­
cally associated with having conscious thoughts in this sense, conscious thoughts 
normally involve more than phenomenal states, because one’s awareness of one’s 
own mental state, and the mental state one is aware of being in, need not be pure 
phenomenal states. Conscious thoughts in the present sense are not all phenomenal 
states. "Conscious thought" is also sometimes used specifically to describe cogni­
tive states which have a phenomenal component. Such states are not all phenomenal 
states either, because having a phenomenal state as a component is not the same as 
being a phenomenal state. Here I am only concerned with pure phenomenal states. 
By "cognitive experience" and "cognitive phenomenal state", I mean experiences 
and phenomenal states which are not tied to sensory or emotional processes in nor­
mal conditions. I will also refer to cognitive phenomenal states as "phenomenal 
thoughts". By "perceptual experience" and "perceptual phenomenal state", I mean 
experiences and phenomenal states which are tied to sensory processes in normal
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conditions.
How much cognitive phenomenology there is is a difficult question, but there 
are certain kinds of cognitive experience whose existence can hardly be disputed. 
In particular, it seems undeniable that episodes of sensory imagination have charac­
teristic phenomenal characters. There is a characteristic phenomenology associated 
with visualization, and also one associated with talking to oneself in one’s head or 
feeling one’s movements ahead of performing them. Cognitive impressions such as 
the feeling of deja vu or the feeling of confusion are equally important to the ecol­
ogy of the mind. There might also be a phenomenology of thought beyond imagery 
and general feelings, but that is somewhat less clear. I will try to work around this 
uncertainty in what follows.
While the phenomenal characters of cognitive experiences differ markedly from 
those of perceptual experiences, it has been suggested that cognitive experiences can 
have the same contents as perceptual experiences. If this were the case, virtualism 
would be false: we would have to posit different virtual relations for cognitive and 
perceptual experiences. Here is an example due to Neander (1998):
[... ] as I am writing now, I remember that my neighbor has ginger 
hair (and I am aware of that memory). But I do not have vivid color 
imagery, and there is a clear phenomenal difference in the quality of 
the conscious experience involved in my seeing as opposed to my re­
membering the color of his hair.
David Chalmers has suggested to me an example which is potentially clearer. Imag­
ine that you are looking at a simple scene, say a white wall marked with a red dot. 
You then close your eyes and try to think about the scene. It might seem that you 
could have a cognitive experience whose content encompasses the scene in as much 
detail and precision as your prior perceptual experience, but which has a different 
phenomenal character.
It is important to note that the preceding examples constitute no objection to
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virtualism unless they are supposed to involve phenomenal thoughts with the same 
contents as perceptual phenomenal states. That one can entertain the same contents 
in thought as in perception is not an objection to virtualism, because virtualism 
allows that non-phenomenal thoughts or propositional attitudes are not states of 
standing in relation R to propositions. In order to make the case against virtualism, 
one must show not merely that the contents which are entertained in perceptual 
experience can be entertained in thought, but that they can be entertained as part of 
phenomenal thoughts. It seems far from obvious to me that this is the case in the 
examples suggested by Neander and Chalmers.
The limitations on recognitional abilities highlighted by perceptual recogni­
tion tasks support the view that phenomenal thoughts never represent the same 
contents as perceptual experiences. If one were capable of forming phenomenal 
thoughts about perceptible properties (properties perceptual experiences represent), 
one should be able to select such a property in thought prior to experiencing it per­
ceptually, then go on to recognize it when one experiences it perceptually. This is to 
be expected because the primary function of thought is to determine our reactions 
to sensory stimuli. Of course, abstract thoughts (thoughts about social systems, 
for example) do not directly determine our reactions to sensory stimuli. But they 
determine our reactions to sensory stimuli through their causal and/or inferential
I
connections with thoughts that have observable contents. Thoughts with observable 
content, including phenomenal thoughts of the kind we are considering, should con­
nect with perceptual experiences, in that when one has a perceptual experience with 
the same content as a thought or a logically related content, one should be able to tell 
that this is the case. If this is correct, the hypothesis that we can have phenomenal 
thoughts with the same contents as perceptual experiences suggests that one should 
as a general rule be able to select the precise properties represented in perceptual 
experiences in thought and go on to recognize them in perception. In practice, how­
ever, we are incapable of doing this. Familiar experiences in the art class or at the
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paint shop show as much. Rigorous tests which bear on this matter have also been 
conducted for both the recognition of color and pitch: in either modality, our ability 
to recognize properties is poor compared to our ability to discriminate them percep­
tually, and this even when the recognition task makes use of short-term memory (as 
opposed to long-term memory) .5 This discrepancy between the grain of perceptual 
representation and the grain of recognitional abilities strongly suggests that we can­
not form phenomenal thoughts about perceptible properties as fine-grained as those 
perceptual experiences represent.
This conclusion also seems warranted by reflection on the phenomenal charac­
ter of imagery. If I close my eyes and try to visualize the Coke can on my desk 
with as much precision as possible, the phenomenal character of the resulting expe­
rience seems to give me no hint as to the precise shade of the can. I seem to have 
no basis for saying that it is red]2 rather than redj3, even though these are shades I 
can discriminate in perception. The point here is not that I cannot name the precise 
shade of red found on the Coke can. The point is that I cannot determine which pre­
cise shade of red it is based on my mental image of it. This strongly suggests that 
imagery represents coarser properties than those represented by perceptual experi­
ence. It does not seem implausible to say that this is all the difference in "vividness" 
between imagery and perceptual experience amounts to.
While the last argument bears primarily on the relation between imagery and 
perceptual experience, it can be extended to phenomenal thought generally. To li­
cense extending the conclusion to phenomenal thought generally, we need only re­
mark that phenomenal thoughts of the imagistic kind appear to have the most precise 
contents of all phenomenal thoughts. This can be seen from the fact that someone 
asked to form as precise a thought as possible of a given object without looking 
at it will invariably engage in imagery. This suggests that phenomenal thoughts 
generally cannot represent the sorts of highly determinate properties represented in
5See Nilsson and Nelson (1981), Malone and Hannay (1978), Raffman (1995).
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perceptual experience if imagistic thoughts cannot.
There seems to be good reason to deny that phenomenal thoughts relate us to 
the same contents as perceptual experiences, but we still have to explain the initial 
plausibility of the position expressed by Chalmers and Neander. One possible ex­
planation lies in the fact that a) we can easily form nan-phenomenal thoughts with 
the contents of perceptual experiences and b) for most purposes, it does not matter 
whether the relevant contents are grasped through experience or not, so we tend to 
conflate these ways of grasping content.
In section 2.4 I sketched an account of how phenomenal states realize propo­
sitional attitudes. I distinguished two kinds of attitude: conscious attitudes and 
external attitudes. Conscious attitudes consist in having suitably related occurrent 
and potential experiences. External attitudes consist in having experiences which 
stand in suitable relations among themselves and to non-experiences (e.g. entities 
in one’s environment). Conscious attitudes can share content with perceptual ex­
periences without being phenomenal states themselves, but the illusion that we can 
entertain phenomenal thoughts with the contents of perceptual experiences owes 
more to the ease with which we token external attitudes with such contents.
We have multiple ways of talking and thinking about precise colors and shapes 
in absence of relevant perceptual experiences, occurrent or potential. First, we have 
conventional means of referring to them. We have names, codes, and reference ob­
jects (the same yellow' as on the place mats). This allows us to talk about more 
specific properties than we can grasp consciously in absence of relevant experi­
ences. With this ability to talk comes an ability to think, because we think in good 
part through internal talk: as a general rule, when you say something to yourself, 
you thereby think what your words mean. When these means of reference fail, there 
remains the more basic method of referring to properties and objects as the causes of 
our experiences. For example, if I visualize an object I just observed, I am inclined 
to refer to the object as that object which caused this memory (the residual mental
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image I have of the object). I might not say this to myself, but that is nevertheless 
the referential intention which grounds my thought about the object, because it is 
the criterion I would ultimately use to identify the object: I would try to lind out 
which object caused my experience. (Note that I am not saying that mental imagery 
is descriptive: my imagery experience does not have a descriptive content. It is the 
thought I tend to form about my mental image which has descriptive content.)
To illustrate, suppose I am looking at what seems to me to be a plant. I then 
leave the site of this experience and go on to talk with others about the plant. If 
someone were to ask which plant I was looking at, how would I go about answering 
their question? I would normally begin by revisiting the place in imagination. I 
would bring back a mental image of the place and describe the scene as I saw it: "I 
mean the large plant with the yellow flowers in the corner of the room, next to the 
portrait". If someone were to ask me what room I mean and I didn’t have any con­
ventional means of referring to it (e.g. “room 43”), I would tell them what I know 
of the room's relation to other parts of the world they themselves might be able to 
locate, and I would typically do this by navigating through a mixture of visual and 
motor memory: "I remember I made a right upon coming out, walked all the way 
down the corridor, got down to the ground level and followed the corridor on the 
left." So far, causation has not entered the picture yet except indirectly through my 
description of a procedure to get from the room to another point. That is because 
we generally assume that our experiences are (in relevant respects) veridical, so we 
give reference-fixing descriptions which are formulated directly in terms of exter­
nal objects as presented by our experiences ("the plant in the corner"). But these 
descriptions abbreviate our true referential intentions. This comes out in cases of 
illusion. If I were to find out that I had not been in a proper room but in a small 
locker which had given me the impression of a large room through some complex 
trickery, I would no longer explain what I mean by reference to the room, its loca­
tion, or its contents. I would say, "the plant I sawc, if that was real." There I mean
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(approximately) the plant that caused my experience of a plant-shape.
The important point is that there are different levels of thought and meaning. 
First, there is what we grasp directly through the experiencing relation, mostly 
through perceptual experience and imagery. Then there is a much larger sphere 
of content on which we can latch indirectly in virtue of the relations our experi­
ences bear to other entities. Grasping things consciously is one among other means 
of picking things out, and what normally matters is what our words pick out. This 
is why we don’t normally pause to distinguish between experientially grasped and 
non-experientially grasped contents.
6.6 Moods and emotions
Emotional states (moods and emotions) are another source of objections to rep- 
resentationalism. It is important to distinguish between emotional states and the 
phenomenal states instantiated in the latter, which I will refer to as "emotional feel­
ings". As a general rule, moods and emotions are not phenomenal states. For one 
thing, they persist in absence of phenomenology. They can be unconscious in every 
sense of the word. They also essentially involve cognitive and behavioral disposi­
tions. For example, one cannot be angry or in a bad mood unless one is to some 
extent disposed to do something mean. This does not appear to be the case of emo­
tional feelings, the pure phenomenal states which tend to accompany moods and 
emotions.
Of course, here I am merely expounding features of what I take to be the folk 
concepts of moods and emotions. Given that there are debates about these matters, I 
should say that nothing of what I have to say here turns on what moods and emotions 
are for the folk. If the folk use these terms in such a way that they are phenomenal 
states or essentially involve phenomenal states, this is fine with me. However, that 
is not how I use the terms "mood" and "emotion". I trust that you can make sense
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of how I use them sufheienlly to see what I mean by "emotional feelings", whieh 
are the only states of interest here.
The main objection from emotional states against representationalism is that 
the phenomenal states associated with moods have no intentional content (Searle 
1983; Kind 2007). Although this is the main objection, I will start with the case of 
emotions because it sheds light on the case of moods.
Emotions such as fear and happiness are generally agreed to have intentional 
content. Almost everyone agrees that they are directed at objects or states of affairs. 
They might nevertheless seem to pose a problem for the virtualist view, because 
the kinds of content they are generally agreed to have are not plausible relata of 
R. Take the emotion of fear, for example. Most would agree that fearing a spider 
is an intentional state whose content is the spider or a proposition involving the 
spider. The problem is that it is implausible that I stand in the experiencing relation 
to the big huntsman spider on the wall which scares me: there is no such thing as 
the phenomenology of fearing Bob the huntsman or even a spider of this specific 
species. There is a sense in which my fear has Bob as intentional object (on some 
understanding of "intentional object"), but the phenomenal state I instantiate as I 
am scared of Bob is not a state of standing in R to a state of affairs involving Bob 
or huntsmanhood. So the kind of account of the intentional contents of emotions 
which is generally agreed upon cannot serve as an account of the relata of emotional 
feelings. This does not mean that virtualism is false, because emotions are not the 
same as the emotional feelings which often accompany them. However, this means 
that we must look elsewhere for a plausible account of the contents of emotional 
feelings.
Such an account is to be found in a proper characterization of the phenomenol­
ogy of emotional feelings. Here I think William James’ well-known remarks on the 
nature of emotions are helpful. James appears to take emotions to essentially in­
volve experiences. I am inclined to disagree with James on this score, but I find his
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characterization of the experiences associated with emotions perspicuous. Here is 
how he describes some of the experiences which typically accompany the emotion 
of fear:
What kind of emotion of fear would be left if the feeling neither of 
quickened heart beats nor of shallow breathing, neither of trembling lips 
nor of weakened limbs, neither of goose flesh nor of visceral stirrings, 
were present, it is quite impossible for me to think. (1890: 451)
While James might well be wrong about the nature of emotions, his characterization 
of the feelings which accompany them seems right to me: they seem to be very 
similar to bodily experiences. It does not seem implausible to say that they are 
states of standing in the experiencing relation to sensations-involving propositions, 
where sensations are entities of the sort we talk about when we say such things as "I 
feel something in my toe" (see section 3.1). The feelings of quickened heart beats, 
shallow breathing, trembling lips and weakened limbs James refers to are in the first 
instance feelings of bodily sensations similar in kind to those we feel when in pain. 
The same applies to the feelings associated with joy, anger, and pretty much any 
other emotion.
Turning now to moods, it seems plausible that the little phenomenology there 
is associated with moods is an attenuated version of the kind of phenomenology 
associated with emotions. When I am in a good mood, I feel relaxed, lighter, and 
generally more prone. These are primarily bodily experiences. We might not want 
to classify all phenomenal states associated with moods as bodily, but this does not 
change the fact that they are experiences of sensations of a kind with the sensations 
we experience in typical bodily experiences.
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6.7 The inverted spectrum
Imaginary cases involving inverted spectra have received a great deal of attention 
in the debates surrounding representationalism. I will consider only the main case: 
Shoemaker’s normal inverts. Block’s (1996; 1998; 2003) Inverted Earth case is 
explicitly directed at externalist representationalism and clearly ineffectual against 
narrow representationalism. Since virtualism is neutral on the narrow/wide ques­
tion, we need not worry about Inverted Earth. Arguably, this scenario is also eas­
ily accommodated by teleological variants on wide representationalism (see Lycan 
1996c).
Shoemaker (1994; 2000) argues that two individuals or groups of individuals 
could be color inverted with respect to each other without either misperceiving col­
ors, even if they perceived the same objects in the same conditions. For example, it 
could have been that men experience red when women experience green and men 
experience yellow when women experience blue. Surely, the argument goes, nei­
ther group could then be said to see colors correctly while the other does not. So, in 
this possible world we are describing, either both men’s and women’s experiences 
are veridical or both men’s and women’s experiences are not veridical. Shoemaker 
opts for the first option. But, assuming as Shoemaker does that different color ex­
periences have different contents, this requires that color experiences represent re­
lational properties such as causing an experience o f such and such type, properties 
which Shoemaker calls "appearance properties" or "phenomenal properties".
Shoemaker’s solution to the puzzle is not open to us, because it is prima fa­
cie implausible that we seep appearance properties: we do not seep experiences or 
experience-involving states of affairs in visual experience. Shoemaker’s view is not 
compatible with our individuation criterion for phenomenal content. Since giving 
up this criterion would require that we forfeit our answers to a number of the preced­
ing objections, we must block Shoemaker’s argument for appearance properties.6
6Shoemaker recognizes that we do not seem to experience relational properties— especially not
198
More than one step in Shoemaker’s argument can be questioned. First there is 
his claim that, in the hypothetical situation described, it is not the case that one 
group of individuals has non-veridical experiences while the other has veridical 
experiences. I don’t see why there could not be such a situation. An experience is 
veridical when its content obtains.* 7 Shoemaker seems to assume that experiences 
which carry the same information about the world have the same content (hence the 
same status as veridical or non-veridical in the same circumstances). This comes 
out when he asks "how can the experiences of Jack and Jill represent the tomato 
differently and yet neither of them misrepresent it, given that the same information 
about its intrinsic nature is getting to both" (my emphasis). I agree with Shoemaker 
that it is hard to see how the informational contents of Jack’s and Jill’s experiences 
could differ with regard to their accuracy given the same perceptual conditions. But 
virtualism is not about informational content. The contents virtualism is about are 
what one seesp, hearsp, etc. There is nothing wrong with a scenario in which men 
seejp blue bananas, women seejp yellow bananas, and only women see correctly.
Even granting Shoemaker’s first claim, we can still resist the argument by at­
tributing non-veridical experiences to both groups of perceivers. On the face of it, 
there is nothing wrong with men seeingjp blue bananas and women seeingjp yellow 
bananas while bananas are red. Again, this would be hard to make sense of on the 
assumption that the contents of experiences are determined by what information 
they carry (or carry in normal conditions, or were designed to carry, etc.); Shoe­
maker’s argument has force against virtualism combined with an informational ac­
count of relation R. However, the argument does not show that what one seesp does 
not go hand-in-hand with the phenomenal character of one’s visual experience.
appearance properties. He argues that this is an illusion due to the fact that we experience appear­
ance properties as monadic properties. But there is arguably no room for one to seep a property as
something else than what it is, so Shoemaker’s view does not seem to square with our position.
7Of course, this might not be what "veridical" means in everyday life since we give the term "con­
tent" a stipulative reading. Nevertheless, this is what it has to mean here for the thought experiment 
to be relevant.
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6.8 Objections to projectivism
Shoemaker (1994) also suggests that the only viable alternative to the appearance 
property view is projectivism about color, the view that color experiences are al­
ways non-veridical. Why projectivism would be the only alternative to appearance 
properties is somewhat unclear. However, there are other considerations which fa­
vor projectivism about color, given virtualism and our notion of phenomenal con­
tent. In brief, there are no actually instantiated properties which might plausibly 
be taken to be what we seep in color experience. In particular, we do not seep 
physical-functional properties more than appearance properties. Our criterion of 
visual phenomenal content seems to require that we adopt projectivism about the 
contents of color experiences.
Projectivism is not exactly the orthodox view. Shoemaker, for one, rejects it. So 
something needs to be said in its defense. I cannot cover the topic in depth, but I 
want to indicate how I think projectivism should be defended. Let us look first at 
Shoemaker’s reasons for rejecting it.
This view has its own set of unattractive consequences. ... it implies 
that our perceptual experience is incurably infected with illusion—that 
we cannot help but perceive things as having properties that they do not 
and could not have. (1994)
So far, Shoemaker has merely restated the projectivist view in more dramatic lan­
guage. What is so bad about systematically experiencing uninstantiated properties? 
Should not this be regarded as a genuinely open possibility given the nonfactive 
nature of experience?
In addition, while we can make sense of the idea of there being proper­
ties that are in some way represented in our experience but never instan­
tiated in anything—e.g., the property of being a ghost—it is difficult, 
to say the least, to make sense of the idea that experienced color could
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be such a property. Granted that there are in fact no ghosts, we at least 
have some idea of what would count as someone vertically  perceiving 
an instantiation of the property of being a ghost. But if we ourselves 
do not count as vertically  perceiving the instantiation of redness-as- 
we-experience-it, I think we have no notion of what could count as 
vertically  perceiving this.S *8 (1994)
Contrary to Shoemaker, I think I can easily see what it would be for an experience 
of red to be veridical even if all such experiences were non-veridical and nothing in 
the actual world were capable of making them veridical: it would be for something 
one is looking at to be red (by "red" here I mean the same thing one means by 
"red" when one talks about "experiences of red"). For one to have a veridical color 
experience is for the state of affairs one experiences in this experience (or a state of 
the kind associated with this experience, for derivative states) to obtain.
The real opposition to projectivism about color stems from the observation that 
we don’t treat colors as mere projections in everyday life (Maund 1995; 2008). We 
routinely describe objects as colored. We order paint, clothes, and cars of particular 
colors, and we complain when we don’t get the requested colors. Everyone agrees 
that grass is green and snow is white. The claim that nothing is really colored seems 
to fly in the face of common sense.
But the claim that things are not really the way they look to us is also now a piece 
of common sense. Everyone with a college education knows that objects are made 
of tiny particle-like things zipping about at high velocity in a near vacuum. And if 
there are no homogeneously filled surfaces, there are obviously no homogeneously 
red objects. Since color always appears in (apparent) homogeneous surfaces or 
volumes, it seems to be part of common sense that objects are not colored the way
they look in experience. How are we to make sense of common sense?
SI can’t resist pointing out that Shoemaker’s choice of example is unfortunate: 1 only have the
vaguest idea what it would take for there to be a ghost. Are ghosts necessarily transparent? Can
there be ghosts which have never lived? Must ghosts be able to pass through walls? What is the
difference between a ghost and a resurrected person?
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It seems reasonable to suggest that color terms, like most terms of ordinary 
language, are used rather loosely in everyday life. Suppose you were to order a 
"blue" shirt from a store. If you were subsequently to accuse the storekeeper of 
not having sold you a shirt of the color you requested on the ground that nothing 
is really colored, and if she were sophisticated enough, she would say that every 
perceptible part of the shirt reflects the right wavelengths, and that this fulfills the 
order. Sometimes, we define or pick out colors in this way. But sometimes we 
don’t. If I say that I sawjp a blue dragon in my dream, I don’t mean to suggest that 
the dragon reflected or emitted any kind of light, caused any kind of experience in 
me, or that it was made of any particular kind of material. By "blue", I mean a 
monadic property which is frequently presented to me in perceptual experience— 
what Chalmers (2006) calls "Edenic blue". Sometimes "blue" means Edenic blue, 
and sometimes it means something along the lines of the property that normally 
causes experiences o f Edenic blue in this world.
There is a plausible explanation for why we are ambivalent like this. On the 
one hand, we have a strong tendency to recycle our words in the face of reference 
failure. Normally, when a term turns out not to refer on its usual understanding, 
we don’t introduce better terminology to replace it; instead, we quietly change our 
use of the term to accommodate reality. We start using the term in a way that will 
insure that it refers and will save the apparent truth of the most important claims we 
want to make using it. On the other hand, we systematically believe the contents of 
our perceptual experiences: the default downstream causal profile of a perceptual 
experience is that of a judgment. It takes some effort not to fall in for what our 
perceptual experiences seemingly reveal to us. The perceptual beliefs about Edenic 
colors which are constantly pushed on us by the flow of experience are inconsistent 
with the scientific world view. Since the scientific view is also deeply ingrained, we 
end up with inconsistent beliefs or a tendency to wobble between inconsistent sets of 
beliefs. The result is that we sit on the fence regarding the use of color terms. If the
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scientific view is right, our recycling policy recommends that we use them to refer 
to such properties as causing experiences of Edenic colors. If the phenomenal view 
is right, we can follow our initial inclination to use them to refer to the properties 
represented in color experience (Edenic colors). The dominant belief varies, and 
linguistic usage varies accordingly.
6.9 Summary
In this chapter I have tried to addressed a range of objections to propositionalism, 
one of the two central tenets of virtualism. There is a unifying thread in my re­
sponses to these objections: much of the initial plausibility of these objections has 
its origin in a conflation of the contents of the relevant experiences with other con­
tents, e.g. the contents of propositional attitudes, the contents of emotions, the con­
ventional meanings of public language expressions, or the informational contents 
of brain events. The objections tend to shed their plausibility once we focus on the 
contents which 1 claim satisfy virtualism. the proposition-like things we stand in 
the experiencing relation to, that is, the things we seep, hearp, feelp, etc. I tried to 
show that these contents mirror phenomenal character.
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Chapter 7
Disjunctivism and introspection
One of the main alternatives to a representational or virtual theory of experience 
is a disjunctive one. As noted in chapter 1, the core tenet of disjunctivism is that 
phenomenal states instantiated in veridical experience cannot be instantiated in non- 
veridical experience. The chief motivation for this claim is a kind of naive realism 
I dubbed factualism. According to factualists, the phenomenal states instantiated in 
veridical experience consist in standing in a factive relation to states of affairs.
The reason disjunctivists refer to factualism as "naive realism" is that they think 
it best captures the pre-theoretic conception of experience which is given to us 
through introspection. My aim in this chapter is to address this motivation for fac­
tualism. I will argue that the revelations of introspection militate for virtualism, not 
factualism. I will discuss other motivations for and against factualism (and disjunc­
tivism) in the next chapter.
While factualism appears to be at the heart of most positions which go by the 
name of "disjunctivism", two potential exceptions were identified in chapter 1: it is 
possible that Martin (2004; 2006) and Snowdon (1980; 2005) do not endorse dis­
junctivism but a potentially weaker claim to the effect that experiences occurring 
in veridical and non-veridical conditions never share a "fundamental kind". Unless 
sameness of phenomenal character implies sameness of fundamental kind, this posi-
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tion is compatible with virtualism. 1 set this interpretation aside because 1) it seems 
plausible that sameness of phenomenal character implies sameness of fundamental 
kind (whatever a fundamental kind is) and 2) my goal is to assess virtualism, not ev­
ery theory which might have been taken as an alternative to virtualism. Snowdon’s 
position might also not fall under the heading of the view I call "disjunctivism" if 
it is best characterized by the particularist thesis. Particularism is compatible with 
virtualism, so I will for the most part set it aside here. I will nevertheless address 
some of the evidence for it in the process of discussing the introspective motivation 
for factualism.
Factualists and virtualists agree that veridical experiences consist in standing in 
a relation to proposition-like things. Their disagreement lies in the fact that factu­
alists think the relevant relation is factive while virtualists think it is virtual (hence 
non-factive). This makes it natural to speak of both views as ascribing contents 
to veridical experiences: the contents of veridical experiences are the proposition­
like things we are related to in these experiences. That is how I will use the term 
"content" when talking about veridical experiences in this and the next chapter.
7.1 The introspective case for factualism
Fish (2009: ch. 1) offers one of the clearest statements of the introspective case for 
factualism. According to Fish, it is introspectively manifest that external objects 
and their properties "shape the contours" of the phenomenal characters of veridical 
experiences, and this means that these phenomenal characters are factive: they are 
states of standing in a factive relation to states of affairs. Martin (2004: 65; 2006: 
354) and Hellie (2007) also explicitly claim introspective support for factualism 
(though they refer to it as "naive realism").
Fish and Hellie both offer the same collection of introspective reports to show 
that introspection supports factualism:
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(7.1) Mature sensible experience (in general) presents itself as ... an immediate 
consciousness of the existence of things outside of us. (Strawson 1988: 97)
(7.2) The ripe tomato seems immediately present to me in experience. I am not in 
any way aware of any cognitive distance between me and the scene in front 
of me; ... The world is just there. (Levine 2006: 179)
(7.3) When someone has a fact made manifest to him, ... the obtaining of the fact 
is precisely not blankly external to his subjectivity. (McDowell 1982)
(7.4) In its purely phenomenological aspect seeing is ostensibly saltatory. It seems 
to leap the spatial gap between the percipient’s body and a remote region of 
space. Then, again, it is ostensibly prehensive of the surfaces of distant 
bodies as coloured and extended ... It is a natural, if paradoxical, way of 
speaking to say that seeing seems to “bring one into direct contact with 
remote objects” and to reveal their shapes and colours. (Broad 1952)
(7.5) Visual phenomenology makes it for a subject as if a scene is simply 
presented. Veridical perception, illusion, and hallucination seem to place 
objects and their features directly before the mind. (Sturgeon 2000: 9)
Fish also cites Campbell and Martin on how their experiences strike them in intro­
spection:
(7.6) The phenomenal character of your experience, as you look around the room, 
is constituted by the actual layout of the room itself: which particular objects 
are there, their intrinsic properties, such as color and shape, and how they are 
arranged in relation to one another and to you. (Campbell 2002: 116)
(7.7) Some of the objects of perception -  the concrete individuals, their properties, 
the events these partake in -  are constituents of the experience. No 
experience like this, no experience of fundamentally the same kind, could
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have occurred had no appropriate candidate for awareness existed. (Martin 
2004: 39)
While not all from salaried disjuactivists, the preceding quotes are a clear echo 
of d isjunctives’ motto. Disjunctivists claim that the relation between phenome­
nal states and external states of affairs introspectively seem—both to them and to 
laypersons— to involve a "direct" or "immediate" contact, or some kind of "consti­
tution", and that this observation militates strongly for factualism or disjunctivism.
7.2 The introspective case against factualism
Opponents of factualism are generally less explicit about the introspective support 
for their position. There is nevertheless an introspective case against factualism. 
My goal in this section is to expound this case. The argument ultimately rests 
on phenomenological premises, so I don't expect it to persuade any card-carrying 
factualist. This is not what 1 aim to do; for now, I only want to make a case against 
factualism which is apt to sway neutral parties. If I succeed at this, I will be in a 
position to deploy a more powerful argument against factualism in later sections.
To see how the phenomenological case against factualism goes, it is necessary 
first to be clear on what a virtualist can grant to the factualist regarding the deliver­
ances of introspection.
When I introspect, I find "an immediate consciousness of the existence of things 
outside of" me. If I am looking at a tomato, "the tomato seems immediately present 
to me in experience." "I am not in any way aware of any cognitive distance be­
tween me and the scene in front of me." The state of affairs I am experiencing is 
"precisely not blankly external to [my] subjectivity." It is for me "as if a scene is 
simply presented." The facts "leap the spatial gap" between me and the world, and 
I come in "direct contact" with them—they are "directly before the mind". It seems 
undeniable that the scene I am experiencing is a "constituent" of my experience.
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All of this is perfectly compatible with virtualism. My consciousness of external 
states of affairs is immediate as Strawson and Levine emphasize, but all this means 
is that I am not made conscious of external states of affairs through conscious in­
ference or through awareness of other things. I am phenomenally conscious of the 
external stale of affairs tout court, and without any conscious priming. The virtu- 
alist can also agree with Broad, McDowell, Sturgeon, Campbell and Martin that 
external states of affairs constitute or enter into our phenomenal states. Presumably, 
external states of affairs are states of affairs which involve properties of sorts only 
broadly-speaking material objects instantiate (e.g. shape properties). According to 
the virtualist, a phenomenal state consists in standing in a relation to a proposition, 
hence is constituted by a proposition. Since we count states of affairs as proposi­
tions, virtualism is compatible with the claim that phenomenal states are constituted 
by states of affairs, whether external or not. A virtualist can even agree that phe­
nomenal states are constituted by facts in veridical cases: when a phenomenal state 
is constituted by a state of affairs which obtains, it is constituted by a fact, because 
facts are just states of affairs which obtain. 1 This is why I introduced the label 
"factualism". It seems to me that the quotes from Strawson, Levine, McDowell, 
Broad and Sturgeon are representative of important tenets of naive realism—a view 
I hold—and not factualism, the stronger view which motivates disjunctivism.
One point factualists commonly make which I have not granted is that ordi­
nary objects enter into the natures of phenomenal states through the states of affairs 
we are related to in them (i.e. that particularism is true). I do not find this to be 
phenomenologically accurate. When I introspect my current computer monitor ex­
perience (in the everyday sense of "experience"), I do not find any trace of Eddy 
(my monitor). I cannot tell simply by scrutinizing my experience whether it is 
an experience of Eddy or an experience of Betty, a qualitatively indistinguishable
'This assumption has not gone unchallenged (see Mulligan 2008). There is no room to debate 
the nature of facts here. I will just say that if the virtues of factualism and disjunctivism turn on 
denying this, they have nothing to do with introspection.
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monitor which has been delivered for someone else at the same time as Eddy. On 
this ground, I conclude that my phenomenal state is not specifically "of" Eddy (or 
Betty), though of course my experience is an experience of Eddy in the everyday, 
"encounter" sense of "experience": my encounter is with Eddy. Introspectively, I 
find that my phenomenal state relates me to a generic state of affairs involving no 
particulars. My phenomenal state tells me about a particular— it tells me that there 
is a monitor-like thing in front of me— , but it tells me this only on an unspecific 
reading: it tells me that there is a monitor-like thing in front of me.
The problem with particularism is most obvious when we consider distant ob­
jects we know nearly nothing about. Imagine for example that you are looking at 
a star in the night sky. You then close your eyes, spin on yourself, open your eyes 
again, and locate a star. You could easily end up looking at a different star than you 
were earlier while having exactly the same experience (while instantiating exactly 
the same phenomenal state). If the stars themselves were essential constituents 
of the phenomenal states you instantiate, these states would be different and we 
should expect the difference to show in introspection, thereby giving you a clue as 
to whether you are looking at the same star or not. You don’t have a clue, so it seems 
that the stars you are looking at do not enter into the natures of your phenomenal 
states.
Of course, one can posit that there are phenomenal differences between experi­
ences that are not introspectible. Insofar as this claim is supposed to apply to the 
sorts of ordinary experiences from which we derive our concept of a phenomenal 
state, it seems to me to be in tension with the very idea of a phenomenal state, but 
there is a more basic problem here. The preceding cases show among other things 
that our naive introspective judgments about our own phenomenal states do not re­
flect the external objects causing these states: they are not judgments in which we 
ascribe ourselves relations to external objects or object-involving SOAs. We are 
asking whether factualists’ claim that naive introspection reveals phenomenal states
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to be constituted in part by external particulars can motivate their view. Since our 
Undings contradict factualists’ starting point (their claim about what naive intro­
spection reveals), they block cases of this kind for factualism. The postulate that 
experiences’ involvement of external objects is not introspectible can save the view 
that we experience objects or object-involving SOAs, but it cannot restore the claim 
that the correctness of this view is introspectively evident.
The intuition that ordinary objects enter into the natures of phenomenal states 
can to a large extent be explained away by two facts.
First there is the fact, mentioned in introduction (p. 4) and repeated many times 
since, that experiences in the everyday sense are encounters. They are events akin 
to bumping into a wall. On this conception of experiences, most are unquestionably 
object-involving. If phenomenal states were ihe states exemplified by experiences in 
this sense, most would be object-involving. But this conception of experiences and 
phenomenal states trivializes the claim that certain phenomenal states are object­
involving. It is not the conception which is relevant to this debate. I am talking about 
phenomenal states in a different sense introduced on page 4 (the felt components of 
sensory, emotional, and cognitive experiences in the everyday sense). I suspect that 
much of the appeal of particularism lies in the obviousness of a homonymous thesis 
about experience in the everyday sense.
A second factor is that perceptual experiences typically reveal enough infor­
mation about external objects to allow us to uniquely identify them. Visual experi­
ences, at least, generally present objects as existing at particular egocentric locations 
and belonging to certain general categories of object (e.g. material object, living 
creature, person). This information is generally sufficient to uniquely identify an 
object. Once one knows that an object of a certain general kind has been at a certain 
location at a certain time, one is normally in a position to refer to the object. That 
is so in virtue of the fact that (as a general rule at least) only one object of a kind 
can occupy any given location at a time. Empowered by the information provided
by perceptual experience, we systematically, seamlessly form thoughts with such 
contents as the object at position x is F. This transition from experiencing generic 
contents to forming definite thoughts about particulars is easily overlooked. One 
could easily come to be under the erroneous impression that perceptual contents 
themselves involve the equivalent of singular terms.
So I think there is good reason to deny that phenomenal states involve particu­
lars in any interesting sense, and also a plausible explanation of why this might have 
seemed to be the case. Having said this, the virtualist can agree with Campbell and 
Martin that "the concrete individuals, their properties, the events these partake in" 
are "constituents of the experience." It is not part of the virtualist or representation- 
alist position that the contents of experiences do not involve concrete individuals. 
It might seem that virtualism combined with the claim that individuals enter into 
the contents of experience would commit one to the view that there are non-existent 
individuals. But virtualism at most requires that SOAs can fail to obtain when we 
experience them. A singular SOA can fail to obtain while all the objects it involves 
exist: the properties predicated of the objects in the SOA can fail to be instantiated 
by the objects even if the objects exist. So virtualism does not imply that there 
are non-existent objects even on the assumption that all the SOAs we experience 
are singular. If a virtualist denies that experience has singular content, that is for 
reasons of phenomenologically accuracy. This is a matter that we can bracket for 
our purposes: if factualists are right about the singular character of the contents of 
experience, this is something virtualists can take on board.
The preceding remarks carry over to Fish’s (2009: 22) claim that the SOAs we 
are related to in experience involve particular property instances. According to Fish, 
one does not merely experience a blue ocean or the fact that the Pacific Ocean is 
blue, but the Pacific Ocean’s particular instance of blueness. Fish stipulates that 
by "the Pacific Ocean’s particular instance of blueness" he does not mean a trope.2
2See his footnote 26.
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It is not clear what he means in this ease, but I am reasonably confident that I 
don’t introspectively find the Pacific Ocean’s particular instance of blueness as a 
constituent of any phenomenal state: if I did, I would be able to distinguish cases 
where I am looking at the Pacific Ocean from cases where I am looking at Twin 
Pacific Ocean simply by scrutinizing the phenomenal character of my experiences, 
but I cannot. So I don’t think Fish’s claim is phenomenologically accurate. Again, 
virtualists could also probably grant the point without committing themselves to 
Meinongian property instances. Take for example a state of affairs P which involves 
both the Pacific Ocean’s instance of blueness and there being a golden mountain. 
Even if it is not possible to be related to the ocean’s blueness without its obtaining 
(on pain of Meinongianism), it is clearly possible to be related to P while there is 
no golden mountain. So we can be related to non-obtaining states of affairs even if 
we always experience particulars of the kind Fish describes as property instances, 
whatever these are.
My point so far is that much of what has been said in support of factualism and 
disjunctivism is compatible with virtualism. In particular, the familiar observation 
that experience is immediate and constituted by external states of affairs— naive 
realism as traditionally understood, I think— does not the least support factualism, 
because it is part and parcel of the broader virtualist view.
A comparison with the case of belief should help drive the point home. I believe 
that Bob the mailman will pass by this morning. We can think of my belief as 
the state of standing in a certain propositional attitude relation to a certain state of 
affairs S. My belief that S is the case is direct and immediate: it is not a belief I 
have merely in virtue of having other beliefs, and it is not (need not be, in any case) 
the product of a conscious inference. One could also say that an external fact is a 
constituent of my belief, because my belief is a relation to S, and S is an external 
fact (it is an external state of affairs which obtains, as it happens). We can even 
allow that an individual (Bob) is part of state S. All of this is certainly compatible
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with holding that the attitude relation which is constitutive of belief is virtual.
The preceding remarks are crucial to the virtualist’s case from introspection 
against factualism. The claim that the virtualist should make about introspection is 
that it does not present phenomenal states as having any property which is incom­
patible with their being instantiated independently o f how the world is— independently 
of the states of affairs presented in these experiences obtaining, at least. To use the 
language of factualists, introspection reveals an unmediated, constitutive openness 
of the mind toward external states of affairs, but (the virtualist should add) nothing 
more of interest. What introspection reveals is compatible with virtualism. This 
is momentous, because there is arguably nothing more to the essence of phenome­
nal states than what we can know about them through introspection. If there is no 
property which makes them factive and which we can know about through intro­
spection, then they are arguably not factive. I will call this the direct argument from  
introspection.
The direct argument from introspection
1. If all veridical phenomenal states essentially have property F, then that some 
have F should be apparent in introspection.
2. Veridical phenomenal states do not introspectively seem to be factive.
Therefore, veridical phenomenal states are not essentially factive.
Premise 1 seems highly plausible in light of how one comes to acquire the concept 
of a phenomenal state: one comes to acquire the concept of a phenomenal state by 
generalizing from examples of phenomenal states one can introspect. This leaves 
almost no room for veridical phenomenal states in general to essentially have prop­
erties which they cannot be seen to have in introspection. Premise 2 is justified in 
good part by the preceding discussion of what introspection reveals about phenom­
enal states. Introspection reveals relations to external states of affairs, perhaps even
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relations to particulars, but this is compatible with virtualism. What introspection 
would have to reveal to falsify premise 2 is the modal property of factivity itself, 
and I deny that it reveals this. Factualists will disagree, but I am not yet trying to 
persuade them. At this stage I am merely trying to articulate the case from intro­
spection for virtualism as it stands; we will see later how this case can be reinforced 
to yield a more persuasive argument.
My claim that there is nothing more to the essence of phenomenal states than 
what we can know about them through introspection could conceivably make a 
physical ist nervous: it looks like we would obtain a valid argument against physi- 
calism by replacing premise 2 in the argument above with the claim that phenomenal 
states do not introspectively seem to be physical. But a modern physicalist ought 
to say that this latter claim is not trivial at all: when you know that your experience 
has a certain phenomenal character, it could well be that you thereby know that it 
has a certain physical or functional property, albeit under a mode of presentation 
which makes this opaque to you. This is the standard response to Jackson's parallel 
knowledge argument, so there is no more threat to physicalism here than there is in 
Jackson’s claim that Mary does not know what it’s like to experience red while she 
remains in her black-and-white room however much she learns about the physics of 
color vision. That is not to say that the knowledge argument is not sound, but that 
my premises do not go beyond what physicalists are already prepared to accept, by 
and large.3
It is worth noting that it is possible to make the case against factualism without
3One might ask why factualists cannot apply the same strategy. How do you know, one might 
ask, that what seems to you like a virtual relation is not a factive relation under a different mode 
of presentation? First, virtuality and factivity are incompatible. It is much harder to see how the 
story would go in this case. Moreover, all physicalists should agree that the introduction of modes 
of presentation is a somewhat ad hoc device. It is to physicalism what disjunctivism is to factualism: 
an accepted price to pay to save the theory. While physicalists can afford an ad hoc response due to 
the powerful independent motivations there are for physicalism, the situation is rather different with 
factualism. The factualist’s position, if what 1 said about the revelations of introspection is correct, 
is something like that of a physicalist trying to turn Jackson's knowledge argument into an argument 
for physicalism. There is a tiny chance that we are being misled regarding the factive or nonfactive 
character of experience by the mode under which it is presented in introspection, but that is all there 
is in absence of independent evidence: a tiny, microscopic chance.
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appealing to the potentially controversial premise 1:
The probabilistic argument from introspection
1. If a state does not seem to have property F essentially when inspected as well 
as we can, then it very probably does not have F essentially.
2. Phenomenal states do not introspectively seem to be factive.
3. Introspection is the best method we have of inspecting phenomenal states.
Therefore, phenomenal states are very probably not factive.
The rationale behind the new premise 1 is that there are far more possibilities than 
there are necessities. For this reason, it would be irrational not to expect nearly all 
properties not to be essential of any given thing.
So far I have not talked about actual cases of illusion or hallucination. I merely 
said that the concept of experience as it is given to us in introspection leaves open 
this possibility of phenomenal states occurring independently of corresponding facts, 
and that this is good reason to think that the possibility is genuine. We must not for­
get that there is also a more conventional argument from actual cases of illusion 
and hallucination which hinges mostly on introspection. The argument boils down 
to a simple observation: some actual illusory and hallucinatory experiences intro­
spectively seem identical in phenomenal type to actual veridical experiences. If we 
are to believe introspection, we should conclude that they are in fact identical in 
phenomenal character, something that is ruled out by factualism.
Consider first the case of mirrors. While probably all mirrors have imperfec­
tions which result in overall visual experiences which are qualitatively different 
from veridical experiences in subtle ways, it seems likely that components of vi­
sual experiences caused by mirrors (an experience of a shape at a certain location, 
for example) are sometimes introspectively indistinguishable from actual veridical 
experiences. Experiences caused by mirrors generally represent objects as located
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at positions behind where the mirrors would appear if they were represented in the 
experience. Since there are generally no relevant objects at these locations, experi­
ences caused by mirrors are generally illusory. It also seems that they often match 
veridical experiences in phenomenal character as far as we can tell, so it seems that 
there are actual illusory experiences which introspectively appear to us exactly the 
same way as some actual veridical experiences introspectively appear to us. Alter­
natively, take the illusion of motion cinematography relies on. It is undeniable that 
displaced, discreet apparitions of a given shape at a sufficient speed can result in 
an experience which is introspectively identical to an experience of the same shape 
moving continuously along the same trajectory. The cinematographically induced 
experience is illusory because it presents continuous motion where there is none. 
If this case is unclear because it is unclear that experience presents motion, take 
instead this familiar illusion. All digital displays, including today’s computer mon­
itors, are made of pixel grids. There is always some separation between the pixels. 
But this separation is invisible from a normal viewing distance. The white back­
ground of my screen appears to be uniformly white, but it is not. We know that no 
object is densely filled (far from it), but my screen at least appears to have a level 
of uniform density real-world objects really have, but without having it. This is the 
second way that introspection speaks against factualism: veridical and non-veridical 
experiences can introspectively appear exactly the same way. Absent evidence to 
the contrary, we should believe what introspection tells us about our phenomenal 
states, so there is good reason to think that some phenomenal states can occur both 
in veridical and non-veridical conditions.
Let us take stock. Factualists claim that their view is supported by introspec­
tion, but this is also something that their opponents can plausibly claim. First, they 
can reasonably claim not to find in introspection any feature which would prevent 
phenomenal states from occurring independently of external facts. They can claim 
this without disagreeing with much of factualists’ alleged introspective findings. In
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particular, virtualists need not disagree with introspective reports to the effect that 
phenomenal states make us directly aware of external facts and are "constituted" by 
external facts, on a normal reading of these claims. Second, virtualists can plausi­
bly say on the basis of introspection that some experiences which are known to be 
non-veridical are phenomenally identical to experiences which are veridical.
7.3 How to settle the dispute
As I indicated earlier, I know what most factualists will think in response to my 
arguments from introspection: they will think that they introspect better than me. 
But 1 think I introspect better than them, and I am not the only one to say the kinds 
of thing I said above. How are we to get beyond foot stomping?
Fish (2009) and Hellie (2007) propose that we survey the opinions of those who 
introspect best— philosophers. The product of their survey is the list of reports I 
gave in section 7.1. We have seen that most of these reports (all except Martin’s) 
say nothing that is clearly incompatible with virtualism. This line of argument 
would be weak even if the reports supported factualism; as it is, I think we can 
set it aside. We can set aside surveys generally, because it is clear that the point 
of disagreement between factualists and virtualists is too subtle for most people to 
grasp on the spot. As Martin (2006) says, "when we come to state the differences 
between the two positions, we find ourselves talking in terms of notions of modality 
and constitution. One might be skeptical whether it could really be part of any 
common sense view that objects were or were not constituents of our experiences 
of them." As for the sophisticates who understand the distinction, there is little hope 
of eliciting theoretically unbiased judgments from them.
An oddity in the factualist position points to a means of resolving the debate. 
From the factualist point of view, introspection is highly misleading: factualists 
are committed to the claim that experiences appear factive whether we are per-
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ceiving veridically or not. They posit that introspection is misleading in making 
non-veridical experiences appear phenomenally identical to veridical experiences, 
but why not posit instead that introspection is misleading in making all experiences 
appear factive to factualists? Given that others report that their experiences do not 
introspectively seem to them to be factive, this seems like a perfectly reasonable 
hypothesis. Of course, a parallel point also applies to virtualists, to some extent: 
given our disagreement about the deliverances of introspection, neither factualists 
nor virtualists should be confident in their ability to introspect.
At this stage, we should accept that introspection in some sense reveals differ­
ent things to factualists and virtualists, and see if any position is more likely to be 
correct than the other despite this fact. We must stop taking our introspective judg­
ments at face value. Instead, we should ask which position best explains the fact 
that we make these judgments. I don't mean to suggest that introspection does not 
involve some kind of infallible awareness of our phenomenal states. I am neutral 
on this. Whatever the case may be, there is room for error between the inner act 
of introspection (if any) and the ensuing judgment. However introspection works, 
the fact is that the product of factualists’ apparently honest efforts at introspection 
is a judgment which is incompatible with their opponents’ own apparent findings. 
In this situation, we ought not to take our apparent introspective findings at face 
value anymore. Rather than try to justify our theories on the basis of our diverging 
introspective judgments, we should look to introspective judgments as mere facts to 
be explained.
I am in effect proposing that we take the perspective of a third party who is 
unable to make introspective judgments of her own. Such an individual would have 
no prima facie reason to favor the putative introspective findings of proponents of 
one theory over those of their opponents. All she could do is ask which theory is 
most likely to be true in light of the fact that the two camps make the judgments 
they make.
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The question, then, is which theory can best explain the apparent introspective 
findings of both factualists and virtualists, under all relevant conditions. The facts 
to be explained are:
A-virtuality When virtualists introspect in veridical conditions, they seem not to 
find factive states.4
A-factivity When factualists introspect in veridical conditions, they seem to find 
factive states.
Indistinguishability Everyone seems to introspectively find the same kind of state 
(factive or non-factive) in veridical and non-veridical conditions, and, for both 
virtualists and factualists, there are phenomenal states which introspectively 
seem the same in veridical and non-veridical conditions.
Since there are multiple competing theories of introspection and some of these the­
ories are probably not entirely neutral regarding the present debate, we should un­
derstand what it is for one to introspectively seem to find that something is the case 
or not in a maximally non-committal way. This should be taken to mean that one 
forms some awareness of a state of affairs by using the primary means one normally 
uses to ascertain one’s own mental states, in some broad sense of "awareness" which 
allows episodes of awareness which are not perception-like.
The probability calculus can help capture the dispute and the strategy I am 
proposing for resolving it. Let O be the totality of relevant introspective facts we 
can take for granted, i.e. the conjunction of A-virtuality, A-factivity, and Indistin­
guishability. Let V and L be the virtualist and factualist hypotheses, respectively. 
We can think of the probabilities of V and L independently of O as their prior prob­
abilities, noted P(V) and P(L). We want to know what probability we should assign 
to each hypothesis given O. Lor hypothesis V, this is noted P(VIO). What we want 
to know, more specifically, is the ratio of P(VIO) over P(LIO): since it is reasonable
4"A-" stands for "apparent".
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to assume that one of the two hypotheses is correct, we only want to know how 
much more (or less) plausible V is than F, given O. By Bayes’ rule,5 this ratio is 
equivalent to the following:
p (o \v )p {v )
P(0\F)P(F)
In the rest of this chapter, I will assess P(OIV) and P(OIF), that is, how well the 
virtualist and factualist hypotheses can explain the introspective data on hand. I will 
discuss P(V) and P(F) in the next chapter.
7.4 The virtualist’s explanation
Let us start with the virtualist’s explanation. Virtualists’ explanation of A-virtuality 
is that they introspect correctly. Given virtualism, correct introspection should not 
reveal phenomenal states as factive. No difficulty here.
The virtualist also has a simple explanation of A-factivity (factualists’ judg­
ments about their veridical experiences). The key to the explanation is that it is 
easy to overlook the possibility that experience relates us to non-obtaining states 
of affairs. The possibility of virtual relations to SOAs is an idea which takes some 
time getting used to, and there is some evidence that factualists either consider it 
incoherent or have overlooked it. Take for example Fish’s and Hellie’s appeal to the 
testimonials listed in section 7.1. The main claim the testifying philosophers make 
which might seem to bear on factualism is that phenomenal states are constituted by 
external states of affairs. Fish and Hellie seem to believe that this claim militates for 
factualism, but it does not: phenomenal states could be states of standing in a virtual 
relation to external states of affairs, and in this case they would be constituted by 
s Bayes’ rule:
nm=p_mm
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external states of affairs without requiring that these states of affairs obtain. It seems 
that Fish and Hellie overlook the very possibility of virtual relations. Martin (2004, 
2006) and Campbell (2002) provide another clue. They consistently describe the 
core tenet of their positions as the claim that experience is "relational", and they op­
pose this claim to representationalism. For example, Martin writes that "intentional 
theories of perception are committed to denying the relational nature of [veridical 1 
experience, even if they are inclined to describe experience as if it were relational." 
(2006: footnote 7) Virtualists don’t have to deny that experience is relational; there 
is no tension of the kind Martin implies within the representationalist view. Martin 
seems to neglect the possibility of virtual relations. In light of these observations, it 
does not seem far-fetched to suggest that factualists are subject to a subtle concep­
tual slip: they correctly observe that phenomenal states of the kinds which occur 
in veridical conditions are relations to and partly constituted by external states of 
affairs, and they wrongly infer from this that these states depend on external states 
of affairs obtaining because they neglect the possibility of virtual relations. Judging 
by what they say, in print and in conversation, what factualists see in introspection 
is what I granted above: perceptual experiences are constituted by external states of 
affairs, in that they are relations to external states of affairs. Because they neglect 
the possibility of virtual relations, factualists wrongly conclude that the veridical 
experiences we have, at least, require that the SOAs they relate us to obtain.
Of course, all of this depends on the cogency of the claim that one can stand in 
a relation to a state of affairs which does not obtain. One might doubt that this is 
possible. But it is part of the virtualist position I recommend that this is possible. 
The matter can be debated, but it is immaterial to the issue at hand. The question at 
hand is how likely A-factivity is on the assumption that virtualism is true (i.e. how 
high P(A-factivitylV) is). On the assumption that the kind of virtualism I recom­
mend is true, it is possible to stand in a relation to a state of affairs which does not 
obtain, and it is easy to see how factualists might have overlooked this fact.
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I said that what factualists see in introspection is merely that experiences are 
constituted in part by external states of affairs, a fact which is compatible with vir- 
tualism. But the virtualist can also allow that factualists in some sense "see" that 
experiences depend on external states of affairs when they introspect. The explana­
tion remains the same: all there really is to see is that experiences'are constituted by 
external states of affairs, but factualists’ spontaneous introspective judgments go a 
little bit beyond this because these judgments are based on a possibly unconscious, 
perhaps automatic inference based on the incorrect assumption that relational prop­
erties require that their relata obtain in order to be instantiated.
There is a supplementary explanation of A-factivity a virtualist can appeal to: 
factualists confuse what their perceptual experiences tell them with what introspec­
tion telis them about these experiences. Perceptual experience normally engenders 
belief or at least an inclination to believe. Typically, someone who experiences an 
F will at least be inclined to believe that there is an F. We saw roughly how this 
works in chapter 2. It might be difficult to tell perceptually induced judgments from 
the deliverances of introspection. You find yourself thinking that a certain state of 
affairs obtains (there is an F), and you simultaneously find yourself thinking that 
your experience consists in a relation to this state of affairs. It is not hard to see how 
you might wrongly conclude that your experience consists in a factive relation to a 
fact, or that you have introspectively seen this.
There is yet another consideration which helps explain A-factivity on the as­
sumption that virtualism is correct. I have repeatedly stressed that a sensory ex­
perience, in the everyday sense of "experience", is an encounter of a certain kind. 
Right now, I am experiencing a yellow post-it note on my computer, in the everyday 
sense of "experiencing". There is a perfectly intelligible sense in which no similar 
experiential event could have occurred had it not been for certain external, object­
involving facts obtaining. My experience, qua encounter with a post-it note on a 
monitor, is essentially a factive relation to the fact that this very post-it note is stuck
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on this very monitor (the relation of encountering a state of affairs is factive). If 
phenomenal states were the states instantiated in experiences in the everyday sense, 
factualism would be true. Now, most proponents of factualism use the word "ex­
perience" without defining it. This raises the possibility that factualists mistakenly 
extend a correct conclusion about experiences in the everyday sense to experiences 
in the technical sense. It could be that factualists introspectively find nonfactive 
experiences (technical sense) but do not recognize them as such because they are 
prone to think of them as experiences in the everyday sense.
Given the three preceding potential explanations— and that all three are mutu­
ally compatible— , a virtualist should not be surprised that some theorists end up 
saying the kinds of thing factualists say. The virtualist seems to have a good expla­
nation of A-factivity.
The virtualist’s explanation of Indistinguishability is a natural extension of her 
explanations of A-factivity and A-virtuality. According to virtualists, the same phe­
nomenal states are present in veridical and non-veridical experiences. Virtualists 
find the same virtual states because they introspect correctly in both cases. As for 
factualists, they find the same factive states because they commit the same errors in 
the non-veridical case as in the veridical case: they assume that there are no virtual 
relations, they conflate perceptual and introspective judgments, and/or they confiate 
the ordinary and technical notions of experience.
7.5 The factualist’s explanation
Like virtualists, factualists have a good explanation of their own apparent observa­
tions, at least on the face of it: given factualism, it would seem likely that some the­
orists introspect correctly and find veridical phenomenal states to be factive. How­
ever, factualists have a harder time than virtualists explaining Indistinguishability 
and their opponents’ apparent observations.
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The virtualist explanations of A-factivity have no counterpart on the factualist 
side for A-virtuality. Regarding the first explanation, virtualists appear to be making 
a distinction which factualists don't make (the distinction between factive and non- 
factive relations to states of affairs). Whether factualists make this distinction or not, 
they cannot explain virtualists’ putative error by saying that the latter are missing 
the distinction. It is also implausible that virtualists are making a distinction where 
there is none to be made. In general, it is much easier to overlook distinctions than to 
see distinctions where there are none to make. The second virtualist explanation of 
A-factivity also has no counterpart in the case of A-virtuality for factualists. In the 
case of veridical perception, a virtualist would normally agree that her experience is 
veridical. Yet she does not see her experience as factive. This cannot be explained 
by her conflating a perceptual judgment with an introspective judgment. The third 
possible explanation also has no counterpart. This is another case where virtualists 
make more distinctions— they distinguish between experiences in the everyday and 
technical senses while, the explanation posits, factualists fail to distinguish the two.
One explanation of A-virtuality a factualist can give is that it is the result of 
Indistinguishability (which would then have to be explained independently). One 
might say that the reason virtualists do not introspectively seem to find factive states 
is that their introspective judgments are influenced by their awareness of the fact that 
they cannot introspectively distinguish veridical from non-veridical states, knowl­
edge which leads them to infer that phenomenal states are not factive. But how 
would phenomenal states appear to one before one draws such a conclusion? The 
factualist cannot allow that they appear non-factive to virtualists prior to their rec­
ognizing Indistinguishability, because this is the fact about introspection which is 
supposed to be explained by our recognition of Indistinguishability. However, if 
our default introspective view of phenomenal states had it that all are factive, the 
rational conclusion to draw in light of the fact that we cannot distinguish factive 
phenomenal states from other states would be that we sometimes seem to introspect
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experiences when we don’t have any. This would be the only conclusion to draw 
because the default introspective view of experience is definitional of the nature of 
experience. If we had reached the virtualist point of view through an inference from 
Indistinguishability, we should at least have asked ourselves whether we should 
save Indistinguishability by endorsing virtualism or an error theory of introspec­
tion. I don’t recall myself asking such a question. On the face of it, all the factualist 
can say to explain A-virtuality is that virtualists fail to notice the factivity of experi­
ence despite of their best efforts; factualists have no explanation of exactly why this 
would be the case.
At first it might seem that the factualist can at least explain Indistinguishability. 
An obvious factualist explanation of Indistinguishability is that in both veridical 
and non-veridical cases the brain receives the same input (or a stimulus sufficiently 
far upstream). Since what one introspects is determined by the state of one’s brain, 
one ends up introspecting alike in both cases. Since the phenomenal states which 
can occur as part of veridical experiences depend on external states of affairs but 
introspective states do not, it is not surprising that one finds oneself unable to tell 
directly in introspection whether one is undergoing a veridical experience or not.
While this explanation of Indistinguishability seems cogent at first glance, prob­
lems arise once we ask what introspection could be on the factualist view. What, 
exactly, is involved in it introspectively seeming to someone that such and such is 
the case? It seems plausible how one’s mental states introspectively seem to oneself 
is either a matter of how one experiences one’s own mental states or a matter of 
how one judges (or is inclined to judge) one’s own mental states are. Either way, 
problems arise for the factualist explanation of Indistinguishability.
Suppose that introspective seemings are experiences. A factualist can say either 
that there are no non-veridical experiences at all, or that there are but that they token 
different phenomenal states than veridical experiences. The first option is ruled out 
if introspective seemings are experiences, because the data show that we sometimes
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introspect incorrectly. Indistinguishability and A-factivity, in particular, together 
entail that it sometimes introspectively seems to factualists that they instantiate fac- 
tive states when they do not. The second option leaves two broad possibilities open: 
either non-veridical experiences token states of standing in nonfactive relations to 
certain entities, or they token phenomenal states which do not have a relational char­
acter. Neither of these options is attractive from the factualist standpoint. The first, 
that non-veridical experiences are nonfactive relations, makes Indistinguishability 
highly mysterious. Why should we find the nonfactive relational states tokened in 
non-veridical perception indistinguishable from the factive states tokened in veridi­
cal perception? To explain this, factualists would at least have to give an account 
of how the nonfactive, non-veridical experiences we are capable of acquire their 
contents. Without an account of the contents of non-veridical experiences and how 
they come about, we have no reason to expect them to match veridical experiences 
in a way that would explain Indistinguishability. The situation is even worse if we 
posit that non-veridical experiences are not relational. Then it is entirely mysterious 
own introspective experiences could reveal anything about mental states.
Suppose now that how one’s mental states introspectively seem to one is a mat­
ter of how one judges or is inclined to judge one’s mental states are. Consider a case 
of known illusion. Say for example that you are looking at a stick half immersed in 
perfectly transparent, completely invisible water. Knowing that the stick is half im­
mersed in water, you recognize the illusion for what it is. Now imagine that a bent 
stick is held above the water. The stick is bent and displayed in such a way that it 
looks exactly like the straight stick. So you are having two indistinguishable experi­
ences, one of which is veridical and one of which is not. This would seem to be just 
the sort of case that one must explain to explain Indistinguishability. But if intro­
spection were a kind of judgment, we would expect it to be influenced by what ones 
believes. So we would expect your knowledge of the illusion to prevent you from 
judging that your experience caused by the first stick is an experience in which you
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stand in a factive relation to a bent stick. Provided that you are sufficiently aware of 
the illusion, you should not even be inclined to judge that the stick in water is bent. 
On the conception of introspection we are considering, it should not introspectively 
seem to you that you are (factually) related to a bent stick, as far as your illusory 
experience of the bottom stick goes. This contradicts Indistinguishability, which 
requires that we introspectively find the same kind of state whether in veridical or 
non-veridical conditions.
I have argued that a factualist explanation of Indistinguishability is elusive whether 
introspection is thought of as a kind of judgment or a kind of experience. There are 
of course multiple ways out of this conundrum. A factualist could say that acts of in­
trospection are cognitively insulated judgments, experiences which make exception 
to factualism, or sui generis mental events. The nature of introspection is obscure 
enough, there is plenty of wiggle room for factualists to escape the dilemma. Still,
I think we can say with some confidence that it is much less clear how to explain 
Indistinguishability on the factualist view than it is on the virtualist view. On the 
latter, any account of introspection or introspective seemings goes. On the former, a 
special conception of introspection and non-veridical experiences appears required, 
and it is far from clear at this stage whether a suitable account could be provided.
7.6 Summary
We have seen that both factualists and virtualists can claim some prima facie sup­
port from introspection for their views. Since both parties seem to introspect the 
best they can, I have suggested that we should not take their apparent introspective 
findings at face value. The only relevant findings that we are entitled to take for 
granted are A-virtuality, A-factivity, and Indistinguishability, which are facts about 
what we seem to find when we introspect. I have then argued that virtualism of­
fers a far more plausible explanation of these facts than factualism. Put in terms
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of the formalism introduced in section 7.3, I have argued that P(OIV) is far greater 
than P(OIF). If we were to give equal values to P(V) and P(F), the probabilities 
of virtualism and factualism independently of considerations having to do with the 
revelations of introspection, we would be in a position to conclude that virtualism is 
far more plausible than factualism. In the next chapter, I will argue that we should 
also assign a significantly greater credence to virtualism than to factualism indepen­
dently of the revelations of introspection.
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Chapter 8
Being in contact with the world
In the preceding chapter I argued that virtualism provides a better explanation of 
the facts about introspection everyone can agree on than factualism. It remains to 
see whether other considerations could sway the balance of evidence in favor of 
factualism.
Factualists often motivate their view by reference to its putative ability to secure 
a type of contact with the external world which representationalism does not al­
low (c.f. Campbell 2002; Child 1994b; 1994a: 145-9; Fish 2009: 23-4; McDowell 
1982; 1986; 1994; 1995; 2002; 2008). Two potentially independent lines of argu­
ment can be discerned within this theme. First there is the epistemological case for 
factualism, which appears to have originated with McDowell. The idea is roughly 
that factualism has the merit of blocking at least some arguments for skepticism 
about the external world. There is also a potentially distinct line of argument to the 
effect that factualism is the only position which can account for the fact that our 
experiences and beliefs are "about" the external world at all (also apparently due to 
McDowell). Both arguments will be discussed in this chapter. I will end by raising 
a problem of my own for factualists concerning our ability to enter in contact with 
the external world.
231
8.1 The epistemological argument
I will first follow McDowell’s exposition of the epistemological argument in his 
1995 article "Knowledge and the internal". Then I will look at an alternate formu­
lation due to William Fish (2009).
McDowell sets out the argument as a reductio ad absurdum: if certain assump­
tions are accepted, skepticism follows; since skepticism is false, one of these as­
sumptions must be rejected, and the best candidate is the assumption that "standings 
in the space of reasons" are internal. Rejecting this assumption supposedly leads to 
endorsing factualism (McDowell skips factualism and concludes to disjunctivism, 
but we will see that the argument implicitly goes through factualism). We will see 
shortly what McDowell might mean by "standings in the space of reasons". This 
expression is best taken as a placeholder to start.
McDowell begins by stating a point he apparently takes to be foundational:
I am going to work with an idea from Sellars, that knowledge-at least 
as enjoyed by rational animals-is a certain sort of standing in the space 
of reasons. (1995: 877)
He then states the view he aims to criticize:
My concern is a familiar philosophical dialectic, which I shall approach 
in terms of what happens to the Sellarsian idea when the image of stand­
ings in the space of reasons undergoes a certain deformation. [...] The 
deformation is an interiorization of the space of reasons, a withdrawal 
of it from the external world, (ibid.)
The view that is McDowell’s target is that standings in the space of reasons are in­
ternal. McDowell does not define "internal". I will articulate his argument formally 
before trying out various interpretations of its key terms.
According to McDowell, problems arise for the view that standings in the space 
of reasons are internal when we consider illusions and hallucinations:
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Consider the Argument from Illusion. Seeing, or perhaps having seen, 
that things are thus and so would be an epistemically satisfactory stand­
ing in the space of reasons. But when I see that things are thus and so, I 
take it that things are thus and so on the basis of having it look to me as 
if things are thus and so. And it can look to me as if things are thus and 
so when they are not: appearances do not give me the resources to en­
sure that I take things to be thus and so on the basis of appearances only 
when things are indeed thus and so. [...] So if I want to restrict myself 
to standings in the space of reasons whose flawlessness I can ensure 
without external help, I must go no further than taking it that it looks to 
me as if things are thus and so. One might hope that this inward retreat 
is only temporary. [...] The hope is that I might start from the fact that 
things look that way to me; add in anything else that the ground rules 
allow me to avail myself of, if it helps; and move from there, by my 
own unaided resources, without needing the world to do me any favors, 
to a satisfactory standing in the space of reasons with respect to the fact 
that the world is arranged the way it looks. [...] Anyone who knows 
the dreary history of epistemology knows that this hope is rather faint.
( 1995: 877- 8)
The argument McDowell opposes starts with the observation that internal standings 
in the space of reasons cannot be factive states such as knowings of external states 
of affairs. Since knowings are standings in the space of reasons, this forces us to 
conclude that knowledge of external facts is impossible (on the assumption that 
standings in the space of reasons are internal). The argument may be schematized 
as follows:
Argument S
1. States of knowing are standings in the space of reasons.
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2. Standings in the space of reasons are internal.
3. If standings in the space of reasons are internal, they do not entail external 
facts.
4. The state of knowing a fact entails this fact.
Therefore, knowledge of external facts is impossible.
To safeguard the possibility of knowledge of external facts, we must reject one of 
the premises of this valid argument. McDowell’s own view is that we should reject 
premise S2. It is the rejection of S2 which is supposed to motivate factualism and 
disjunctivism.
Given that premises S3 and S4 seem fairly secure, we can collapse them into 
one premise for simplicity. We can also rewrite McDowell’s argument as a straight 
inference rather than a reductio:
Argument N
1. States of knowing are standings in the space of reasons.
2. If standings in the space of reasons are internal, they are not states of knowing 
external facts.
3. Knowledge of external facts is possible.
Therefore, some standings in the space of reasons are not internal.
The argument is incomplete as it stands because it does not say anything about 
phenomenal consciousness (that is, it is incomplete qua argument for factualism). 
To take us to factualism or disjunctivism, the argument needs an additional premise 
to the effect that—as McDowell might put it—one’s standing in the space of reasons 
is internal to one’s subjectivity:
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|0 ]n e ’s epistemic standing on some question cannot intelligibly be con­
stituted, even in part, by matters blankly external to how it is with one 
subjectively. For how could such matters be other than beyond one’s 
ken? And how could matters beyond one’s ken make any difference 
to one’s epistemic standing? [..] the disjunctive conception of ap­
pearances shows a way to detach this ’internalist’ intuition from the 
requirement of non-question-begging demonstration. When someone 
has a fact made manifest to him, the obtaining of the fact contributes to 
his epistemic standing on the question. But the obtaining of the fact is 
precisely not blankly external to his subjectivity [..] (1982)
I take it that the subjectivity in question is phenomenal consciousness; otherwise, it 
is hard to see how we might eventually reach a conclusion which bears on factual- 
ism or disjunctivism. Plausibly, that standings in the space of reasons are internal to 
phenomenal consciousness would require at least that they supervene on phenome­
nal states (past, present, and future). If we add this claim as a premise we obtain an 
argument which takes us close to factualism:
Argument M
1. States of knowing are standings in the space of reasons.
2. If standings in the space of reasons are internal, they are not states of knowing 
external facts
3. Perceptual knowledge of external facts is possible.
4. Some standings in the space of reasons are not internal. (From 1-3)
5. Standings in the space of reasons supervene on phenomenal states.
6. If some standings in the space of reasons are not internal and standings in 
the space of reasons supervene on phenomenal states, then some phenomenal
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States are not internal.
Therefore, some phenomenal states are not internal.
So far, we have left the terms "internal" and "external" undefined. Independently 
of what these terms normally mean, we can stipulate that a state is external (i.e. 
not internal) just in case it is factive. Only this definition, or a stronger definition, 
yields a conclusion which bears on factualism. Read this way, the conclusion of 
argument M guarantees that at least some phenomenal states confirm factualism. It 
is only a matter of finessing to extend this argument to a large proportion of veridical 
phenomenal states, so we can grant that the conclusion warrants factualism.
A residual difficulty is that it is not clear what standings in the space of reasons 
are. McDowell does not really explain this expression. There is no explanation 
in his 1995 article, and all I could find elsewhere is a quote of this passage from 
Sellars’ Empiricism and the Philosophy o f Mind in Mind and World (p. xiv):
The essential point is that in characterizing an episode or a state as that 
of knowing, we are not giving an empirical description of that episode 
or state; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying 
and being able to justify what one says. (Sellars 1956/1997: 8)
This is the only place where Sellars uses this expression in EPM. Judging from 
this passage, having a standing in the space of reasons would seem to be a matter of 
being able to justify certain claims, but it is not clear whether Sellars (or McDowell) 
intends the specific manners in which one can justify a claim to be part of one’s 
standing in the space of reasons. Take for example the state of being able to justify 
the belief that P based on one’s knowledge that P is the case. Does this count as a 
standing in the space of reasons?
We can get around this terminological difficulty by assessing the argument on 
the two relevant kinds of reading of "standing in the space of reasons". Standings 
in the space of reasons can be such that all knowings are standings in the space
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of reasons, or they can be such that not all knowings are standings in the space of 
reasons. We can take the standings referred to by McDowell to be standings of 
either kind. However, the argument only has a chance on the first reading, because 
the second makes Ml trivially false, so we have to take McDowell to be using 
"standing in the space of reasons" in a sense in which all knowings are standings in 
the space of reasons.
The problem with the argument on this reading is that M5 seems highly dubi­
ous. If states of knowing external facts count as standings in the space of reasons, 
M5 entails that external knowledge supervenes on phenomenology, which is highly 
dubious. Take hallucinations. If there are phenomenally identical pairs of halluci­
nations and veridical experiences, then it is almost guaranteed that two individuals’ 
phenomenal profiles throughout their lives could be identical while one knows that 
P and one does not. Of course, disjunctivists such as McDowell deny that there 
are phenomenally identical pairs of hallucinations and veridical experiences. Still, 
the argument appears question begging on the present reading, because premise M5 
has no appeal independently of disjunctivism on this reading. M5 seems dubious 
even assuming factualism and disjunctivism. The reason is that we have a certain 
amount of freedom in forming beliefs based on experience. Someone who is more 
prudent than most might fail to form the belief that P (hence fail to know that P) 
where another who has the same phenomenal profile would believe and know that 
P.
Let us consider an alternative statement of the epistemological argument due to 
Fish (2009) (the quotes are from McDowell):
[Skepticism] gets a foothold only if we have to view perceptual expe­
rience in such a way that “even if we focus on the best possible case,
[a subject’s] experience could be just as it is, in all respects, even if 
there were no red cube in front of her’’. It is against the background of 
such a view of experience that the skeptic can make a compelling case
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that empirical knowledge is thereby shown to be impossible and hence 
that we do not and cannot have knowledge of the external world. ... it 
would constitute a response to the skeptic if we could show that we can 
“make sense of the idea of direct perceptual access to objective facts 
about the environment” (2009: 24)
As before, the motivation for factualism is that skepticism follows if factualism is 
rejected. Fish does not say exactly how the skeptical argument factualism addresses 
goes, but we can infer from what he says that the argument has the following top- 
level structure:
Argument S2
1. A subject’s experience could be just as it is, in all respects, even if the subject 
were suffering from massive hallucination.
2. If (1), then we cannot have empirical knowledge.
Therefore, we cannot have empirical knowledge.
So Fish's version of the epistemological argument for factualism, put in the form of 
a straight argument rather than a reductio, is:
Argument F
1. We can have empirical knowledge.
2. If (1), then a subject’s experience could not be just as it is, in all respects, if 
the subject were suffering from massive hallucination.
3. A subject’s experience could not be just as it is, in all respects, if the subject 
were suffering from massive hallucination, (from 1 & 2)
4. If (3), then factualism is true.
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Therefore, factualism is true.
Once the argument is put this way, it loses all intuitive appeal it might have had. For 
why accept premise F2? Premise F2 simply states that the possibility of empirical 
knowledge requires the truth of disjunctivism (or some variant of disjunctivism). 
Fish does not say why we should believe this claim, and it is far from prima facie 
plausible. Suppose for example that someone tells you that it is raining outdoors, 
and that you have every reason to believe them. As a result, you form the belief that 
it is raining outdoors. According to premise F2, you could not count as knowing 
that it is raining unless the phenomenal states which are veridical in this world were 
such that they could not possibly have been non-veridical. This seems prima facie 
implausible.
Fish's and McDowell’s cases suffer from parallel problems. The general form of 
argument is that skepticism threatens unless factualism is true. The key question is 
whether there really is a plausible argument for the conclusion that empirical knowl­
edge is impossible which one can avail oneself to on the assumption that disjunc- 
tivism is false. Otherwise, anti-skepticism does not stand to benefit from factualism 
or disjunctivism. McDowell and Fish have not provided or uncovered such an ar­
gument. On the reading of "standing in the space of reasons" which ties such states 
to phenomenology, the skeptical argument rebutted by McDowell (argument S) as­
sumes a relation between knowledge and phenomenology which is not acceptable 
under the supposition that disjunctivism is false (the relation captured by premise 
SI). Similarly, the second premise of the argument Fish responds to (argument S2) 
essentially states that the possibility of empirical knowledge implies disjunctivism, 
which is implausible on the assumption that disjunctivism is false. While disjunc­
tivism does undermine the skeptical arguments addressed by McDowell and Fish, 
so does anti-disjunctivism.
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8.2 The darkness-within objection
A common theme throughout McDowell’s and other disjunctives’ work is that 
mental states—experiences, in particular—can only have content if they are con­
stituted by these contents, in a way that makes them dependent on their contents 
obtaining. Otherwise, everything is dark inside. I will refer to this claim as the 
Extension Requirement. Sometimes McDowell puts the point as a rejection of "the 
dualism of conceptual schemes and content".
McDowell’s arguments for the Extension Requirement are well hidden. I have 
searched his entire body of work on perception and found only two points which 
look like reasons for endorsing this claim.
The first point occurs in the following passage, which follows McDowell’s in­
troduction of disjunctivism in his 1982 article. He refers to disjunctivism as "the 
innocent position":
We arrive at the fully Cartesian picture with the idea that there are 
no facts about the inner realm besides what is infallibly accessible to 
the newly recognized capacity to acquire knowledge [introspectively].
What figures in the innocent position I have just outlined as the differ­
ence between the two disjuncts cannot now be a difference between two 
ways things might be in the inner realm, with knowledge of which is the 
case available, if at all, only with the fallibility that attends our ability to 
achieve knowledge of the associated outer circumstance. Such differ­
ences must now be wholly located in the outer realm; they must reside 
in facts external to a state of affairs that is common to the two disjuncts 
and exhausts the relevant region of the inner realm. We cannot now see 
the inner and outer realms as interpenetrating; the correlate of this pic­
ture of our access to the inner is that subjectivity is confined to a tract of 
reality whose layout would be exactly as it is however things stood out-
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side it, and the common-sense notion of a vantage point on the external 
world is now fundamentally problematic. (McDowell 1982/1998: 241)
McDowell’s discussion of the Cartesian picture is tangential to his justification of 
the Extension Requirement, because his reasoning would apply to any view which 
has relevantly similar implications. The relevant implication of the Cartesian picture 
is that phenomenal states are independent of the external world. On this picture, 
they must be independent of the external world because we have infallible access 
to them but not to the external world. According to McDowell, this implies that 
phenomenal states (subjectivity) and the external world do not "interpenetrate", and 
this in turn means that phenomenal states lack content about the external world.
This reasoning is easier to follow if we "picture subjectivity as a region of real­
ity" (1982/1998: 240-1) as McDowell suggests we do. Think of phenomenal states 
as states in which we catch objects and states of affairs using a "phenomenal lasso". 
Phenomenal lassos are just like normal lassos, except that they are perfectly trans­
parent and constitute experiences. The content of your experience at a time is what 
you have caught in your phenomenal lasso at that time, and a phenomenal state is 
a state of having caught certain entities in one’s phenomenal lasso. On this picture, 
we can only sustain the view that phenomenal states are independent of the world 
by supposing that they are catchings of internal entities. I believe that McDowell 
endorses the Extension Requirement because he is thinking of phenomenal states 
along these lines.
But that is evidently not how experience works. Or so do virtualists claim. The 
factualist is not entitled to assume that anything like the lasso picture of experience 
is correct at the outset of an argument for factualism or disjunctivism, because that 
picture is flatly incompatible with the virtualist view of experience. McDowell’s 
argument presupposes an uncommon picture of experience which is only appealing 
from within the factualist doctrine.
The other defense of the Extension Requirement I have found is in McDowell’s
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1995:
If the space of reasons as we (ind it is withdrawn from the objective 
world as it makes itself manifest to us, then it becomes unintelligible 
how it can contain appearances, content-involving as they must be, ei­
ther. We are here in the vicinity of a third Sellarsian idea, that reality 
is prior, in the order of understanding, to appearance; I am drawing the 
moral that it makes no sense to suppose that a space sufficiently inte- 
riorized to be insulated from specific manifest facts might nevertheless 
contain appearances. (1995: 889)
McDowell appears to be referring to Sellars’ discussion of the "logic" of look state­
ments. Sellars does make a claim to the effect that "reality is prior, in the order of 
understanding, to appearance". However, factualism cannot be inferred from Sel­
lars’ position. Sellars’ point about appearances is summarized in this passage of 
EPM:
The point I wish to stress at this time, [...] , is that the concept of looking 
green, the ability to recognize that something looks green, presupposes 
the concept of being green, and that the latter concept involves the abil­
ity to tell what colors objects have by looking at them [...] (1956/1997:
43)
Sellars’ point, generalized, is that one cannot obtain the concept of something look­
ing F prior to having the concept of something being F. This is the trust of Sellars’ 
discussion of looks, which is primarily aimed at repudiating the logical atomist idea 
that concepts of external things can be reconstructed from concepts of observable 
facts which can be known with certainty. Factualism does not begin to follow from 
this. Virtualism, for example, analyzes experiences (appearances) as virtual rela­
tions to state of affairs such as something being an F (as opposed to looking F), 
and this very strongly suggests that reality is prior to appearance in the order of
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understanding, yet virtualism obviously does not entail factualism. In other words, 
virtualism agrees with Sellars but not factualism.
Bill Child (1994a) develops another argument which he claims to find in Mc­
Dowell (the "line of thought" referred to is McDowell’s Extension Requirement):
According to that line of thought, one cannot have thoughts about Fs 
unless: either one is (or has been) in direct cognitive contact with Fs; 
or one can construct a way of thinking of Fs from concepts of kinds of 
thing with which one is (or has been) in direct cognitive contact. Now 
on the non-disjunctive conception of experience we are not in direct 
cognitive contact with the world, since the most basic mental charac­
terization of experience is world-independent. But it is arguable that no 
concept constructed solely from world-independent contents can itself 
be a concept of an objective world independent of thought. (147)
The following passage sheds some light on the reasoning behind Child’s claim that 
we can be in "direct cognitive contact with the world" only if disjunctivism is true:
[...] to think of conscious experience as a highest common factor of 
vision and hallucination is to think of experiences as states of a type 
whose intrinsic mental features are world-independent; an intrinsic, or 
basic characterization of a state of awareness will make no reference to 
anything external to the subject. (146)
Child does not seem to have a particularly demanding understanding of "cognitive 
contact", but he seems to have a very demanding understanding of the requirements 
of the highest common factor view (of the denial of disjunctivism): according to 
him, this view does not allow that an "intrinsic" or "basic" characterization of a 
phenomenal state includes expressions which refer to external entities, e.g. terms 
like "square" or "red".
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Child’s assumptions about the implications of the highest common factor view 
seem implausible in light of an analogy with the case of belief. Almost everyone 
(disjunctivists included) agrees that beliefs satisfy a highest common factor view: 
true beliefs and false beliefs are exactly the same qua beliefs; truth and falsehood are 
contingent properties of beliefs. This does not incline us to say that intrinsic or basic 
characterizations of beliefs cannot involve terms which refer to external properties 
or states of affairs. Consider in particular two of the main contenders for a basic 
characterization of the nature of belief: wide functionalism and interpretationism. 
On either view, the most basic characterization of a belief state might well make 
reference to external properties and states of affairs. In the first case, it could make 
reference to external properties or states of affairs as part of the functional role of the 
belief. In the second case, it could turn out that the most basic characterization of a 
belief state is along the lines of being interpretcible as believing that P, and "P" could 
well be a sentence which involves such terms as "square" and "red" or picks out an 
external state of affairs. If the highest common factor view about belief allows 
terms which make reference to external properties as part of basic characterizations 
of beliefs, why not the highest common factor view about experience?
There are three main kinds of basic characterization of the nature of experience 
one might reasonably expect within the virtualist framework: narrow physicalist 
and functionalist accounts, wide physicalist and functionalist accounts, and dualist 
accounts. If dualism is true, "standing in R to 3xred(x)" (or "standing the experi­
encing relation to 3xred(x)") is the most basic characterization of an experience of 
red we can expect, and it makes reference to an external property. If wide physical- 
ism or functionalism is true, again, the most basic characterization of an experience 
of red may be expected to make reference to redness (as in the case of belief). It is 
only on a narrow physicalist or functionalist account that it seems unlikely that the 
most basic characterization of experiences of red would make reference to redness. 
Child’s line of reasoning at best yields an argument against narrow physicalism and
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functionalism, not an argument against the highest common factor view.
Campbell (2002) also puts forward a related argument. He is primarily arguing 
against representationalism, but he also presents the argument as a case for the Ex­
tension Requirement, because he assumes that the alternative to representationalism 
is a view whose central tenet is the Extension Requirement. The argument turns on 
an appeal to the explanatory role of experience:
Experience is what explains our grasp of the concepts of objects. But if 
you think of experience as intentional, as merely one among many ways 
of grasping thoughts, you cannot allow it this explanatory role. Suppose 
someone said: "Actually, reading newspapers is the fundamental way 
in which you understand the concepts of a mind-independent world.
All your conceptual skills depend on your ability to read newspapers."
The natural response to this would be that reading newspapers does 
indeed involve the exercise of conceptual skills, but it is simply one way 
among many of exercising those conceptual skills. Just so, if all there 
is to experience of objects is the grasping of demonstrative thoughts 
about them, then experience of objects is just one among many ways in 
which you can exercise your conceptual skills. At this point we do not 
have any way of explaining why there should be anything fundamental 
to our grasp of concepts about experience of objects. (122)
The argument seems to go something like this:
1. Experience is more basic than conceptual representation.
2. If representationalism is true, then experience is not more basic than concep­
tual representation.
Therefore, representationalism is false.
Premise 2 is false if virtualism counts as a kind of representationalism. Virtualism 
says nothing at all about the conceptual or non-conceptual status of experience, or
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its relation to propositional attitudes and concepts. It leaves it entirely open that 
all conceptual representations (on any reasonable understanding of this expression) 
derive from and depend on relation R in some way or other (hence that experience 
is more basic than conceptual representation). If conceptual representation is the 
kind of thing that is going on in propositional attitudes, this is essentially the view I 
gestured toward in sections 2.4 and 6.5. I would be very surprised if this view were 
inconsistent with virtualism.
Campbell’s general approach to these matters in Reference and Consciousness is 
somewhat puzzling. He begins by arguing that conscious attention provides "knowl­
edge of reference of demonstratives". The latter notion is explained as follows:
Knowledge of reference of the demonstrative is what causes and justi­
fies the use of particular procedures to verify and find the implications 
of propositions containing the demonstrative. (25)
The "explanatory role of experience" Campbell refers to in the first quote above 
when he objects to representationalism seems to be the role of conscious atten­
tion in providing knowledge of reference of demonstratives. Campbell’s main point 
against representationalism is that only the sort of factualist view of experience he 
recommends can account for the explanatory role of experience. But the explana­
tion of knowledge of reference in terms of conscious attention Campbell himself 
provides at the beginning of the book does not seem to depend on the factualist 
view. His explanation is that conscious attention directs sub-personal processes to 
construct representations of objects at particular perceived locations:
To sum up: if you are to act intentionally on an object, you must con­
sciously attend to it, in the common-sense use of the term; but that act 
of attention must also cause the selection of suitable information for 
processing, and suitable processes to operate on it, if the information­
processing of which you are capable really is to be harnessed to your 
objectives. (27)
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On the face of it, a virtualist could account for the role of conscious attention in just 
the same way as Campbell. 1
8.3 The curse of the senses
According to factualists, the phenomenal states which are tokened in veridical ex­
perience are states of acquaintance with facts. One problem with this view is that, 
for most phenomenal states, there does not seem to be actually obtaining states of 
affairs which can account for their phenomenology.
Let us begin visual phenomenal states. As a general rule, in vision we experi­
ence the world as composed of densely filled objects. By "densely filled", I mean 
that the objects we experience seem to occupy all the space they span. But according 
to current scientific theory, there are no densely filled medium-sized objects. Rather, 
there are clouds of high velocity particle-like things whose interactions produce an 
illusion of densely filled objects. That is not to say that there are no medium-sized 
objects such as chairs and tables, but that if there are, they are not at all the way 
they appear to us in experience: they are something like four-dimensional clouds of 
particles. It seems obvious that the states of affairs we experience have no match in 
this picture of the world. It seems prima facie implausible to say that an experience 
of a red ball is a relation to a cloud of particles reflecting such and such electromag­
netic wavelengths. One could say that this is what it is in spite of appearances— that 
the "mode of presentation" of experiences makes the identity opaque to us, but why 
should we believe this given the availability of the virtualist position? There is a 
strong prima facie case from science that visual experience is always illusory with 
respect to colors and shapes, so far as colors and shapes are supposed to be what 
we are related to in color and shape experiences.2 Since all visual experiences have
'l think that is also true of Brewer’s (1999) account of demonstrative reference, but I don’t have 
space to engage with Brewer’s reasoning here.
2The qualification that colors should be understood as the properties we experience in color 
experience is important. There are accounts of color which are plainly compatible with the scientific
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colors and shapes as part of their contents, this means that all visual experiences are 
partially illusory. The same goes for other modalities: experiences of sounds are 
not relations to vibrations in a medium, taste experiences are not relations to chem­
ical compounds, bodily experiences are not relations to any kind of physiological 
activity, and so on.
The moral we should draw from this depends on whether we read factualism 
as a claim about all possible veridical experiences or a claim about actual veridical 
experiences only.
Weak factualism The phenomenal states which actually are tokened in veridical 
perception are states of standing in a factive relation to external states of af­
fairs.
Strong factualism The phenomenal states which can be tokened in veridical per­
ception are states of standing in a factive relation to external states of affairs.
So far, I have been assuming the strong reading because I take factualists to be 
making a claim about the nature of experience generally, but the scientific picture 
of the world could conceivably lead one to fall back on the weak reading.
Call WF- the view that weak factualism is true but strong factualism is not. 
If WF- is correct, there are uninstantiated phenomenal states which could be both 
veridical and non-veridical (in different circumstances), yet the phenomenal states 
which are tokened in veridical perception in the actual world are necessarily veridi­
cal. One major oddity with WF- is that its truth seems to be up to us. Suppose that 
it has so far been confirmed by all actual phenomenal states. Presumably, some of
picture. For example, there is the view that colors are reflectance properties. It might be that this 
is what colors are in the everyday sense of "color". Personally, I find the everyday concept too 
muddled to lend itself to any clear analysis, as I explained in section 6.8. But we can set this 
aside. The point is only that no instantiated properties are plausible candidates for the properties 
which are characteristic of the SOAs we are related to in "color experience". If we call "colors" the 
properties which are characteristic of the SOAs we are related to in color experience, then colors are 
plausibly not instantiated. Whether these properties are what we mean in everyday life by "colors" 
is immaterial to the issue at hand.
Chalmers (2006) pursues the implications of the scientific view of the world at much greater length 
than I can afford to here.
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the contingently possible phenomenal states which contradict strong factualism are 
states we could in practice bring about (thereby falsifying weak factualism). So it 
seems to be up to us whether WF- will continue to be confirmed. The position is 
literally unstable. Independently of this, if the actual veridical phenomenal states 
are factive, we should expect that this is a feature of the general kind of phenomenal 
state they fall under (a kind of state which has many uninstantiated instances). We 
should expect factualism to be true on the strong reading if it is true on the weak 
reading.
Factualists also seem committed to the stronger reading by their argument from 
introspection (without which the view would lose much of its appeal). According 
to factualists, naive introspection presents us with factive states and nothing else. 
Factualists are right to insist that this putative datum militates for their view (what 
I denied earlier is that it is a datum). We all agree that introspection yields judg­
ments of the form /  am in state S, and that phenomenal states are states of the kind 
exemplified by the states we self-ascribe in this way. If all the relevant states we 
self-ascribe in this way were factive as factualists claim, phenomenal states would 
be by nature factive, because we are not allowed to subtract from the concept of 
a phenomenal state we get through introspection. So I can see how introspection 
could be taken to support factualism, but only if it supports it on the strong reading.
These considerations speak for discarding WF-. But if a factualist is committed 
to the strong view, then she is committed to rather surprising consequences on the 
scientific picture of the world. For notice that the strong view directly implies the 
incorrigibility o f error.
The incorrigibility of error If a phenomenal state is tokened in non-veridical con­
ditions, it could not possibly be tokened in veridical conditions.
If (strong) factualism is correct and we are to take scientists’ claims about the basic 
constitution of the world at face value, we should conclude not only that perceptual 
experience is misleading, but that our perceptual experiences could not even have
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been veridical. Not only are we unlucky enough to be in a deceptive universe, but 
our minds are essentially deceptive.
The principal problem with the incorrigibility of error is that it flies in the face 
of what just about every single human being believes. All human beings take a ma­
jority of their visual experiences to be veridical. Well educated people know, in the 
back of their minds, that nothing is really (Edenically) colored or densely filled, but 
they nevertheless systematically believe their senses in everyday life. This strongly 
suggests that the idea that our visual experiences are veridical is fully coherent. In 
absence of evidence to the contrary, at least, there is every reason to think that our 
visual experiences could have been fully veridical. If they are also in fact massively 
illusory (as science shows), it follows that strong factualism is false.
There are other ways of supporting this line of argument than by appealing to 
the scientific image of the world. Consider blur, perspective, and gestalt effects. In 
chapter 6 ,1 argued that variations in blur, perspective, and gestalt effects correspond 
to systematic differences in the contents of experiences. But I didn’t argue that the 
contents of the relevant experiences are veridical in every respect, and it seems 
prima facie plausible that we need to posit contents which are not veridical in order 
to account for these phenomena. The tentative accounts of the contents of b-states 
and grouping experiences I offered indeed make their contents non-veridical. On 
the face of it, there are not enough relevant properties instantiated in the actual 
world to account for these kinds of perceptual variation. If blurry, perspectival, 
and gestalt experiences are relations to states of affairs, they are relations to non­
obtaining states of affairs. This is a major problem for strong factualism given 
that one’s total visual experience at a time always reflects the effects of some blur 
and some perspective: one’s total experience is always necessarily non-veridical. 
Consider also the case of bodily experiences and emotional feelings. It is very 
hard to see what obtaining states of affairs these could relate us to. They seem to 
be necessarily non-veridical on the factualist view. The same is true of sensory
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imagery. It seems undeniable that imagistic experiences are generally not relations 
to obtaining states of affairs, because we generate them at will independently of 
how the world is. They are essentially non-veridical if factualism is correct.
8.4 Summary
In chapter 7, I argued that virtualism is better supported by introspection than fac­
tualism. Virtualism is simpler and more elegant than disjunctivism, so this already 
makes a good case for the view. In this chapter I have discussed the two main ar­
guments for factualism which are (mostly) independent of introspection and found 
them wanting. I have also argued that this view does not square well with the 
scientific image of the world and other considerations which show that perceptual 
experience is pervaded with illusion.
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Nomenclature
Named propositions
Disjunctivism The phenomenal states instantiated in veridical experience cannot 
be instantiated in non-veridical experience, (p. 49)
Factualism The phenomenal states instantiated in veridical perceptual experience 
are states of standing in a factive relation to states of affairs, (p. 43)
Impure virtualism (IV) For any manner of representation M, there is a relation R 
such that: 1) For any basic phenomenal state s which has M there is some 
proposition P such that s = standing in R to P; 2) R is virtual with respect to 
basic phenomenal states, (p. 145)
IV- Impure virtualism is true, but pure virtualism is false, (p. 145)
Objectivism The phenomenal states instantiated in non-hallucinatory perceptual 
experience are states of standing in an acquaintance relation to ordinary ob­
jects. (p. 44)
Particularism The phenomenal states instantiated in non-hallucinatory perceptual 
experience are states of standing in a relation to states of affairs involving 
ordinary objects, (p. 44)
PCSE+ For every basic sensory phenomenal state e in modality (j), there is a phe­
nomenal B-perceiving i in modality 0 such that e = i. (p. 112)
253
Perceptual conception of sensory experience, the (PCSE) For every sensory phe­
nomenal state e in modality 0, there is a phenomenal perceiving i in modality 
0 such that e = i. (p. 105)
Sensory virtualism (SV) For any sensory modality M, there is a relation R such 
that: 1) For any basic phenomenal state s in M, there is some proposition P 
such that s = standing in R to P; 2) R is virtual with respect to basic phenom­
enal states, (p. 40)
(Pure) virtualism There is a relation R such that: 1) For any basic phenomenal 
state .v, there is a proposition P such that s = standing in R to P; 2) R is virtual 
with respect to basic phenomenal states, (p. 37)
(Pure) virtualism+ (Pure) virtualism is true, and relation R is the experiencing 
relation, (p. 143)
Weak virtualism (WV) For every basic phenomenal state .v, there is a virtual rela­
tion R and a proposition P such that: 1) = standing in R to P; 2) R is virtual 
with respect to basic phenomenal states, (p. 41)
Terms
B-perceiving A state which can be denoted by a predicate of the form "0 S", where 
0 is a perceptual verb and S is either a bare infinitive clause, a participial 
clause, or a small clause which complements the verb. (p. I l l )
Basic phenomenal state A phenomenal state which is not derivative, (p. 36)
Cognitive experience An experience of a kind not normally associated with an 
emotion or a sensory process, (p. 3)
D-perceiving A state which can be denoted by a predicate of the form "0 S", 
where 0 is a perceptual verb and S complements the verb, which is not a
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B-perceiving. (p. I l l )
Derivative phenomenal state A state which consists in being in one of a given set 
of phenomenal states distinct from itself, (p. 36)
Experience (technical sense) An event which consists in instantiating a phenom­
enal state, (p. 6)
Experiencing relation, the The introspectively salient relation which is at least 
partly constitutive of seeingp, hearingp, smellingp, feelingp, etc. (p. 142)
Intensional perceiving A state ascribable using a locution of the form "a  0-s S", 
where 0 is a perceptual verb used intensionally and S complements 0. (p. 94)
Intensional reading Intensional reading A reading of an expression of the form "a  
0-s S", where 0 is a verb and S complements 0, is intensional just in case it 
is not material, (p. 92)
Material reading A reading of an expression of the form "a 0-s S", where 0 is a 
verb and S complements 0, is material just in case its assigns the expression 
a logical form in which the argument of 0 specified by S is or involves a 
variable bound by a quantifier located outside the arguments of 0. (p. 92)
Phenomenal character See phenomenal state. The phenomenal character of an 
experience is the phenomenal state it is an instantiation of. (p. 6)
Phenomenal perceiving A state ascribed by a pure phenomenal ascription, (p. 
105)
Phenomenal property See phenomenal state.
Phenomenal state A state of the kind best exemplified by the states a) instantiated 
by individuals in sensory, emotional, and cognitive experiences b) individu­
ated by the felt components they confer to such experiences, [everyday sense 
of "experience"] (p. 4)
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Pure phenomenal ascription A perceptual ascription of the form "NP (f) S" in 
which the predicate "(f) S" denotes the state denoted by "0-ly experiencing) 
S". (in the technical sense of "experiencing"), (p. 105)
Virtual A relation R is virtual with respect to a set S of its state instances iff there 
is a state s in S which is a state of standing in R to some x and which is such 
that it is metaphysically possible for 5 to obtain whether a obtains or not. (p. 
35)
Subscripts
i e.g. seeing). Intensional use of a perceptual verb. (p. 94) 
m e.g. seeingm. Material use of a perceptual verb. (p. 94) 
p e.g. seeingp. Phenomenal use of a perceptual verb. (p. 99) 
c e.g. seeing_c. Non-phenomenal use of a perceptual verb. (p. 103) 
int e.g. modalityint, visualjnt. Internal-organ modality, (p. 157) 
phe e.g. modalityphe, visualphe. Phenomenal modality, (p. 157) 
rep e.g. modalityrep, visualrep. Representational modality, (p. 157) 
sti e.g. modalityst), visualst). Stimulus modality, (p. 157)
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